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3ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to provide the interested reader with a critical account of 
far-reaching changes in modem Arabic literary theory, approximately since the 
1970s, in the light of an ascending paradigm in motion, and of the tendency by 
subsequent critics and commentators to view litefary criticism in terms of a self- 
elaborating category morphing into cultural critique.
The first part focuses on interdisciplinary problems confronting Arab 
critics in their attempt “to modernize but not to westernize”, and also provides a 
comparative treatment of the terms, concepts and definitions used in the context of 
an ever-growing Arabic literary canon, along with consideration of how these 
relate to European modernist thought and of the controversies surrounding them 
among Arab critics. The second part explores some distinguishable morphological 
markers whose deployment involves a more or less radical distinction between, on 
the one hand, renovationist assumptions of cultural change as an uninterrupted 
process of historical continuity, and, on the other, innovationist assumptions based 
on discontinuity.
The first of these modernizing models, involving revivalist ideas from the 
age of al-Nahdah, laid the foundation for a double dependency: on the past, 
serving to compensate, through remembering and reviving, for lack of creativity; 
and on the European-American West, serving to compensate, through intellectual 
and technical adaptation and borrowing, for the failure to invent and innovate.
However, it is the second, counter-revivalist model that has assumed pride 
of place through the work of various poets, theorists and critics considered here. 
By the end of the eighties a self-generating, self-referential modernist theory had 
become the dominant critique.
The third part proffers the case for a new paradigm. Drawing on the 
arguments and views of numerous scholars, the emphasis here is that “difference” 
establishes a distinctive mode of autonomy vis-a-vis Western Eurocentric theory.
4A criticism that is not a criticism of criticism cannot be taken 
seriously.
Adunls
(Kalam al-bidaydt (“Textual Beginnings”), Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 
1989, p. 210)
By the late twentieth century, modernity lost much of its 
Europeanness, not least because it has become necessary to speak 
of modernities rather than any one particular mode of modernity.
Gerald Delanty
(Modernity and Postmodernity, London: Sage Publications, 2000, 
p. 154)
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9Notes on Methodology and Terminology
1. The present inquiry, carried out in the spirit of a root and branch 
critique and its implicit terms of reference, is not so much a history of 
modem Arabic literary theory as a critical essay in interpretation. The 
presentation of its material, and the case derived from it, comprise an 
attempt to provide a self-explanatory example of the mind and 
thinking of a cluster of writers and critics who have exhibited a new 
slant on modern theory in its capacity as cultural critique. Rather than 
compress such an unwieldy subject into a bare outline of trends and 
movements, I have sought to examine and shed light on arguments 
embedding an emergent concept of modernism that possesses both 
generic and historically specific existence, displaying as it does a 
dynamic “innovative” state of mind; one informed by a variety of 
timeframes whereby the past can no longer be conceived in its own 
terms, but rather in terms of the predominance of the present.
2. The interpretation offered here is proposed -  to use al-Tawhldi’s 
vibrant expression — as kalarn ‘aid kalam, that is, discourse about 
discourse, theory about theory. Central to this perspective is a 
recognition that reality is mediated through language and is therefore 
discursive. Such a problematized area of inquiry takes, moreover, a 
further tack: one that both initiates the exercise and provides it with its 
tacit assumptions. It is precisely in this sense that adab, an extra- 
literary category, informs a possible theory of “innovation” as distinct 
from “renovation” modernism. This issue is the focus of the present 
inquiry, in conjunction with the all-embracing notion of 
interdisciplinarity. Indeed, cultural identity, which permeates the 
problematic of modernity, can only be understood in terms of
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interdisciplinarity, this latter being a shorthand means of relocating 
identity by setting it within the larger context of theory. As such, 
cultural theory is relational and incomplete; not grounded in some 
essentialized past but rather permanently constructed and 
reconstructed within the paradigm of the present.
3. What characterizes a theory of “criticism of criticism” is the ubiquity 
of an all-encompassing critical activity that seeks to examine the act 
of writing itself, so subsuming not literary criticism and theory alone, 
but also genre-making processes (as revealed by viewing the various 
forms of writing in general and of fiction and poetry in particular) 
viewed as reflexive performances of critique in their own right. Such a 
critique will seek to conduct a sustained interrogation of established 
conventions and canons, placing them beneath the rubric of “secular 
engagement”: a theoretical space permitting a cogent and unrestricted 
examination of theory, literary criticism and literature.
4. The constituents of theoiy, questioned here from within a paradigm in 
motion that is ready and waiting to emerge, do not proceed as a 
succession of discrete components but rather overlap and blur into one 
another; and, as such, the limits of the modernist period under 
examination are extremely difficult to determine and isolate. From the 
narrowest viewpoint, however, the 1970s may be taken as a roughly 
defined starting point; and, within this context, the present study 
follows specific directions taken since the appearance of Adunls’s 
iconoclastic inquiry into the statics and dynamics of Arabic culture, 
on the part of critics and commentators who have begun to view 
literary criticism in the light of a new paradigmatic category
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morphing, persistently, into an accomplished mode of cultural 
critique.
5. While this study is informed by Arabic and Western critical concepts 
and approaches, the emphasis is on the texts placed under scrutiny, 
these latter giving rise to a compendium of context-sensitive concepts, 
analytic insights and strategies that work, collectively, to supply the 
critical tools for use in interpretation. Only the negational terminology 
central to a sustained interrogation of the basic assumptions of 
modernism, comprising such notions as de-definition, refutation, 
abrogation and the rejection of closure and finality, can have the 
power to turn inward to examine theory’s own dynamism, and so 
provide a viable instrument for reconstructing theory in the mode of 
oppositional criticism: a critiquing exercise in crisis diagnosis rather 
than a mere presentation of meanings in temporal sequences of events.
6. Set against the backdrop of a premised shift from the oppressive 
literalness of “trendism” (which is a corollary of the relentless 
ephemerality of fashion) to “innovative” modernism, the mode of 
representation here designates not a model for the relationship of a 
copy to a pre-existent Western origin (which is merely a symptom of 
the malfunctioning of a manipulable/manipulative system of global 
commodification and commodity fetishism), but, rather, a model 
embodying a negative reaction against literalism as a term opposed to 
innovationism and governed by the notion of emulation, with all the 
latter’s pejorative connotations. As an interpretation of innovation 
modernism, then, this model is designed to aid an understanding of 
literary theory through replacement of its terms and axioms by more 
efficacious and perspicuous ones.
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7. Like other problematic concepts, the pre-terminological concepts 
employed in the course of the present model-building are absolute 
until shaped by their contexts. And, like the tendencies suggested by 
these contexts, the premises they are designed to support work 
themselves as they proceed. As such, the pre-terminological concepts 
in question pervade a mode of becoming rather than a mode of being; 
pervade, that is, a problematic whose network of issues is held 
together by the central theme of “innovative” as distinct from 
“renovative” modernism. These issues are unsolved problems which 
maintain an open connotative flow and keep the debate moving.
8. The treatment of theory in this work is nominalistic. I have attempted 
to examine critically each writer’s sense of theory and to respect 
writers’ differences and similarities. Nevertheless, the texts under 
consideration operate collectively, and seek to contribute to the 
creation of an integrative nexus of concepts opening out one upon 
another.
9. Unless otherwise indicated, translations from Arabic in the text are 
my own.
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PART ONE:
Literary Theory as a Model: 
A Structural Configuration
14
I. Modern Arabic Literary Theory: The Matrix Concept
What follows is a study of modernism viewed as a model-building project 
within the context of Arabic literary theory, and proposing a testable 
hypothesis whose critical assumptions re-emphasize, through the logic of 
sustained exposition, the meaning and function of a cultural phenomenon 
working its way out into actuality. The matrix concept that organizes this 
trans-literary phenomenon, encompassing an array of interreferential, 
even interconnected theoretical orientations,1 is set against the backdrop 
of a premised shift from renovative to innovative modernism; and it 
possesses a kind of entropy quality, proposing as it does a strictly 
tentative transition from theoretical randomness to cultural system.
In the context of this framework, what lies within the range of the 
phenomenon will eventually be tackled by posing certain theoretically 
relevant questions, thereby providing the effective means for refitting and 
reworking a cluster of interpretive procedures, heuristic devices and 
conceptual frames of reference. By virtue of this, a multiplicity of 
disputatious definitions of modernism, enclosed within their own self- 
appointed limits, and stemming from literary theory’s complementary 
rather than contradictory narratives, can then be combined to form a 
single articulated definition standing in metonymic relationship to a 
paradigmatic theory of change.
From this position on, the notion of complementarity takes on a 
discursive2 identity and initiates a process of articulating this complex, 
all-embracing definition, determining levels of inclusion and exclusion. 
The specificity of the notion of complementarity is inseparable from its 
articulation. Thus, rather than viewing modernism from the locus of an 
accomplished category, one may attempt to think it through, on the 
paradigmatic level, as an investigatory work model proposing various
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definitions all o f  which possess a critical core: a model designed to 
produce a problematized representation o f  modern Arabic literary 
theory. This will not necessarily represent a fully accomplished project. It 
will, however, “provide devices which will simplify and aid 
understanding of the essential mechanisms involved”.4
Building an investigatory model will not, in other words, be viewed 
as grounded in a process whereby some conclusive meaning underlying 
literary theory is made evident, but rather as an alternative procedure 
whereby meaning is continually produced and accomplished; as 
formulating an emerging, open-ended paradigmatic unity. The theoretical 
underpinning o f  this model-building grounded in a problem-oriented 
inquiry is thus beset, in a positive sense, by the very problems it seeks to 
explain.
Taken together, the interrelated strategies that might help explicate 
this phenomenon will, in consequence, be conceived as possessing their 
own intrinsic logic and dynamic, while, at the same time, presenting a 
kind of self-propelling literary and cultural re-arrangement that 
epitomizes an attempt to trace the patterning of conflictual forces on 
Arabic literary texts -  both critical and creative -  and to bring to light 
many other related aspects of Arabic culture.
For this puipose, what has been said about such paradigmatic 
rupture, drawing on the arguments and views of Thomas Kuhn, becomes 
fully recognizable, and may be viewed as filling in the details of a process 
of teleological revision and intertheoretic change, whereby the notion of 
an older socio-cultural paradigm is finally overthrown, to be replaced by 
a new framework that enables us to grasp the significance (or meaning, or 
denotation) of the macro in terms of the micro and vice versa. As such, it 
clearly becomes necessary for the researcher, if he is to comprehend this 
process of substitution, to take into account the question of positionality.
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If modern literary theory is not to be viewed, according to a standpoint 
frequently taken for granted, as basically derivative,5 but rather seen as 
representing its own distinctive theoretical formation and factual reality, 
then it follows that its discursive identity can be alternatively conceived 
as possessing a native base far firmer than some previous studies have 
ever conceded.
To return to the articulated definition, the particular framework of 
articulation would appear to suggest that its work model, intended to 
operate as a unit, will be encompassed by a paradigm-shifting system of 
meaning and value, reflecting an essentially contested concept of 
modernism: one over which a fundamental disagreement exists between 
proponents and opponents as to the precise limits of the perception of 
change involved. Moreover, when such a model-building of modem 
literary theory is viewed not merely as a process of literary and linguistic 
re-arrangement but as a symbolic act of self-image-reconstructing, then it 
further emerges as the site wherein a fractured tradition resides. To this 
end the unfolding of theoiy, composed of various taxonomies of socio­
cultural crystallizations, literary forms, genres and sub-genres, can be 
adequately tackled free from any attempt to perceive it as a 
unidisciplinary monolith that is all things to all critics.
The admitted implication here is that the full connotations of this 
approximate term are elusive; they are contested rather than agreed and 
fluid rather than fixed. As such, its dynamics of diversity can be 
consciously read in and around the competing and often contradictory 
strands of theorizing, without any reductiveness or vagueness with 
respect to anomalies and exceptions that cannot be resolved within the 
parameters of a newly emergent paradigm, and without any attempt to 
stretch the critical term so as to address all the fundamental issues raised
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by the growth of relativist trends and movements that appear to validate 
every possible theoretical position, however incongruous.
The crucial point, then, is that the ongoing process of modernism is 
being highlighted in terms of the constant reminder of a transformational 
progression: from the conventional concept of naqd — a literary term 
whose etymological formulation and range of application have always 
been occluded in the practice of judging and evaluating literary works, 
including classification by genre and structure -  to the radical and far- 
reaching concept of naqd,6 which entails a process of refuting, 
invalidating and unsettling the world o f the text as well as the text o f  the 
world.
Thus the performative function of literary criticism has, in this 
context, been elevated to the status of cultural critique: a paradigm shift 
whose philosophical and epistemological implications, epitomizing a 
succession of displacements and transformations of concept, suggest a 
crisis-boundedness of metatheory — o f a theory about malting theory. 
With the help of the above conceptualizations, oppositional thinking can 
now be seen as the matrix of critiquing, linking action frames of reference 
to culture and, in consequence, setting one thing against another: doubt 
against certitude, liberation against tyranny, truth against error, and so on.
This in turn pertains to the idea that, for an analysis to be called 
naqd* literary criticism must necessarily be viewed from within the locus 
of interdisciplinarity, conjoining, in consequence, literary and critical 
theories and all varieties of discourse. The proposition emerging from all 
of the above is that the concept of interdisciplinarity has, through an 
unrestricted progression of paradigm shifting, displaced the disciplinarity 
of conventional literary criticism. In other words, this notion of 
permutation will now permit us to predict the eventual demise of 
predicated boundaries between literary criticism and social science
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disciplines, and the emergence of cultural critique as a multi-dimensional 
and specialized unidisciplinarity, imposing a consequent order and 
systematic nature of its own.
If we look back at the final decades of the twentieth century (1970
-  2000), we may see how the modern Arabic literary theoiy of the period 
indicates this paradigmatic shift from literary criticism to cultural critique
-  a process to which the word “supersession” may safely be applied. Not 
only is this supersession evident in literary theoiy5s uncompromisingly 
dismissive critique, which strives to dismantle the trappings of tradition 
in the course of subverting the tradition itself; it may also be discerned in 
a set of modern works produced by poets and writers of fiction whose 
reflexive practices provide key compositional principles, adjusting older 
understandings to new forms, refining their concepts and sharpening their 
tools.
Furthermore, although the categoiy of “cultural critique55 has not 
frequently been made explicit9 over the three decades in question, 
manifestations implying this loose-ended concept have been the subject 
of extensive and regular discussion.
The neatest and most outstanding formulation of this modernist and 
interdisciplinary position -  a position susceptible to various assessments 
according to the stance of the analyst -  remains that supplied in Adunls5s 
iconoclastic Al-Thabit wa ’l~mntahawwil (“The Static and Dynamic: A 
Study in Conformity and Creativity among the Arabs55).10 This seminal 
and overarching work has aroused considerable controversy, notably with 
respect to his views on Arabic tradition, seen as this is from an 
unflinchingly novel, indeed deliberately unsettling perspective. The 
emphasis here is on a theoretical approach grounded in oppositional 
technique, a radically secular literary criticism that is not, however, 
“literary55 in any narrow sense of the word; and once this critical element
19
has been released beyond the old boundaries, the interpretive possibilities 
become still greater, pointing to a deliberate attempt to suspend, or 
dismantle, the established boundaries between literary criticism and one 
or more of the disciplines of epistemology, philosophy, sociology, 
linguistics, psychoanalysis and psychology. To this end new methods of 
trans-literary theory-making are actively invented, propounded and 
defended in works by Zaki Najlb Mahmud, Adunls, Kamal Abu DIb, 
Jaber ‘Asfur, ‘Abdussalam Mseddi, Hisham Sharabi, Muhammad 
Barrada, Aziz Al-Azmeh, Muhammad ‘Abed al-Jabiri, George Tarablshi, 
Sabri Hafiz, Abdullah L‘aroui, Muhammad Bennls, and many others.11
These new methods, procedures and devices have attracted 
ceaseless attention in their turn, thereby establishing their more or less 
tentative legitimacy, or even provisional validity. In consequence, and as 
the sub-title of this study indicates, the crucial issue becomes that of a 
categorical shift in the concept of modem Arabic literary theory. This 
shift, where it is present, results not in any dissolution of the specific 
identity of literary criticism, or in any reduction of it to a mere adjunct of 
another social science discipline; rather it serves to initiate a process of 
discursive transformation, marked by a deliberate weakening of its 
established dividing lines and bearing the connotation of an emergent 
socio-cultural paradigm -  without, however, necessarily imposing some 
form of external, monolithic unity.
From this further point of departure, it seems possible to argue that 
the creative achievements of Arab poets and writers of fiction may 
likewise come to be identified, in due course, as examples of theory- 
making, revealing the presence of reflexive, albeit stealthy, compositional 
premises, and, by extension, defining the basic critical assumptions of the 
process of writing itself.
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Briefly, then, an articulated definition of modernism epitomizing 
theoiy as a hypothesis verifiable but not verified, and delving into its 
conceptual devices with a view to systematic exploration of a possible 
poetics o f  method and procedure, will have emphasized the following
point: that literary theoiy, insistently and unremittingly radical as it is, is
* 12 emerging as an ongoingly rigorous, ceaseless and open-ended critique
of the quintessence of Arabic culture, as this culture endeavours to
engage, through free dialogue, the lingua franca of a universal movement
of ideas, concepts, trends, “isms” and tools of thought.
All this says something about the problematic of open-endedness. 
By refusing textual closure13 and rejecting finality, modern Arabic 
literary theory is seen to have predicated the possibility of a sustained dis­
closure, proposing as it does a process of tentative, flexible and open- 
textured discursiveness that is as much a matter of becoming as of being.
In other words, the reasoning behind this discursively constructed 
investigatoiy model of theoiy can now proceed to examine the biaxial 
conception of being and becoming. Since the processes initiating “being” 
and “becoming” are inherently dynamic, standing in opposition to the 
notion of cultural fixity, references to regulated theoretical arrangements 
must not be allowed to lead on to a straitjacket of essentialism.
From here a further aspect of the foregoing critical point emerges. 
The attempt to encompass an ever-changing literary theory means that it 
becomes increasingly impossible to take a snapshot of a history of 
criticism at a given instant of time. The pairing of history and critique can 
easily be construed as proposing seemingly asymmetric, if not mutually 
exclusive categories, thus suggesting a level of irreconcilability. Each of 
these avowedly divergent disciplines presents itself as having a mind of 
its own. Yet the concept of articulating a critical account of literary theory 
proposes connective components, and is defined by them. It implies
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operations whereby they are made to correspond to each other, 
presenting, in consequence, a blending of narrative and analysis, of 
chronology and thematology.14
Finally, one further way of putting this is to argue that, without the 
structuring intervention of critiquing, polemicizing and problematizing, 
any attempt to construct a reasoned account of literary theory, grounding 
a critical core, will be a mere agglomeration of isolated facts and 
concepts.
This modernist idea of intervening, interrupting 01* attempting to 
get in the way of the flow of chronology is rich in possibilities. One of its 
most distinguished representatives is Walter Benjamin, whose arguments 
lay a particular stress -  in terms that can hardly be seen as less applicable 
to the present text than to their original context -  on the following 
contention:
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it the 
way it was. It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a 
moment of danger.15
1 In this regard, the notion of a relationship supplying the link between this set of 
theoretical crystallizations is seen to involve a species of interdisciplinarity; the 
relationship lying in those implications that are proposed by logic or by the meanings 
of the terms involved in constituting the phenomenon.
The phenomenon is thus seen as proposing a relationship o f tadayuf (a logical 
term borrowed from ‘Ali al-Sharif al-Jurjani), entailing the notion of interdependence 
and implying, in consequence, a possible link between mutually dependent 
conceptions. See ‘Ali al-Sharif al-Jurjani, Kitdb al-ta ‘rifdt (“Book of Definitions”), 
Beirut: Maktabat Lubnan, 1969, p. 62.
2 That is, attained through a series o f inferences, proceeding by logical argument from 
premises to conclusion.
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3 The meaning o f building an investigatory work model, in the sense in which the idea 
is used here, has been made almost self-evident by an array o f philosophers, 
sociologists and critics associated with the study of the humanities. One of these 
writers, G. Duncan Mitchell, has the following to say on the subject:
A model is used to assist explanation either by using an analogy showing 
similarities between the thing to be explained and the phenomenon which is 
known or better known, i.e. the model, or else by setting out a number of 
assumptions which are interrelated.
In the same vein, a corresponding concept o f methodology can be identified, in this 
context, as being an implicit abstract indicating an explicit work model. Consider, for 
instance, the following comment on the concept o f methodology as suggested by the 
same writer:
One of the uses of this term is to refer to the techniques a particular discipline 
uses to manipulate data and acquire knowledge.
See G. Duncan Mitchell (ed.), A New Dictionary o f Sociology, London-Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 125, 127.
The concept of the work model is similarly viewed by A.R. Lacy, as a “theoiy 
intended to explain a given realm o f  phenomena, or a sort o f  picture intended to 
explain a theory by replacing its terms with more perspicuous ones”. See A.R. Lacy, 
A Dictionary o f  Philosophy, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 136. Here 
and elsewhere, italics within quotations are mine unless otherwise stated.
4 See Nicholas Abercrombie, Stephen Hill, Bryan S. Turner, The Penguin Dictionary 
o f Sociology, London: Penguin, 2nd edition, 1988, p. 158.
5 See, for example, WalTd Hamameh’s comment that “contemporary [literary] 
criticism in the Arab world remains basically derivative”. WalTd Hamameh, in 
Michael Gorden, Martin Kreiswirth (eds.), The John Hopkins Guide to Literary 
Theoty and Criticism, Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1994, 
p. 35.
6 The binarity o f naqd versus naqd was initially developed in Kamal Abu DTb, “Fi T- 
fikr al-naqdi wa T-fTkr al-naqdi” (“On Critical and Oppositional Thought”), seminar 
paper presented at a conference on Cultural Creation and Change in Arab Societies at 
the End o f  the Twentieth Centuiy, held at the Center for Transregional Studies, 
Princeton University, 4-9 May, 1998.
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7 Seyla Benhabib has made familiar the distinction between the domains o f “critique” 
and “criticism”, a distinction suggesting an underlying symmetric relation o f criticism 
and critique vis-a-vis the Arabic critical terms naqd and naqd. On the application and 
range o f the concept of critique, see Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A 
Study o f  the Foundations o f  Critical Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986, pp. 9, 66-7, 112, 122, 153-4, 171-4. For a thorough examination o f the existing 
link between the concepts o f critique and literary criticism, see Robert Con Davis, 
Roland Schleifer, Criticism and Culture: The Role o f  Critique in Modern Literary 
Theory, London: Longman, 1991. The authors argue that “in the context of the history 
— the genealogy -  of the concept of critique . . . the critical study o f literature is a 
form, more or less self-conscious, of cultural critique”. As such, “literary criticism 
articulates and examines particular cultural norms”, (p. 47)
An early implication of this link can perhaps be discerned in the Egyptian 
modernist Taha Husain’s Fi 'l-adab al-jdhili (“On Jahili Literature”) (Cairo: Lajnat 
al-Ta’Ilf wa ’l-Nashr, 1927). Salma Kliadra Jayyusi, in her Trends and Movements in 
Modern Arabic Poetiy (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1977, I, 150), cites Pierre Cachia’s 
argument for the identification of such a link. According to Cachia, Husain’s real 
achievement in the book (refuting as this does the automatically accepted idea that the 
ancestry of Jahili poetry was pre-Islamic) lies in “the negation of past prejudices”. 
The point here, if  one accepts Cachia’s claim as credible, is that Husain may be 
plausibly viewed as having employed some o f the analytic tools developed later by 
cultural critique (a term then virtually unknown) in order to reach his conclusion. See 
Pierre Cachia, Tdha Husain: His Place in the Egyptian Literary Renaissance, London: 
Luzac and Co., 1956, p. 137.
8 The concept o f naqd, the inner core o f radical criticism, proposes a commutative 
relationship with Edward Said’s concept o f the “oppositional”. Said invokes this 
shorthand rejectionist term to denote an autonomous category o f criticism that 
operates in the mode o f negation:
If criticism is reducible neither to a doctrine nor to a political position on a 
particular question, and if  it is to be in the world and self-aware 
simultaneously, then its identity is in its difference from other cultural 
activities and from systems of thought or of method. In its suspicion of 
totalizing concepts, in its discontent with reified objects, in its impatience with
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guilds, special interests, imperialized fiefdoms, and orthodox habits of mind, 
criticism is most itse lf. . .
In consequence:
Criticism must think of itself as life-enhancing and constitutively opposed to 
every form of tyranny, domination and abuse.
See Edward Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, London: Vintage Edition, 1991, 
p. 29.
9 For a relatively early reference to the term “cultural critique”, see Hisham Sharabi, 
Neopatriarchy: A Theory o f Distorted Change in Arab Society, New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988:
My hope is that Arab society will still become modem, will still be able to 
overcome disabling neopatriarchy and build an independent, progressive, and 
humane Arab world. This cultural critique is a contribution to that effort, (p. 
xi)
10 Beirut: Dar al-‘Awdah, 3 volumes, 1974, 1977, 1978.
11 A degree of personal discrimination is inevitable in a study of this kind, if  it is not 
to become too unwieldy.
12 For a related work emphasizing the unavoidable centrality of open-endedness, as 
the negation o f textual cessation, see Sami Swaydan, Jusur al-hadathah al~ 
mu ‘allaqah (“The Hanging Bridges of Modernity”), Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1997, p. 9.
13 I allude here to Nietzsche’s biaxial notion of closure/disclosure, implicit, as 
suggested in the following parable, in his conception of the absence o f a sense o f 
ending:
Not every end is the goal. The end of a melody is not its goal; and yet as long 
as the melody has not reached its end, it also hasn’t reached its goal. A 
parable.
See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Wanderer and His Shadow, No. 204, cited in Geoffrey 
Galt Harpham, The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism, Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, paperback edition, 1993, p. 67.
14 For a critical account o f theory that tends to pair history and critique, conflating 
chronology with thematology, see, for instance, Aziz Al-Azmeh, I  bn Khaldun in 
Modern Scholarship: A Study in Orientalism, London: Third World Centre for 
Research and Publishing, 1981. This historicized account of cultural critique has
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vigorously maintained the ascendancy of criticism, examining, as the book’s cover 
note explains, “the performance and methods of orientalist discourse in the very wide 
array of fields which have taken an interest in Ibn Khaldun: Arabic philology, 
sociology, historiography, philosophy and others”.
15 Quoted in Michael P. Steinberg (ed.), Walter Benjamin and the Demands o f  
History, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 1.
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II. Modernism: An Articulated Definition
In its common use as an operative term, modernism (haddthiyyah) brings 
into play elements and factors of a polemical theory of change, belonging 
to a “paradigm in motion55 -  this last being a term coined by John Fekete 
in his work The Critical Twilight: Explorations in the Ideology o f  Anglo- 
American Literary Theory from  Eliot to McLuhan}
In the social sciences, “paradigm55 is derived from Thomas S. 
Kuhn, The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (1962). For Kuhn scientists 
work within paradigms which are “general ways of seeing the world and 
which dictate what kind of scientific work should be done and what kinds
9  * • •of theoiy are acceptable55. Described as “notoriously ambiguous55 by G. 
Duncan Mitchell,3 the term has nevertheless become veiy widely used in 
literary criticism and cultural critique. Jeremy Hawthorn4 explains the 
substitutionality of the process of cultural change, suggested by the term, 
as follows: “Paradigm succeeds paradigm like the succession of blinkered 
generational views with which Philip Larkin's poem ‘High Windows5 
presents us, each seeming as if it represents an advance but each with its 
own inevitable limitations.55
The term “paradigm in motion55 is, then, used here to imply (among 
other things) that the basic assumptions guiding Arabic literary theory can 
neither be dictated by, nor reduced to, a linear schema. Another way of 
making the same point is to foreground the temptation to resort to the 
concept of substitution (or supersession) as an analytical device whereby 
one literary/theoretical formation is seen to supplant another via the 
randomness of historical breaks, shifts and discontinuities.
However, the technical refinement of this use, as proposed in the 
various accounts foregrounded by Arab literary critics, is heterogeneous 
and disputational; so much so that one is confronted with the problem of
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reformulating a workable checklist of the rival emergent and open- 
textured narratives -  which may, however, be seen as complementary 
rather than contradictory stages in an ongoing process of articulating and 
definition-making.
Given this situation, an attempt to reconstruct a definition of the 
term, allowing for a broader but ultimately less discrepant framework of 
its joined constituents, should need no excuse. As might be expected, the 
basic approach will be marked not by “essentialism”, a conception that 
often elevates cultural difference to a canon of dichotomic essences, but 
by “perspectivism”, which lays a major emphasis on understanding 
culture through a process of theoretical de-differentiation in which the 
divine, mythical and privileged concept of “origin” is superseded by what 
Edward Said calls “the secular, humanly produced and ceaselessly re­
examined notion of beginning”.5 The main task of this section is to 
initiate a thesis on modern Arabic literary theory (“modern” here 
referring to the period since 1970) by describing, defining and grappling 
with its basic assumptions through the “perspective” of a distinctive 
critical construction whose autonomous function does not, however, 
involve any equation of “autonomy” with such interchangeable notions as 
separateness, detachment or disconnectedness. A closer examination of 
the above postulation will then have to proceed along at least two lines of 
argument.
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First, it will have to consider approaching modern Arabic cultural 
and literary theory as a system evolving through its own “internal” 
dynamics (dynamics, in ordinary dynamic systems, being the study of the 
way systems change).6 This does not imply any desire to play down 
external influences or to reduce them to insequential parameters; it simply 
suggests we should take full account of the infelicity of failing, 
repeatedly, to see the Arabic wood for the western trees.
Second, analysis of the concept of a modern Arabic theory of 
literature will assume that “theoretical traditions have an internal logic 
and relative autonomy vis-a-vis broader socio-political and cultural 
developments”.7 This standpoint is exemplified in a critique advanced by 
Adunls, in which he lays emphasis on this “internal logic”, even relative 
autonomy, of Arabic literary theory.
In his An Introduction to Arab Poetics Adunls argues that 
modernity, or “the new”, in Arabic poetry, “however unequivocal its 
formal break with the past may appear, is nevertheless identifiably Arab 
in character; it cannot be understood or evaluated within the context of 
French or English modernism, or according to their criteria, but must be 
seen in the context of creativity and judged by the standard of innovation
O
particular to Arabic”. For this reason, modernity is, for him, inseparable 
from language; and, consequently, “the language of modernity can have 
no value independent of the history of the creative genius of the [Arabic] 
language”9 itself. In other words, a methodological examination (i.e. the 
undertaking of an inquiry into inquiry) of modern theory, as here hinted 
at, implies reworking through an “inside out” approach. Instead of tracing 
the influences of western modernist movements on Arabic writings about 
literary criticism, something which falls outside the scope of this study, I 
shall consider the steps necessary for the formulation of a categorical 
framework that will encompass the critical assumptions and methods
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underlying a viable theory of “modernism”; one whose constituents are 
informed, on the one hand, by the patterning determinants of Arabic 
culture’s receptivity10 to intrinsic needs for change, and, on the other, by 
the paradigms that tend, as with any cultural belief system, to conform to 
literary tradition11 and cling to the past. Employment of a categorical
1 'Jframework, determined by its purpose and stated m terms of the means- 
consequence relation, yet not uncharacterized by scepticism, will involve, 
somewhere along the line, a “filtering” process of inclusion/exclusion 
whereby the various definitions, postulates and axioms of literary theory 
to which the concept of modernity broadly refers can be either suspended 
or confirmed. With this in mind, an attempt to re-examine a multiplicity 
of basic assumptions and approximate critical presuppositions that lie at 
the heart of modernism, to re-arrange their position in relation to the 
complexity of the notion of cultural change and accord them their proper 
status as relevant, well-grounded instances within the history of Arabic 
sense and sensibility, can now open up in a number of directions.
1 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977. See Raymond Williams’ foreword, p.
xiii.
This concept o f viewing cultural change as a continual process o f substitution, 
whereby one paradigm displaces another, is clearly articulated in Adunls’s poem 
“Qabr min ajl New York” (“A Grave for New York”). Consider, for instance, the 
following lines:
Thus I end all rules,
and for each moment I make up its rule.
Thus I advance, but do not proceed,
and when I proceed I do not return.
(See Al-Athcir al-kamilah [“Complete Works”], Beirut: Dar al-‘Awdah, 1971, vol. 2, 
p. 671.)
The question of cultural modernity and change is also the central theme of Al~ 
Thabit wa ’l-mutahawwil (“The Static and Dynamic: A Study in Conformity and
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Creativity among the Arabs”), Adums’s seminal work, cited above. AdunTs’s 
iconoclastic attitude towards Arab cultural heritage, and the leading role he plays in 
modem Arabic poetry and literary theory, have, as said, aroused much controversy. 
There is, however, no doubt as to the profound influence o f “his ideas about 
innovation and modernity on a whole generation o f poets” (and also on literary and 
cultural critics). See Salma Khadra Jayyusi (ed.), Modern Arabic Poetiy: An 
Anthology, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, especially pp. 17-28 and 
137.
2 See Abercrombie, Hill and Turner, op. cit.
3 Mitchell, op. cit.
4 Jeremy Hawthorn, A Concise Glossaiy o f  Contemporary Literary Theory, London: 
Edward Arnold, 1992.
5 Edward W. Said, Beginnings: Intentions and Methods, London: Granta Books, 1985 
edition, p. xix.
For an analysis that tends to highlight the relevance of Arabic language and 
Arab society to the concept o f “origin” in modern literary theory, consider the 
following conclusion in Adunls, An Introduction to Arab Poetics, trans. from Arabic 
by Catherine Cobham, London: Saqi Books, 1990: “The Arabic language and Arab 
society are not two primitive plants but have firm roots reaching deep into history; it 
is these roots which provide the context for and the means of achieving modernity. 
Thus a knowledge o f the origins of their ‘ancient5 forms, the changes they underwent 
and the problems they encountered, especially with regard to the mysteries of the 
particular genius of the language, is essential to an understanding o f the ‘modem5. For 
an Arab to be truly modem his writing must glow like a flame which rises fi’om the 
fire o f the ancient, but at the same time is entirely new.55 (p. 101)
6 See A. Alvarez, Night: An Exploration o f Night Life, Night Language, Sleep and 
Dreams, London: Vintage, 1990, p. 148.
7 Nicos Mouzelis, Sociological Theory: What Went Wrong?, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1995, p. 10.
8 Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 100.
9 Ibid. Emphasis on the Arabic language has always been central to Arabic theory o f 
literature. See Halim Barakat’s appraisal: “At the centre of Arab artistic expression is 
language. The word constitutes the most celebrated element not only in literature but
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also of music, painting, architecture, and even sculpture in certain instances. 
Numerous scholars have been prompted to draw attention to the special influence that 
the Arabic language has on Arabs. For example, Philip Hitti has asserted that, ‘no 
people in the world, perhaps, manifest such enthusiastic admiration for literary 
expression and are so moved by the word spoken or written, as the Arabs.’ Similarly, 
the Palestinian artist Kamal Bullata writes that traditionally, ‘Arab creativity revolved 
around the word: the word as spoken revelation and as visible image. Poetry, being 
the elixir of language, was the natural art fonn in which Arabs excelled. On the visual 
plane, the arabesque became the spiral product o f Arabic.’” (Halim Barakat, The Arab 
World: Society, Culture and State, London: University o f California Press, 1993, p. 
206.)
10 Receptivity is here synonymized with relevancy. The conceptual bridge linking the 
two terms can be seen to reflect modem literary theory’s ability to adopt, adapt and 
relativize. For an example on this point, see Muhammad al-Nuwayhi, Qadiyyat al- 
sh ir  al-jadid (“The Issue of New Poetry”), Cairo: Ma‘had al-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyyah 
al-‘Aliyah, 1964.
S. Moreh (in Modern Arabic Poetry (1800-1970);, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976) 
gives the following account of al-Nuwayhi’s wilful interaction with the poetics o f T.S. 
Eliot: “In order to prove its necessity, al-Nuwayhi based his book on T.S. Eliot’s 
article ‘The Music of Poetry’ and discussed the influence of this great poet and critic 
on modem Arabic poetry . . . Consequently: “Al-Nuwayhi tried to find to what 
extent Eliot’s ideas are relevant to the new form.” (pp. 263-5)
11 See, for instance, Nazik al-Mala’ika, Qaddya 'l-shilr al-m uasir  (“The Issues of 
Contemporary Poetry”), Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1962, p. 300, where she rejects the use 
of western methodology and tenninology in modern Arabic literary criticism.
12 A categorical framework is deployed (in this context) as a method of reasoning, 
justified by its validity; as a teleological process without a pre-judged end; and as an 
overall approach to the study of the boundaries of cultural and literary inquiry.
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1. On the Infelicity of Misreading Trendism for Modernism
There are three confusables that are related in meaning and are 
frequently, in practice, grouped together beneath the rubric of 
correspondence and resemblance: namely modernism, modernity and 
modernization. A proper definition of “modernism”, which is a catch-all 
term fraught with vagueness and characterized by blurred edges, must 
accordingly grapple with each of these terms, whose boundaries of 
cultural and literary inquiry almost but not quite overlap.
Since the 1970s1 the concept of modernism has come to embody,
* * 2 *among other things, an aesthetic response to the failings of Arab projects
of modernity, stemming from processes of modernization whereby 
progress depends on a variety of structural, economic and social 
transformations. Moreover, viewed from the perspective of Ogburn’s 
notion of cidtural lag, the term proffered by him to trace the outline of a 
condition whereby material changes in the West move faster than the 
cultural assumptions that regulate how these changes are viewed, modern 
Arabic cultural critique may be seen to have progressed at a much faster 
pace than that of the material changes for which it has sought to act as 
stimulus and source of inspiration.
This might be stated in another way. Having come into existence 
within the context of this alternative model, a model embedding the 
notion of “cultural lag ” in reverse, Arab modernism may be viewed as 
the expression of a timeless and unfettered human impulse: the 
phenomenon, constant and unvaiying, of a universal yearning of the 
human spirit to disrupt, if not violate, an uninterrupted continuance of 
domain-reinforcing literary canon and cultural tradition.
Yet, having failed to found a significant social force to cany it 
through, the critique of modernity has effectively taken on the aspect of a
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psychodrama in which critiquers are foregrounded as performing actors; 
that is to say, as patients required to act some part in a drama (of change), 
constructed with special reference to the relevant symptoms or problems, 
while the other parts are taken by members of a therapeutic team.4 In 
other words, the concept of modernity has been transformed into a 
“problematic”5 whose therapeutic team of cultural theorists and critics is 
left with the serious task of re-inventing the hallmarks of cultural 
“newness”.
In his work Arab Intellectuals and Heritage,6 George Tarablshi, a
■ 1 • • «literary critic turned psychotherapist and cultural analyst, has initiated an
* Q  ■inquiry into what he boldly terms “Arab collective neurosis” vis-a-vis 
the project of modernity. His attempt to apply certain forms of Freudian- 
oriented9 concepts, in combination with other, related methodologies, 
suggests a simplified form of psychodrama in which a linear narrative10 
of its own narrator is persistently introduced -  the consequence being an 
incapacity, in this narrator, to empathize with any of the writers whose 
works he sets out to criticize.
This collective form of “cultural” psychodrama, required to act as a 
critical tool, is apparently designed to facilitate Tarablshi’s endeavour to 
exorcise, with near unerring logic, some of the critical writings of a set of 
modernist Arab intellectuals whom he regards as active agents, or even 
cultural catalysts.
In a positive sense now, his critique is based on two divergent 
methods of analysis: namely “application” and “re-invention”.11 The 
distinction between these two conceptual terms, as put forward by 
Tarablshi, implies an intrinsic difference in reasoning. In attempting to re- 
appropriate the language of psychoanalysis from literal interpretation, he 
argues that, as a critic of culture, his role is to “re-write” Freudian 
analytical theory; i.e. to domesticate it into an alternative context of
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* 19relevancy, in opposition to any arbitrary “application” of its 
distinguishing postulates and premises.
It follows from this anti-essentialist and anti-foundationalist 
position -  one shared by the most prominent and productive critics 
associated with the modernist movement in Arabic literature -  that a 
distinction within, rather than between, two trajectories can now be safely 
established in the hope of discerning some pattern in a tumultuous flow of 
ideas. These trajectories, whose underlying logic suggests a binarity of 
opposites, are trendism and modernism. Before embarking on a more 
detailed examination of the internally incorrigible differences between 
these seemingly not dissimilar notions (sufficiently slippery, indeed, to be 
used often interchangeably), let us emphasize that a certain ambiguity 
exists as to the meaning of the word trendism. It has been coined with
I T •reference to an ephemeral category that must not be considered as 
having a free-standing, independent construction -  being bound, on the 
contrary, to a continuously changing concept of fashion and to what is 
emphatically not literature in the full sense.
The central issue, then, is to identify trendism -  which involves a 
universalizing catalysis dominated by short-lived European styles and 
ideas -  as a concept encompassing the very notion of cultural mimicry. 
Based on uncritical adherence to fashion, it is a concept whose influence, 
dominatory, restructuring and pervasive, continues to insinuate itself into 
the context of a world-system perspective, and is highlighted by the 
claim, often reiterated in the literature of post-colonial studies, that 
Europe has “constructed itself as modern, and constructed the non- 
European as traditional, static, pre-historicaF}A A consequence of this 
last is the further claim that “the imposition of European models of 
historical change has become the tool by which these societies are denied 
any internal dynamic or capacity for development”.15 If this interpretation
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is plausible, then one valid concept of modernism -  namely, that of the 
historical model of the early twentieth-century European movement in 
literature and culture that sought to break with the conventions of the 
nineteenth century -  can be singled out as the sole true, legitimate and 
wholly well-grounded paradigm, embedding the idea o f  changelessly 
willing a change}6
What all this amounts to in practice is that viewing modernism
17  * • *from the perspective of the mimicking consumer, i.e. viewing culture, at 
the receiving end, as something slavishly attempting to reproduce an 
unrepeatable, even inimitable model o f transformation based on the 
essentialist notion o f  sacred origin, is to regard modernism, in this pre­
fixed and commodified condition o f  being, as a more or less 
straightforward trendism.
It is not, therefore, surprising that trendism is often misconstrued as 
modernism, rather than being seen for what it is, as a symptom of the
i  o
malaise it illuminates; or that it is postulated as “derivative” and 
secondary, a by-product of a sole authentic modernism, i.e. as an 
epiphenomenon, an added accompaniment to a contextless process of 
modernization whereby culture is conceived as merely indulging in 
intellectual borrowing from external sources without ever undergoing a 
course o f  relativizing and reformulating from within.
The classic statement of this position is found in M.M. Badawi’s A 
Critical Introduction to Modern Arabic Poetry}9 where trendism appears, 
tellingly, to masquerade as modernism. Some of Badawi’s remarks in this 
connection undoubtedly provide ammunition for critics who dismiss 
modernism as being merely the prime symbol of a mindless conformity to 
literary fashion. He specifically uses the word “old-fashioned”, whose 
contextual meaning proposes, in his analysis, a more or less trendist 
rather than modernist connotation:
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Arab poets turned to the poetry of T.S. Eliot in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, when it was already beginning to look old-fashioned, 
having in the meantime been succeeded by the work of the 
generation of Auden and Philip Larkin.
However, reflection suggests that his assertive conclusion has been 
reached in unexpected fashion:
In fact, to the informed reader, the excitement of discovery which
was felt by many Arab poets and critics in the 1950s in the work of
* 21Eliot seemed somewhat naive and certainly provincial.
The implication of this value-judgmental comment is that Eliot’s poetics 
of modernism have not been allowed to transcend their cultural and 
historical circumstance so as to attain a new domain of contextuality. 
Rather than being re-defined from the viewpoint of Arabic culture’s own 
processes of relevancy and receptivity, Eliot is viewed merely in terms of 
the fashion-conscious poetics of trendism: as a prime example of the 
demode poet, out o f  fashion, outmoded and outdated.
All this leads, in effect, to the following conclusion: that a 
misreading of trendism for modernism seems to underemphasize the 
tendency of modem literary theory to approach culture as a complex and 
open-textured process of change evolving through its own internal 
dynamics, and, as such, ignores the kind of anti-essentialist assumptions 
put forward by a variety of competing critics and historians of ideas. 
From this point of view Walter Burkert is probably right when he argues 
that “the mere fact of [cultural] borrowing should only provide a starting 
point for closer interpretation”, and that “the form of selection and
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adaptation, of reworking and refitting to a new system is revealing and 
interesting in each case”.22
1 The period of the 1970s and 1980s is marked by the emergence o f innovative versus 
renovative modernism, and has coincided with what Hisham Sharabi describes as “the 
emergence o f scholarly and critical works forming the radical critique of 
neopatriarchy”. See Sharabi, op. cit., p. 104.
2 For a theoretical elaboration on the failure of Arab literary and cultural critics to 
establish direct linkages between the aesthetic, the historical and the social strands in 
the critique o f modernism, see Adunls, “Hawla ma'zaq al-hadathah fi T-mujtama* al- 
‘Arabi” (“On the Predicament o f Modernity in Arab Society”), a paper presented at 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, in October 1998.
3 Ogbum is specifically concerned with the problem of incongruity between western 
cultural changes and western economic (and technical) changes. The reformulated 
premise here is that, while economic changes within western culture occur before 
cultural norms can be introduced to control their use, the reverse is tme regarding 
modernization in Arabic culture. See W.F. Ogbum, On Culture and Social Change, 
Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1950, pp. 86-95.
4 See Charles Rycroft, A Critical Dictionaiy o f  Psychoanalysis, London: Penguin 
Books, 2nd ed., 1995, p. 144.
5 As a literary term “problematic” (ishkaliyyah) entered the vocabulary of modern 
Arabic criticism through Muta’ Safadi’s collection of short stories Ashbah Abtdl 
(“Phantomlike Heroes”), Beirut: Dar al-Fajr al-Jadld, 1959. In his introduction to the 
collection, entitled “Problematic Fiction” (pp. 7-14), Safadi rejected Socialist 
Realism’s typification of the character in fiction, which, he emphasized, deprives the 
protagonist of the freedom of “becoming”, i.e. the freedom to respond to social and 
historical circumstances.
According to the Encyclopedia o f Contemporaiy Literary Theoiy (ed. Irena R. 
Makaryk, Toronto, Buffalo and London: University of Toronto Press, 1997, pp. 615- 
6): “The term [problematic], in the strict definition given it by French Marxist 
philosopher Louis Althusser, has had wide currency in politically committed literary 
theory and criticism since the early 1970s.”
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Following John Fekete, the term is used in this study to denote a “theoretical 
framework within which complexes of problems are structural, and single problems 
acquire density, meaning and significance”. See Fekete, op. cit., pp. 217-8.
6 Al-Muthaqqafun al-Arab wa 1-turath, London: Riad Al-Rayess Books, 1991. The 
book is based on an implicit psychodramatic presentation, played out here as a tacit 
form of psychotherapy. For further analysis tending to connect the theoretical and the 
theatrical, see Aziz Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, London and New York: 
Verso, 1993, pp. 7-10, in which “Islamic culture takes on the aspect of a 
psychodrama”.
The perspective of psychodramatizing Arabic and Islamic cultures appears to 
be synonymous with Erving Goff man’s dramaturgical perspective whereby people are 
viewed as social actors and social life as theatre. Shakespeare writes, in As You Like 
It:
All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and their entrances;
And one man in his time plays many parts. (Act II, Scene VII)
See E. Goffinan, The Presentation o f  Self in Everyday Life, New York: Doubleday 
and Co., 1981, p. 8.
7 Ibn Rushd (1126-98), the Arab philosopher, jurist and physician revivified in the 
present as a progenitor of modernity, may be regarded as an early exponent of medical 
terms like “patient”, “remedy” and “antidote” in a philosophical text. As such, certain 
of Ibn Rushd’s writings have psychosomatic connotations; they assume, that is to say, 
that a person consists of a body {soma) and a mind {psyche). In this narrow sense, 
reference to “cultural” psychotherapy is made possible within the context of 
Tarablshi’s attempt to bring out the cultural illnesses and symptoms affecting Arab 
intellectuals under the sway o f modernist thought. See, for example, Ibn Rushd, 
Tahdfut al-tahafut (“The Incoherence of Incoherence”), ed. M. ‘Abed al-Jabiri, 
Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1998, pp. 378-9.
8 This is the sub-title of TarabXshi’s book.
9 The application is hardly surprising, given that Tarablshi is the sole translator of 
Freud’s complete works into Arabic.
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10 The notion o f linearity is intended to suggest a distinctly ordered succession of 
concepts “squeezed into a single point of linear representation”. See Oswald Ducrot, 
Tzvetan Todorov, Encyclopedic Dictionary o f  the Sciences o f  Language, trans. from 
French by Catherine Porter, Oxford: Blackwell, 1981, p. 107.
11 Tarablshi, op. cit., p. 107.
12 Charles Rycroft is probably right when he says: “Unfortunately ideas cannot be 
transported bodily from one language to another simply by translating them word by 
word, and it possibly has to be envisaged that something significant happens to an 
idea or a theory when it is translated into another language.” See Rycroft, op. cit., p.
xiv.
13 On the connection between fashion and ephemerality, see the closing sentences o f 
AdunTs’s An Introduction to Arab Poetics, where he writes that “fashion grows old 
from the moment it is born, while creativity is ageless”, (pp. 101-2)
14 See Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, Helen Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial 
Studies, London: Routledge, 1988, p. 145.
15 Ibid.
16 As an exclusive concept whose validity can be verified only by reference to western 
culture, the idea o f changelessly willing a change is coterminous with Eurocentric 
thinking. Consider, for example, the following assertion by Erich Neumann: “Western 
culture, whose crisis we are experiencing today, differs from  all others Imown to us in 
that, although a continuum, it finds itself in continual process o f  change, even if the 
degree of change is not always equally apparent.” (Erich Neumann, The Origins and 
History o f  Consciousness, Princeton: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 3rd printing, 1973, 
p. 381.)
17 For an early discussion of cultural mimicry, see Albert Hourani, Syria and 
Lebanon, London: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 70. “To be a Levantine,” he 
observes, “is to live in two worlds or more at once, without belonging to either; to be 
able to go through the external forms which indicate the possession o f a certain 
nationality, religion or culture, without actually possessing it. It is no longer to have a 
standard of values of one’s own, not to be able to create but only able to imitate’, and 
so not even to imitate correctly since that also needs a certain originality. It is to 
belong to no community and to possess nothing of one’s own. It reveals itself in
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lostness, pretentiousness, cynicism and despair.” (Quoted in Fu’ad ‘Ajami, The Arab 
Predicament, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 177.)
18 On this point see WalTd Hamameh’s article “Arabic Theory and Criticism”, in 
Gorden and Kreiswirth, op. cit., pp. 30-5. The article concludes with the assertion that 
“contemporary criticism in the Arab world remains basically derivative”.
19 Published Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975.
20 Badawi, ibid., p. 263. Unsurprisingly, Philip Larkin remains almost unknown in the 
Arab world, despite Arab interest in Anglo-American poetry from early on. He is, 
above all, “a very English poet, interested in the local feel . . . ” See David Daiches, 
Malcolm Bradbury, Eric Mottram (eds.), The Avenel Companion to English and 
American Literature, New York: Avenel Books, 1981, p. 304.
21 Badawi, op. cit., p. 263. “Provincial”, in this context, is an alternative term for 
“unsophisticated”.
22 Walter Burkert, The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence on Greek 
Culture in the Early Archaic Age, trans. from German by Margaret E. Pinder and 
Walter Burkert, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2nd printing, 1995, p. 7.
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2. On the Interchangeability of Modernity and Modernism
The terms “modernity” (hadathah) and modernism (haddthiyyah) have 
been deployed as interchangeable categories in Arabic literary criticism, 
albeit with a discernible difference of emphasis. Viewed historically 
against the mainstream experience of Arabic literature, this optical 
illusion becomes evident: the concepts of modernity and modernism have 
been presented as synonymous, interchangeable or commutative, the two 
seemingly not dissimilar terms being viewed as each identifiable with the 
other.
Viewing this problem-oriented question from such an angle, the 
gist of the argument for distinguishing between modernism and its 
misleadingly symmetric conceptual double, modernity, is best 
appreciated by reference to the cultural critique set out in Hi sham 
Sharabi’s work Neopatriarchy: A Theory o f  Distorted Change in Arab 
Society, referred to above.1 This theory as to the causes underlying the 
abnormal form assumed by modernization in Arab society more or less 
demonstrates the implications of misreading modernity for modernism 
and vice versa. Sharabi is concerned, from the outset, to stress that the 
word “modernity” is “misused and overused by both western social 
science and media” and that it has in consequence “lost its proper 
signification”. For this reason, Sharabi himself uses it, in the context of 
Arab culture and society, to imply not “a model to aspire to or an example 
to imitate”, but rather a “mode of being” grounded in the essential 
characteristics of “modernized consciousness”.
These characteristics he explains by reference to “the tendency to 
convert models into fetishes”, observable within Arab society “in the 
way, for example, education or dress or artistic production even socialism 
are approached and appropriated as models and guides”. This tendency
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towards irrational reverence embodies, he hastens to add, “two related 
and mutually reinforcing tendencies, imitation and passivity”. For “ideas, 
actions, values, or institutions” are “validated (or invalidated) not by 
criticism but by reference to a model”. The upshot, with regard to this 
“fetishized modernism”, is “a category which imposes itself directly, 
without mediation or critical self-consciousness. It governs all kinds of 
activities, including creative ones”, such as “modem Arabic poetry”.3
If we now turn to a critical examination of modernism as defined 
by Sharabi -  as “modernity’s expression in art, literature, philosophy and 
all forms of creative endeavour” -  we may note how, within the context 
of current Arabic literary writings (and notably modem poetry), the 
concept of “modernism” is proposed as a discernible category, distinct 
from “modernity”, which is aptly described by Sharabi as “the 
consciousness appropriate to [modernism]”.4
The notion of establishing categorical boundaries between 
modernism and modernity, as propounded by Sharabi, bears both ongoing 
reflection generally and a constant examination of certain selected 
aspects. It is not that the notion in question constitutes anything especially 
profound as far as modern Arabic literary theory is concerned. Rather, the 
ultimate implication of this process of differentiation (delimiting points of 
convergence and divergence) is that it will serve to reveal the 
teleologically oriented explanations encompassing a cluster of methods 
and approaches that bring to light the predicament of modernism. 
Consider, for instance, a passage by Yusuf al-Khal (poet, exponent of 
modernity and founder, in 1957, of the literary periodical Shi V, one of the 
most influential publications in the Arab world), in which he points out 
Arabic culture’s state of deadlock vis-a-vis the project of modernization. 
This project is viewed by al-Khal as a paradigmatic monolith fusing
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modernism with modernity, the consciousness appropriate to modernism. 
In the light of all this, he writes as follows:
The contradiction of being a form inside the modem world and an 
essence outside it compels us to confront the problems of the 
presence of an old society in a modem world and the problems of 
the presence of a modern world in an old society.5
It is not difficult to provide further qualifying examples that suggest, 
implicitly, the interchangeability of these interconnected critical terms. 
One such example may be found in the writings of Elias Khury, in which 
modernity is conceived as a labour of negation -  or, to borrow Sharabi’s 
term, “a mode of being”. Khury writes:
The idea of modernity in contemporary Arabic culture is posited as 
a problematic of its own. It is not a copy of western modernity but 
is an Arab attempt to formulate this term within the context of a 
cultural domain which has its own historical particularism, and 
lives the problems emanating from the concept of nahdah 
[renaissance, or revival].6 This is why Arab modernity has been 
foregrounded as a revivalist enterprise. Having conjoined the 
splinters of cultural, social and political fragmentation, modernity 
can be presented as an attempt to surpass this fragmentation by
n
means of moving forward.
In a later passage Khury expresses this view more dramatically:
For the Arabs, whose legitimacy, based on the past, has been lost, 
modernity can be seen as a quest for future legitimacy in a world
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forcibly unified and hegemonized by western capitalism. In this 
world the peripheries are banished and pushed to the edge of 
history’s memory, only to be restituted as a folkloric object, as a 
benchmark attesting to the superiority of the West and its ability to 
negate, if not annihilate, the category of the “other” . . .
From this specific perspective, Khury now re-affirms that
seeking legitimacy is, then, an attempt to respond to the threat of 
annihilation and to stop self-destruction through acceptance of part 
of it.8
Modernity is, therefore, posited here as a mode of being; it invokes the 
embedded fear and anxiety about, and the complexity of, what we call -  
often too summarily -  a threatened cultural identity. For this reason the 
cultural synthesis stemming from the historical encounter between the 
Arabs and the West becomes pivotal for re-thinking the construction of 
cultural identity as an unceasing process -  a matter of becoming as much 
as of being. The first seemingly viable Arab cultural synthesis of this kind 
is that illustrated by al-Nahdah, dating back, as said, to the second half of 
the nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth. Khury, however, 
rejects the notion of such a synthesis of Arabic literary and cultural 
revival, maintaining that the revival in question was in fact more 
successful in inspiring Arab self-awareness than in creating anything in 
terms of coherent intellectual system. As such, the initiative for bringing 
about a genuine change has, it would seem, passed to the exponents of a 
radical form of modernism, one that upholds the concept of substitution 
as opposed to evolution.9 Thereby, cultural identity is being ceaselessly 
made and re-made through the substitution of literary and intellectual
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innovation for the renovation reflected in the revivalist conception 
promoted by al-Nahdah.
Viewed from within the context of modernism, cultural identity can 
-  if we are to be specific -  no longer be viewed as a static or pre-given 
entity, but rather as a complex phenomenon symbolizing a sustained 
struggle to redefine the essentialist elements posited in the “universal”, 
the concept at the heart of a Eurocentrist model, by attempting to 
deterritorialize it.10 The methods and procedures implied by such 
deterritorialization, leading to a grounding and reshaping of Arabic 
literary theory, will be tackled at a later stage.
It might, of course, be argued that a sharply restricted or “exact” 
definition underpinned by something more than mere arbitrary 
judgement, a definition marked by a thorough consideration of the 
differences distinguishing modernity from modernism, is impractical, 
even artificial. Yet, if one accepts Sharabi’s suggested definition of 
modernity (“the consciousness appropriate to [modernism]”) as viable 
and applicable to the Arabic cultural context, then the theoretical 
constructs whereby the term “modernity” might bear the connotation of 
an all-embracing project of change will transform modernity into a 
teleologically oriented concept presenting itself as an ideology. In other 
words, modernity (,hadathah), described in terms of purpose and function, 
has here been turned into modernism (hadathiyyah), a category 
professing an “ism” (or “yah”, to give the corresponding Arabic particle 
of relation).11
Viewed, in this way, as a teleology, modernism is like any other 
concept: it cannot be predicated as an abstraction existing for its own 
sake, but rather assumes meaning in relation to a goal; and it is through 
paradigmatic change that this goal can be achieved. Expressed in these 
terms, though, it is hard not to think of “teleological” modernism as
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proposing a defined conclusion -  a clearly fixed cultural identity, or “true 
identity”. 12
One way of unravelling this “true identity” is to search out, and 
redefine, its “appropriate consciousness”, i.e., its substratum of truth, its 
inner core. Writing on the most recent phase in the development of 
modem Arabic poetry, M.M. Badawi indicates this inner core, in which 
“the poet has become once again identified with his own people, but he is 
no longer the spokesman:13 he is the hero who in his personal salvation 
seeks the salvation of his people”.14 This identification with a fixed and 
all-encompassing emblematic cultural identity represents a particular 
ideological form often leading, he suggests, to “excessive solemnity and 
hollow self-dramatization15 in contemporary Arabic poetry”. But, he 
asserts, it also explains “why in its best examples, the spiritual 
experience, which is the poem, becomes at once a political and a cultural 
comment”.16
In the light of the above, it would seem that the voluntaristic17 
element in modernism -  whereby the intentions and motives of the 
cultural actor (whether modernist poet or theoretician) are assumed to be 
voluntary, determined not merely by economic and social factors but 
more fundamentally by ontological ones -  should not be 
underemphasized. This is perfectly compatible with AdunTs’s theoretical 
formulation epitomizing what is apparently an ontological substratum:18
The progress of society is not represented by economic and social 
renewal, but more fundamentally by the liberation of the 
suppressed elements beneath and beyond the socio-economic 
structure, in such a way that human beings at their freest and most 
responsive become both the pivot and the goal.19
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To conclude, the interchangeability of modernity and modernism is 
especially strongly evident in most Arab writings on cultural change. The 
term “modernity” is in fact used (or misused) by most Arab critics as an 
umbrella concept denoting the modernism of literary movements and 
trends whose workings are in fact biaxial: involving, on the one hand, the 
hadathah or hadathiyyah movement that centred around the ShVr journal, 
and, on the other, the general trend of modernization whereby the concept 
of newness has been adapted, reworked and refitted to the temporality 
and territoriality of a native system of innovation, if not renovation.
Amid this all-encompassing convergence of modernity and 
modernism, Adunls has noted that Arab poetic modernity is central to 
many disciplines. And if this modernity is
partly based on the liberation of what has been suppressed -  that is, 
on the expression of desire -  and on everything that undermines the 
existing repressive norms and values, and transcends them, then 
ideological concepts like “authenticity”, “roots”, “heritage”, 
“renaissance”, and “identity” take on different meanings.
This has resulted, finally, in an anti-closure, an open-ended modernism:
Traditional notions of the continuous, the coherent, the one, the 
complete, are replaced by the interrupted, the confused, the plural, 
the incomplete, implying that the relationship between words and 
things is constantly changing: that is, there is always a gap between 
them which saying or writing the words cannot fill. This 
unbridgeable gap means that the questions “What is knowledge?”,
“What is truth?”, “What is poetry?”, remain open, that knowledge
* * * 21 is never complete and that truth is a continuing search.
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These open-ended questions suggest at least something of what is at stake 
in the process of articulating an Adumsian-oriented definition of 
modernity/modernism, and why his model has had such a huge impact on 
literary theoiy for more than three decades. The perspective informing 
this definition is sharply distinct from other modernist conceptions in 
that, in contrast to the ethnocentrist/Eurocentrist models, it is conceived 
as taking place by continuously reflecting on, and alluding to, the past 
and the instantaneous, through the epistemological lens of an extended 
present. As such, AdunTs’s brief discussion is revealing. He takes the 
opportunity, in the discussion of Arab “Poetics and Modernity”, to 
explain that there is at bottom a valid modernist model unfailingly 
relevant by virtue of its being insistently open-ended; a model that 
epitomizes a paradigm in motion by means of ceaselessly unfolding itself. 
If ethnocentric/Eurocentric models of transformation are concerned with 
the renovative, that of Adunls is informed by the innovative.
1 The term “cultural critique” is employed by Sharabi as an omnibus category, 
emphasizing the discipline of sociology as an essential component of the study of 
culture, which is seen, in turn, as an interdisciplinary intellectual pursuit. This pursuit 
is presented not as a simple seamless garment but rather as a complex problematic 
stressing the interconnectedness of literature and the humanities.
2 Sharabi, op. cit., p. x. The term “mode of being” has obvious ontological 
connotations. Sharabi does not, however, propose it with a view to suggesting 
philosophical components concerned with the study of existence itself.
3 Ibid., pp. 24-5. Sharabi’s reference to “modem Arabic poetry” implicitly rejects the 
notion of translating European poetry into Arabic -  something he takes to imply, 
broadly, “neopatriarchal outlook and practice”. This form of neopatriarchy is, he 
explains, exemplified by the poetry journal Shi'r (Beirut, 1957-63) and the movement 
that centred around it. This movement has, he continues disapprovingly, “introduced 
in Arabic translation T.S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, Saint John Perse, Eric Maria Rilke, and
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Rene Char among others”. {IbicL, p. 159.) This remark would appear to imply an 
embedded anti-modem, even essentialist position.
4 Ibid., pp. 17-8. Commenting on Marshal Berman’s seminal work on modernity, All 
that is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience o f  Modernity (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1982), in which the American sociologist identifies modernity as being “a 
uniquely European phenomenon”, Sharabi remarks that “this is a fact which had 
devastating existential consequences for the non-modern world”.
The implication o f this problem has been tackled with care in Al-Azmeh, op. 
cit. Al-Azmeh argues that there are many modernities and not simply one.
5 Al-Haddthah f t  I-shi'r (“Modernity in Poetry”), Beirut: Dar al-TalTah, 1978, pp. 5- 
6 .
6 This term was “first used by Juiji Zaydan and others to describe the process of 
Arabic literary and cultural renewal which occurred during the second half o f the 
nineteenth, and early years o f the twentieth centuries. It was associated with a number 
of interrelated factors, both political and intellectual . . .  On the intellectual level [it 
included] the consequent attempts by Arab intellectuals to reassess the relationship 
between Europe and the Arab . . . world”. See Julie Scott Meisami, Paul Starkey 
(eds.), Encyclopedia o f  Arabic Literature, volume 2, London and New York: 
Routledge, 1998. For a more relevant assessment of al-Nahdah, as seen from within 
the framework of the present analysis, see Adunls, Sadmat al-hadathah (“The Shock 
of Modernity”), Beirut: Dar al-‘Awdah, 1978.
7 See Elias Khury, Al-Dhdldrah al-mafqiidah (“Lost Memory”), Beirut: Dar Ibn 
Rushd, 1982, p. 25.
8 Ibid.
9 For an illustration of the difference between these two contrasting models of 
transformation, evolution and substitution, see Muhammad Bennls, Al-Shi‘r al-'Arabi 
al-hadith: bunyatuhu wa ibdaldtuh (“Modem Arabic Poetry: Its Structure and 
Substitutions”), volume 4, Musa 'alet al-hadathah (“Questioning Modernity”), 
Casablanca: Dar Toubqal, 1991, pp. 66-77. For the different concepts of substitution 
(threshold, rupture, break, mutation, transformation) leading on to the concept of 
discontinuity, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology o f  Knowledge and Discourse on 
Language, trans. from French by A.M. Sheridan Smith, New York: Pantheon Books, 
1972, p. 5.
50
10 The concept o f a Eurocentrist model o f modernity has always borne an avowedly 
geographical connotation. In this context it is used to refer to a deterritorialized 
category. A concept such as modernity can, according to G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, 
be deterritorialized when it is viewed as “a result o f contingency rather than necessity, 
as a result of an ambience or milieu rather than an origin, of becoming rather than a 
history, of a geography rather than a historiography, of grace rather than nature”. See 
Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. from French by Graham 
Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, London and New York: Verso, 1995, pp. 96-7.
11 See “isms”, in Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary o f  Culture and 
Society, London: Fontana/Croom Helm, 1976, p. 144.
12 This should not, o f course, be taken to imply that the concept o f cultural identity 
epitomizes an essentialist trait or a changeless paradigm; for “cultural identity is 
permanently being made and re-made within available practices and relationships and 
existing symbols and ideas”. See Jorge Larrain, Ideology and Cultural Identity: 
Modernity and the Third World Presence, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, pp. 162-3.
13 In other words, the modem Arab poet has ceased to be simply a persona, becoming 
rather person and persona.
14 Badawi, op. cit., p. 260. The difference between the Arab poet’s old role, as a 
spokesman for his own people, and the new role is, apparently, that he has now 
become more protagonist than hero.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 This may be explained through the argument that modernity is, in the final analysis, 
about choice.
18 In this formulation modernity/modernism is viewed as dealing with the nature of 
existence.
19 See AdunTs, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 96.
20 Ibid.,  p. 101.
21 Ibid.
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3. On Three Major Variables of Cultural Response to the 
Employment of Modern Literary Terminology
The language of modem literary theory contains a considerable number 
of concepts that are not wholly unambiguous (that might indeed be 
regarded as evasive, vague or loose-ended), or which even bear 
contradictory interpretations in their contextual usages. Examples of such 
terms are “culture”, “identity”, “tradition”, “modernity”, “modernism”, 
“appropriation”, “centre”, “margin”, “discourse”, “genre”, “class”, 
“origin”, “primary”, “derivative”, “innovation” and “renovation”, to name 
only a few.
These terms are best understood against a backdrop of the concept 
of ideology, “ideology” being used here in accordance with the almost 
self-evident definition given it by critics and cultural commentators: to 
mean a set of beliefs, ideas and attitudes, consciously or unconsciously 
held, which reflect the dominant culture within a society.1 This language 
of theory contains a great many precise, technically defined words. Yet 
none of them can be regarded as firmly established when they are once 
transferred/transformed from their theoretical habitus into an alternative 
cultural domain. In these circumstances, the introduction of modern, 
innovative and renovative terminology has, in the context of Arabic 
literary theory, insistently problematized the question of founding the 
conceptual means that will permit critics and historians of ideas to tackle 
modern theory’s tentative assumptions.
An analysis of this problem will consequently require attention to 
three major variables of cultural response: negation, affirmation and 
contextualization.2
Before proceeding to consider a few examples illustrating these 
variables, I would make the following observation with regard to the
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biaxial category of “modernism” and “modernization” as viewed against 
the mainstream experience of current exploratory writings in Arabic 
criticism. In the absence of any well established theoiy of change, it is 
feasible to define the concept of modernism in terms of other, unrelated 
tools of thought, thereby isolating the process of modernization from the 
logical conclusions of its modernist assumptions. Starting from such a 
basis, a reductionist3 approach would seem to enable the critic to cut off 
his self-transforming arguments about modernity/modernism from their 
cognitive possibilities and so construct them in such a way that they lack 
theoretical status -  that is, to exclude, even eliminate their corresponding 
logical consequences.
This is particularly true of some Arabic writings on modern literary 
criticism, and there are implications, beyond this, for cultural critique. 
Consider, for example, Nazik al-Mala’ika’s negatory position vis-a-vis 
the use of western critical terms. On the one hand, she makes persistent 
claims to be the first poet to write shi sr hurri citing her poem “Al-Kulera” 
(published in December 1947) as an example of the emergence of modern 
poetry,4 and establishing herself as one of the most enthusiastic 
apologists, even the most articulate, for this new form characteristic of 
modem European poetry. Yet she does not, on the other hand, hesitate to 
condemn the use of western terminology and literary critical methods as 
“dangerous”. Moreover, al-Mala’ika finds, in the alleged influences of 
European culture on Arabic criticism, “an invasion which is more 
dangerous to the Arab nation than military invasion”; and she insists, m 
consequence, that “the danger in the intellectual invasion lies in the fact 
that it is aimed at the spirit and roots of the nation”.6 The reason for this, 
she argues, is that “the intellectual invasion corrupts the personality of the 
nation, i.e. the source of originality and invention, and paralyzes it,
• * 7preventing progress and animation”.
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Notwithstanding al-Mala’ika’s overall positive contribution to the 
critique of modern poetry, the negatory approach here, predicating 
cultural identity as a changeless conception, does not seem essentially 
different from that advocated by Islamic reformism, whose theoretical 
position was argued and defended in the writings of Muslim thinkers of 
the nineteenth century, specifically al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh. 
While negotiating a positive response to western science and technology, 
these reformists propounded the possibility of a reconciliation between 
the pro-modem and the anti-western, thus underlining the idea that the 
intellectual baggage accompanying the dominant western culture need not 
be an integral or constituent part of the Islamic cultural perspective. In 
other words, al-Mala’ika’s backward-looking viewpoint on the question 
of modernization tends to overlap with that suggested by the nineteenth- 
century Islamic reformists. Both attitudes seem to rest on a position 
leading to some form of reductionism. What al-Mala’ika is in fact 
attempting to do is to eliminate the cause-effect relationship between the 
theoretical assumptions of modernity and their teleological systems, i.e., 
the end state towards which they are alleged to be working. The upshot is 
that, whichever way one looks at this unsettling problem, the intellectual 
baggage encumbering the project of modernity cannot be avoided, 
discarded or simply removed from the argument.
It is precisely because of this apparent over-simplification that al- 
Mala’ika tends frankly to underemphasize, if not peripheralize, the 
difficulty of legitimizing a proposed modern standpoint, one potentially 
receptive to a new world view, while rejecting the use of modem literary 
theory’s terminological language, or while giving only partial 
explanations to the cultural predicament entailed in the notion of 
appropriating8 borrowed tools of thought.
54
The opposite point of contrast is embodied in an unquestioning 
affirmative attitude, a major variable that postulates a textbook example 
of dialectical reversal: namely, the unrestricted borrowing of western 
critical terms and literary conceptions, implicitly disregarding the 
possibility of an interactive-situational dimension portrayed in the 
potentially patterning, relativizing and domesticating cultural contexts 
that tend to mould these terms and conceptions into internally coherent 
objects of theoretical knowledge.
This unproblematized position9 represents (among other things) the 
reverse side of the coin. No study shows this equally self-inflicted form 
of reductionism more clearly than Sabri Hafiz’s “Al-Bahth ‘an manhaj li 
naqd al-shiT al-hadlth” (“In Search of a Method for the Critique of 
Modern Poetry”).10 In deploying a multiplicity of conflicting western 
critical approaches, theories and terms, while being at the same time 
neglectful of Arabic cultural contexts, the study pinpoints a host of 
external concepts that fail to be internalized, and are thus not converted 
into the domesticated percepts and frames of reference that form part of 
Arabic mental furniture.11
The third major variable is that of cultural and epistemological 
contextualization. Contextualism’s transforming role is implied in its 
response to a system of relevancy that prevails, at a given instant, in an 
alternative cultural and epistemological context.
The idea that relevance is contextually decided, validated and 
ascertained, that norms vary with cultural setting, has been acknowledged 
in M.A. al-Jabiri’s notion of the contextual determination of meaning. 
This notion of context, seen as the manufacturer of a meaning that is 
consistent with relevance, is suggested in the following account in which 
al-Jabiri sets out his discursive position on the use of borrowed 
conceptual tools of thought:
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The concepts employed here belong to a set of philosophies, 
methods and modes of reading. Some of these concepts can be 
traced back to Kant, Freud, Bachelard, Althusser and Foucault, or 
to Marxist categories, without which contemporary thought cannot 
properly function. Experienced readers well versed in these 
philosophies and methodologies will doubtless note that we are not, 
in using these concepts, restricted by the limits and confines 
proposed by their primary frameworks.
The present writer is more likely to employ these concepts in
a more or less free manner. This freedom will, nevertheless, be
exercised with utmost responsibility; for the concepts are viewed
not as inflexible frameworks but as instruments of analysis whose
deployment will be made useful and rewarding by the determinants
of their setting [within a context]. Otherwise they must be avoided,
12as long as they are perceived merely as objects of tokenism.
1 The concept of ideology is used in broad conformity with Gramsci’s notion of 
hegemony. Viewed as the main theoretical grounding of legitimacy, the hegemonic 
function o f ideology is most fully elaborated in Adunls’s critique o f the process of 
modernization. This complex process places the paradigm of tradition (which 
postulates the predominance of a set o f collectively held beliefs about validity) -  the 
static -  in contrast to the paradigm of modernity (which suggests a breakdown of 
canonical legitimacy) -  the dynamic. Hence modernity comes to be viewed as “the 
primaiy problematic o f  Arab society”. See AdunTs, Fatihah li-nihayat al-qarn (“An 
Opening for the End o f the Century”), Beirut: Dar al-cAwdah, 1980, p. 22.
For a comprehensive analysis of the role and meaning of ideology in Arabic 
thought, see ‘Abdullah L‘aroui, Majhum al-ideologiah (“The Concept o f Ideology”), 
Casablanca, 1980. See also Jorge Larrain’s systematic study, cited above, o f the 
concepts of ideology viewed from a Third World perspective. Throughout the first 
two chapters o f this latter book (“Ideology, Reason and the Construction o f the Other”
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and “Ideology and the Assault on Reason”, pp. 6-58), Larrain sets out a detailed 
exposition o f the hegemonic function of ideology.
2 The term “variable” is not used here in a strictly sociological sense, but rather as a 
reflection of its general meaning, i.e., as a concept interchangeable with 
“phenomenon”, “measure”, “scale” or “indicator”. See Mitchell, op. cit., pp. 237-8.
3 Within this frame of reference, “reduction” emphasizes a procedure proposing a 
reductive analysis, a distortion of thought whereby a given complex and sophisticated 
set of concepts is reduced to a more basic, even simplistic formulation.
4 For an extensive discussion of al-Mala’ika’s contention that her experiment in what 
she called shi'r hurr is equivalent to free verse, see: Jabra Ibrahim Jabra, Al-Rihlah al- 
thdminah (“The Eighth Journey”), Beirut: Manshurat al-Maktabah al-‘Asriyyah, 1967, 
pp. 7-19; and Moreh, op. cit., pp. 203-15.
5 See al-Mala’ika, op. cit., p. 300.
6 From a lecture delivered by al-Mala’ika at the Fifth Congress of Arab Writers, 
Baghdad, 1965. See Moreh, op. cit., pp. 273-4.
I Ibid., p. 274.
8 “Appropriation” is used, in this context, to mean “taking or making use of without 
authority or right”, and is viewed, in consequence, as a by-product of al-Mala’ika’s 
notion of “cultural invasion”. As a key concept in post-colonial studies, appropriation 
describes “the ways in which post-colonial societies take over those aspects of the 
imperial culture -  language, forms of writing, film, theatre, even modes of thought 
such as rationalism, logic and analysis -  that may be of use to them in articulating 
their own social and cultural identities”. See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, op. c it, p. 
19.
9 The position is described as “unproblematized” because it is not presented as open to 
question or debate.
10 Al-TalT'ah magazine, Cairo, April 1972.
II A reversal of this approach is evident throughout Sabri Hafiz’s work The Genesis o f  
Arabic Narrative Discourse: A Study in the Sociology o f  Modern Arabic Literature, 
London: Saqi Books, 1993.
12 See ‘Abdullah L‘aroui and others, Al-Manhajiyyah f i  ’l-adab wa 'l-'ulum al- 
insaniyyah (“Methodology in Literature and the Humanities”), Casablanca: Dar 
Tubqal, 1986, p. 13; quoted in Hisham Sharabi, Al-Naqd al~haddri lil mujtama' al-
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‘A rabiji nihayat al-qarn al-Hshrin (“Cultural Critique of Arab Society at the End of 
the Twentieth Century”), Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wihdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1990, p. 
57.
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4. On Modernism and the Methodological Deadlock of 
Incommensurability
It is hardly surprising that modern Arabic literary criticism, tied as it has 
been to the contexts of revivalism and renaissance in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, should have had its conflictual theoretical 
underpinning embedded in a mass of normative considerations of a 
comparative n a t u r e for to argue that modernism was inspired, even 
brought about, by European cultural influences would appear to imply 
that modern Arabic literary criticism springs from basic assumptions 
informed by a goal-oriented theory of literature, standing in uninterrupted 
relationship with a world view.
These cross-cultural assumptions are premised on the tentative 
proposition that aspects of two contrasting modernisms, belonging to 
different cultural systems yet sharing certain universalist conventions and 
tested hypotheses, may be seen as analogous; and that, as such, it is 
possible to examine, simultaneously, both their differences and their 
similarities. In other words, the modernism of Arabic literary theory may 
be viewed from mutually exclusive/inclusive viewpoints: on the one 
hand, from an outward, hegemonic and Eurocentrist position, as being a 
mere “ersatz” modernism,2 replicating, indeed mimicking, a 
primary/authentic European model; or, on the other hand -  and here we 
are probably on firmer ground -  through turning our attention to the most 
feasible hypothetical alternative: that is, by suspending such an external, 
explicitly a priori approach, marked as this is by a set of merely tentative 
critical suppositions predicated in the course of gathering and 
manipulating evidence.3
Release from this now evidently discredited essentialism will, we 
should add, be attained not through some uncompromisingly inward-
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looking stance, but rather through removing obstacles to change -  
obstacles that are themselves generated by the ethnocentrism implicit in 
such an introverted approach. This, in turn, will require focus on initiating 
the reconstruction and self-actualization of a holistic method, operating 
from the inside out.4 The range and application of such a method implies, 
among other things, an emphasis on certain common ground, a focus on 
the questioning, the subtle, the hesitant, rather than on the essentialist 
dimensions characterizing a homogeneous account of modernity; an 
account that has long grounded the central while marginalizing, even 
excluding, the peripheral.
To return to the central point, highlighting of the view that 
epistemological standards of cultural change propose an inescapable 
monolithic uniformity can now be deconstructed, even dislodged, with a 
view to de-centring a Eurocentric model of cultural hegemony whose 
dominance conflates power with knowledge and knowledge with power.6
Examining critically now, from the viewpoint of an articulating 
framework, we may see the category of modernism as being internal and 
internalized, different and autonomous, but not separate and 
disconnected. Here too comparison requires an element of analogy 
between the objects compared. The difficulty consists not, however, in 
determining the precise degree of analogy involved. The problem, with 
such a comparative method, lies rather in its being repeatedly deployed in 
an axiology-oriented context, whereby the notion of comparability 
proposes a correlation based on the value-laden concept of mufcidalah
” Vrather than the value-neutral concept of muqaranah.
Such a situation stems, it would seem, from a misreading of the 
first term for the second. Whereas mufadalah, as its etymology implies, 
suggests examination of the qualities of two supposedly commutative 
cultural and literary concepts, with a view either to underlining a virtually
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Manichaean contrast or to discovering an equality of regard or value 
between them, muqaranah (again as the etymology implies) points to a 
host of ongoing procedures of juxtaposing, combining and contrasting -  
the verb qarana meaning to connect, conjoin, link, associate. The latter 
term, therefore, indicates the possibility of a value-neutral probe. Context 
envelopes a parallelizing process. Once the notion of non-hierarchical 
comparability has been introduced, whether unequivocally or tentatively, 
there is the possibility of an inquiry into the likenesses and differences of 
two corresponding concepts, without necessarily being judgmental or 
giving rise to any explicit notion of value and evaluating.
In other words, desynonymizing these terms (etymologically 
distinct albeit synonymized conceptually) serves a useful purpose; for, 
when the comparison is a mufadalah rather than a muqaranah, the 
argument tends to touch upon the field of axiology: that is, on the study 
of value rather than on consistently non-judgmental literary comparison 
or cultural parallelism. As such, the value-laden concept of mufadalah 
specifically involves negation as a feature of judgment, or, if you will, 
triggers a hierarchicalizing process of evaluative comparativeness 
whereby the concept of “original” modernism suggests, implicitly, the 
immediate negation of its designated “duplicate”.
It should be clear by now that such judgmental comparison implies 
the presence of an intrinsically pre-judgmental category; of an all- 
embracing, pre-conceived concept, relativized to fit neatly with a 
Eurocentric framework. Moreover, such a pre-judgmental framework 
implies, in its turn, an all-encompassing mode of negation whereby the 
“other” is seen as culturally dislocated, and as collectively exposed to the 
pre-judgment of -  indeed primarily denied by -  the underlying 
essentialism of the Eurocentric “se lf’.
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The above argument can be re-presented by citing and probing a 
relevant example, illustrative of a process of mufadalah that indicates the 
effective absence of a common basis or standard of objective 
comparability. Let us consider the conceptual impasse of 
incommensurability,8 the methodological deadlock informing the central 
contention of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Hammudah’s gushingly critical book Al- 
Mardya al-muhaddabah: min al-bunyawiyyah ila. ’l-tafldk (“Distorted 
Mirrors: From Structuralism to Deconstruction”).9
For Hammudah the notion of modern literary theory insinuates a 
state of lop-sided parallelism connoting a binarity of modernisms: 
authentic European versus mimetic Arab. The first is real, genuine and of 
undoubted origin, while the second is imitative, derivative and lacking in 
originality. Here, this lop-sided positionality can be seen as a benchmark 
o f an ongoing process o f distorted tawazi;10 that is, as an avowedly 
asymmetric correlation, resting on a multiplicity of dichomotic and 
hierarchical power differentials, and so making any comparison between 
the two juxtaposed models impossible. For it is manifestly evident, in this 
context, that a celebrated, if lop-sided, correlativity, conjoining not too 
dissimilar cultural strands, tends to denote a value-loaded procedure of 
mufadalah rather than a procedure of non-judgmental muqaranah.
To put this another way, the starting point epitomizing 
Hammudah’s essentializing central contention would appear to be an 
assumption that we are dealing with two different modernisms whose 
similarities are nonetheless expected to confirm their fundamentally 
identical nature; and that, if we should in fact be confronted with apparent 
dissimilarities, the “derivative version” should nonetheless fit neatly with 
the “primary” model. The “derivative version” is thus merely reduced to 
what the author repeatedly calls its “reflection in a distorted mirror”.11 
The crucial point at issue here, then, is that of exposing the fallacy of
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these taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie the notion of 
synonymizing two dissimilar, even contextually distinct cultural strands.
In consequence, this lop-sided pairing assumes the appearance of a 
persistent order, one whose dominance imposes a “totalizing discourse
which seeks to occupy all available ground and thus deny any
12oppositional site to those whom it excludes”.
It should be added that, quite apart from underlining the force of 
unquestionable authority, this ongoing process of totalizing and excluding 
demonstrates the ontological priority and superiority of an original model, 
thus serving, potentially, to establish seamless conceptual connections 
with the brand of religious fundamentalism prevalent in some parts of the 
world today. Hence the implosion of cultural essentialism masqueraded 
as theological purism and grounding the presence of irreducible and 
impermeable “power differentials”. As an ultimate consequence, this 
notion of religious fundamentalism, highlighting the power differentials 
of a discourse of authenticity and celebrating “our” culture versus 
“theirs”, gives rise to its essentialist counterpart, literary fundamentalism, 
by turning a non-symmetric relationship around, consolidating the 
“other”13 and downgrading the “se lf’. In order to be truly “oneself5, a 
literary fundamentalist (or ethnocentrist, or essentialist) has to defend 
himself against an established and distinctive “other55; and, in order to 
face up to this “other55, he has to adopt the other's cultural assumptions 
and values. In other words, a literary fundamentalist must be the “other55 
so as to be able to become “oneself5.
This is clearly circular reasoning par excellence, and effectively 
constitutes a vicious circle, whereby a logical fallacy points to a new 
difficulty that only serves to make the original problem worse, if not 
wholly incapable of resolution. To recapitulate: such an approach is self-
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evidently flawed through its contention that one may, concurrently, be 
both “oneself” and the “other”,
Hammudah’s way out of this deadlock -  one brought about by an 
evidently crude and deterministic brand of biological inevitability -  is to 
attempt to reverse the sequence, proposing the consequential supersession 
of “our” modernism by “theirs”. In so doing, he aims to stress a 
concomitant process of de-differentiation whose primary objective is to 
obliterate all the subtle differences and distinctions posited as 
foregrounding the basic assumptions implicit in Arabic modernism, and 
so to overemphasize “close” structural and functional affinities with the 
determinants of an essentialized, even fetishized “authentic” European 
model, embedding the notion of an “origin”, an “unrepeatable 
beginning”14 regarded with the veneration and awe appropriate to the 
sacred.
At this point, religious fundamentalism moves aside to make room 
for literary fundamentalism, its commutative double, thereby negating the 
legitimacy of an emergent modernism through the process of 
continuously undoing its pre-given “differentials” and replacing them 
with the “power differentials” of a Eurocentrist model -  that is to say, 
with the manufacturers of the notion of sacred origin. And this effectively 
undeimines the validity of the comparative method itself.
What the above amounts to is this: by suspending the very notion 
of commonsense reasoning, and by failing to acknowledge a standard of 
comparability based on a set of shared cross-cultural assumptions -  on 
various decontextualized, abstract, general, formal principles, norms, 
conventions, procedures, and the like -  Hammudah has rendered his 
position evidently untenable. The internal logic of his approach 
effectively suggests (among other things) the emergence of an imminent 
methodological deadlock based on a lop-sided form of parallelism; the
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creation of a logical problem, apparently incapable of resolution, that 
highlights the incommensurability of two virtually asymmetric, even 
wholly non-symmetric models of transformation.
One further point should, finally, be taken into account: that 
Hammudah’s criticism, in the very course of insistently rejecting 
modernism as a threatening paradigmatic category, has nonetheless 
consistently relied on the parameters of the selfsame European model he 
has so vigorously opposed every step of the way.
1 The notion of a comparative method in Arabic literary criticism can be traced back 
to al-Amidi (d. 371/987), who termed the process al-muwcizanah (“weighing”). Al- 
Amidi compared two different if  not wholly dissimilar contemporaneous poets, Abu 
Tammam and al-Buhturi, as representing a binarity of axial cultural strands: the 
“artificial/nurtured” fmasnu *) as against the “natural” (matbur). Here, however, 
comparison is restricted to an Arabic literary framework. The notion o f extending the 
comparative method to include different cultural contexts was proposed by the age of 
the European Enlightenment, with its belief in the unity of mankind and in universal 
concepts of progress. In the eighteenth century the idea of culture, viewed as an 
explanatory concept, gained prominence as a new paradigm representing the 
Romantic and racist reaction against the principles of the Enlightenment and the 
French Revolution, with a consequent dismissal of the universal as redundant and the 
proposition o f “culture” as a token of national identity.
It was in the context o f this reaction that the method o f cultural comparison, 
implicit in the supremacist model advocated by Herder, Nietzsche and Spengler, came 
to be viewed as a hierarchicalizing process o f differentiation, putting forward the 
notion o f biological inevitability and emphasizing innate cultural particularism.
Edward Said’s perception of a binary opposition between cultural “filiation” 
(stressing biological inevitability) and cultural “affiliation” (epitomizing the modem 
notion o f choice) is perhaps the most articulate attempt to challenge the theoretical 
components intrinsic to the essentializing Eurocentric position of the age of the 
Enlightenment, and to the explicit essentialism o f its rival, the eighteenth-century 
cultural model informed by, or derived from, the particularizing position of a
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monolithic conception of identity. For an exposition of Said’s line of argument, 
grounding his theory of modernism as a movement from fate to choice, through the 
displacement of the biological concept of “filiation” in favour of the voluntarist 
concept of “affiliation”, and probing the idea o f a “metaphorical” cultural parent, see 
Said, Beginnings.
2 This essentially dismissive tenn evokes the problem of defining the meaning, sense 
or connotation of unrepeatable origin. Is the “original”, then, a synonym for the 
“authentic”? Can it always be traced back to a scared origin? And why, in this case, 
can a concept or a work of art not be “authentic” without being “original”?
3 “A priori”, in this sense, is used to imply an untested, even untestable category. As 
such, it is known independently of experience, or perceived other than as the result of 
inquiry.
4 That is, proceeding continuously, by internal logic, or reason, from within a 
framework. For an example of this methodology, see Mouzelis, op. cit., p. 10.
5 The peripheral is culturally subordinate to the central where the present distribution 
of power differentials is seen as confirming a changeless theoretical positionality. 
Such an assertion would have been perfectly compatible with Ernest Renan’s (1823- 
92) ideology-driven strategy of systematically ignoring, rejecting or suppressing the 
role of Near Eastern influence in the making of what he calls “the miracle of ancient 
Greece”. Eurocentrism is accordingly to be seen not merely as a reflection of the 
present power differentials between the centre and the periphery, but also as 
advancing the idea that Europe, whose classical civilization is firmly rooted in “the 
miracle of ancient Greece” represents the beginning of history. See, for instance, 
Muhammad Waqidi, Al- ‘Ulum al-insdniyyah wa ’l-ideologiah (“The Humanities and 
Ideology”), Beirut: Dar al-TalTah, 1983, p. 146.
6 Works such as Michel Foucault’s The Archaeology o f  Knowledge and The Order o f  
Things are key texts for explaining the relationship of knowledge and power. In the 
former book Foucault defines the episteme, a concept almost identical to Thomas 
Kuhn’s concept o f the “paradigm”; the convergence of knowledge and power is seen 
as proposing “something like a world-view, a slice of history common to all branches 
of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates a general 
stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men of a particular period 
cannot escape”. See Foucault, Archaeology o f  Knowledge, p. 191.
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This definition, epitomizing Foucauldian strategy and mode of analyzing 
power, knowledge and representation, is perhaps “the most important single 
theoretical source for Edward Said in Orientalism”. Yet “the relationship between 
Said’s ideas and Foucault’s” remains “complex, shifting and at times contradictory”. 
See Valerie Kennedy, Edward Said: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2000, pp. 24-5.
7 See Khaldoun Al-Shamaa, Al-Naqd wa ’l-hurriyyah (“Critique and Freedom”), 
Damascus: Arab Writers Union Publications, 1977, p. 262.
8 This term, borrowed from the philosophy of science, is used here to denote the lack 
of a common basis of comparison between two supposedly symmetric categories. 
Although these categories “may not logically contradict one another, they have 
reference to no common body of data”. See Robert Audi (general editor), The 
Cambridge Dictionary o f  Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd 
edition, 1999, p. 421.
9 Kuwait: ‘Alam al-Ma‘rifah, April, 1998.
10 This is a rhetorical concept. See A.M. Abu T-Qasim al-Sejilmasi, Al-M anza‘ al- 
badT: f i  tajnis asalib al-badT (“The Magnificent Tendency: On the Science of 
Metaphor”), Rabat: Maktabat al-Ma‘arif, 1980, pp. 415, 509.
11 This is Hammudah’s own expression. See Hammudah, op. cit., p. 8.
12 See Hawthorn, op. cit., p. 191.
13 The colonized subject is characterized as the “other” “as a means of establishing the 
binary separation of the colonizer and colonized and asserting the naturalness and 
primacy of the colonizing culture and world view”. See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 
op. cit., pp. 169-71. In this context the colonizer becomes the ‘"other” through the 
dialectical process of “othering”, a term coined by Gayatri Spivak.
14 What Hanna Arendt calls an “unrepeatable beginning”, Edward Said calls an 
“origin”. Said, however, distinguishes between a beginning and an origin as 
involving, most fundamentally, the difference between an active and a passive 
relationship. “Why should an author wish to ground his work in the passivity of an 
origin? This question would be meaningless outside of the context o f authority.” See 
John Guillory, Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton and Literary Histoiy, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1983, p. 27.
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5. On Re-centring as a Pertinent Universalistic Alternative to the De­
centring of Eurocentrist/Ethnocentrist Modernism
An important aspect of the universalistic theories of literature typical of 
modernism is that they tend, invariably, to be grounded in a Eurocentrist 
position; one, that is, whereby European cultural values and assumptions 
are placed at the centre of literary analysis and taken to be “the normal, 
the natural or the universal”.1 Such Eurocentrism distorts the researcher’s 
perceptions by perpetuating the concept of a single absolutized and 
totalized cultural model, while, for primarily racist reasons, 
systematically ignoring, denying or suppressing Afro-Asiatic roots of 
classical civilization. As such, Eurocentrism is seen to be “masked m 
literary studies by concepts such as literary universality, in history by 
authoritative interpretations written from the point of view of the victors, 
and in early anthropology by the unconscious assumptions involved in the 
idea that its data were those societies defined as ‘primitive’ and opposed 
to a European norm of development and civilization”.3
In fact this authoritative, even authoritarian standpoint, whereby 
“truth” is defined by ignoring, downgrading or invalidating other cultures 
as inferior, naturally implies the essentialist concept of Eurocentrism:4 an 
attitude whose ranking of theoretical formulations and cultural hierarchies 
is to be explained in terms of the power differentials that inform much of 
the relationship between the categories of East and West, so highlighting 
the notion of heterogeneity rather than that of complementarity. In other 
words, a universalistic outlook would appear to imply, in this ontology- 
bounded context, the resurgence of an identity crisis brought about by the 
problematic of having to come to terms with an absolutized western 
concept of modernity. Something of the tone of this concept can be 
gauged from the following observation by Jorge Larrain:
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Most universalistic theories held conceptions of the non-European, 
of the “other”, which emphasized the contrast between the chaotic 
and irrational ways of the “other” and a rather triumphalistic and 
optimistic notion of their own rational European cultural identity. 
This identity conceived itself as the centre where history was being 
made and it was able to place and recognize everybody else as 
peripheral.5
Nowhere is this problem more strongly felt than in current Arabic 
writings. To cite one example, Aziz Al-Azmeh has, in his essay 
“Disengaging Arabism from Islam”, strongly maintained (albeit from a 
wholly critical viewpoint) the existence of an all-embracing state of 
affairs6 which, he explains, “has emerged as we approach a post-modem 
turn in which capitalism is seen as the rubric encompassing the modern 
age and rendering old solutions meaningless”.7
Referring to the geographical substratum underpinning Hegel’s 
conception of the East-West divide,8 Al-Azmeh initiates a reconsideration 
of the relationship between the Arab world (the periphery) and the West 
(the core, the centre). This relationship should not, he stresses, be seen as 
implying any total split: “There is no complete separation between areas, 
countries or nations deemed fully backward and others deemed fully 
advanced.”9 It is not, he believes, feasible to view the intellectual 
encounter between the two groups in terms of sharp contrast; rather, he 
repeatedly advocates a forward-looking awareness of the complexity of 
one of the liveliest areas of debate within modern cultural critique:
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What we should take into account here is not only the omnipresent 
West residing in the locus of the East but also the various 
differences and nuances presented by the western [model] itself.10
Al-Azmeh is especially careful to argue not so much for a de-centring 
(i.e. invalidation) of the notion of Eurocentrist hegemony as for a 
constructive response to a cultural problematic. In order to bring about 
this affirmative phase of analysis, he explores the possibility of re­
centring (or re-arranging, or permuting) the relation of the centre to the 
periphery, and vice versa:
We do not suffer from an inferiority complex vis-a-vis Europe.11 
And although Europe is the catalyst, the prime mover of modem
I 9history, we do not see in it the end of history. We are not, 
moreover, bound by European historical limitations but are part of 
a [modernizing] global historical project moving beyond the 
boundaries of the West.13
For Al-Azmeh, then, the concept of modernity is presented as an open- 
ended category. His contribution here is to undertake a deliberate, even 
deliberative, attempt at re-centring,14 rather than de-centring or 
peripheralizing, a European core of modernity. In common with most 
anti-essentialist stances, this account consciously rejects any claim on the 
part of modernism to closure and finality.
In a sense this is the same distinction as made by Adunls in his 
venture to re-centre the Eurocentrist model through initiating a 
reconsideration of the still-to-be-determined relationship between the 
“se lf5 and the “other”. For him this relationship is posited as 
complementary and (to borrow Deleuze and Guattari’s term) wholly
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deterritorialized.15 Concluding a debate on the nniversalist aspect of the 
project of modernism, Adunls points out the deterritorialized nature of the 
conception’s formulation, highlighting the overlap of its spatio-temporal 
co-ordinates:
The spaceship which has reached the moon, and the first wheel 
whose invention is attributed to the Sumerians, are closely 
interconnected. If you fail to identify the Sumerian wheel as an 
integral part of this spaceship, then you are not modern. Whereas 
the co-ordinates of heterogeneous periods of history overlap 
incessantly, geographical spaces, too, seem to overlap in 
consequence.16
This is hardly surprising, since, for Adunls:
One cannot conceive of Europe as a detached entity separate from 
the legacy of al-Andalus. And if the media is insistent in unifying 
the world and turning it into a global village,17 then the concept of 
time may have, subsequently, to be seen as a continuum.18
Adunls’s complementary narrative of modernism, conceived as part of a 
deterritorialized universal project, clearly points to the looming presence, 
behind the idea of the universal, of a deeper and more important problem: 
namely the problem of universal norms and their truth; of failing to re­
define the truth as a process of becoming, as a paradigm of 
complementarity,19 as a concept infusing the “self’ and the “other”, and 
vice versa, as an attempt to synthesize the central and the peripheral.
Connected with this is the relationship between the centre and the 
periphery as presented by ethnocentrism. Hailing and celebrating Europe
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as the centre in this lop-sided relationship is only one side of the coin. 
The other is that of ethnocentrism, whose cultural and literary 
assumptions place the notion of ethnicity at the centre of the selfsame 
asymmetrical relationship. Thus, ethnocentrism, as depicted by tradition- 
based modernizers, has consistently assumed that al-qadim (“the old”), 
embodied in the past, is the centre, while al-jadid (“the new”), embodied 
in the present, is the periphery. M.A. al-Jabiri’s attempt to permute the 
ordered sequence of power differentials, such as those epitomizing an 
ethnocentrist position, gives stirring expression to the possibility of re- 
centring a “heritage-based understanding of heritage”. Such an 
understanding has, he explains, resulted not in the production of al- jadid  
but in the mere reproduction of al-qadim; and, in view of this (al-Jabiri 
continues), it becomes obvious that any possibility of breakthrough must 
now lie in “liberating our conception of heritage from the ideological and 
emotional underpinnings that stamp our subconscious with the imprint of
the general and the absolute, and thereby strip [the conception] of its
0 1relativism and historicism”. Here the emphasis is displaced to the vexed 
question of viewing the past from the locus of the present. In other words, 
al-Jabiri’s theoretical formulations do not dismiss the classical heritage 
but rather propose an alternative re-centring of the paradigm of the old, 
through re-examination of its viability, validity and sustainability via the 
epistemological lens of the paradigm of the new, predicated as its 
legitimator.
Another way of seeing how this approach articulates with the 
making of modernism is by referring to a significant passage in Adunls’s 
Introduction to Arab Poetics (cited above), delivered at the College de 
France in 1984. In it Adunls argues as follows:
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I did not discover this modernity in Arabic poetry from within the 
prevailing Arab cultural order and its systems of knowledge. It was 
reading Baudelaire which changed my understanding of Abu
0 9Nuwas and revealed his particular poetical quality and modernity, 
and Mallarme’s work which explained to me the mysteries of Abu 
Tammam’s23 poetic language and the modern dimension in it. My 
reading of Rimbaud, Nerval and Breton led me to discover the 
poetry of the mystic writers in all its uniqueness and splendour, and 
the new French criticism gave me an indication of the newness of 
al-Jurjani’s24 critical vision.25
By this means modernism can come to be viewed as both within 
and beyond time. As Salma Khadra Jayyusi succinctly puts it:
Instead of treating time as a linear and flat progression, [Arab 
moderns] treated it as mythical permutation of past and present 
where all periods intermesh and interlock, juxtaposing past and
9 f tpresent, merging periods and unifying human experience.
1 The notion of conjoining “normality”, “naturalness” and “universalism” as the “truth 
value” for judging the “other” lies, it would seem, at the heart o f Eurocentric 
essentialism. Such essentialism also provides scope for the corresponding claim that 
the “other” is unnatural, abnormal and even wholly uncharacteristic. The affirmation 
of fixed identities o f the “se lf’ in contrast to the “other” is, then, the theoretical 
platform for re-asserting the politics o f organic hierarchy, determinism and headlong 
essentialism. As such, an ontology-bounded procedure such as “naturalization” should 
be viewed, in connection with its ephemerized stress on the processes of 
standardizing, correcting and rectifying, as grounding foundational power 
differentials.
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There is, it should be noted, no precisely congruent correlation between the 
value-laden English term “naturalization” and the corresponding Arabic word tajnis. 
The latter term -  implying the concept o f having become established as native -  is a 
neologism denoting, specifically, admission to citizenship.
2 This is the central contention o f Martin Bernal’s influential book Black Athena: The 
Afro-Asiatic Roots o f  Classical Civilization (Vol. I, “The Fabrication of Ancient 
Greece, 1785-1985”, London: Free Association Books, 1987). Bernal argues against 
the taken-for-granted claims of the “Aryan model” and the anchoring of modem 
European thought in ancient Greece.
In his introduction to The Pimlico History o f  Western Philosophy, Richard 
Popkin comments on Bernal’s “mind-boggling” thesis, concluding that his work “has 
alarmed traditionalists and encouraged innovators”, and that “it has given new 
impetus to the consideration o f the many sources o f the scientific and philosophical 
ideas that we first find articulated in texts from ancient Greece”. See Richard H. 
Popkin (ed.), The Pimlico Histoiy o f  Western Philosophy, London: Pimlico, 1999, p. 
5.
3 Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, op. cit., p. 93.
4 J.J. Clarke aptly expresses the point at issue:
Even in times characterized by the globalization of culture there still remains 
an endemic Eurocentrism, a persistent reluctance to accept that the West could 
ever have borrowed anything of significance from the East, or to see the place 
of Eastern thought within the Western tradition as much more than a recent 
manifestation, evanescent and intellectually lightweight, at best only a trivial 
part o f a wider reaction against the modern world.
See J.J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western 
Thought, London and New York: Routledge, 1997, p. 5.
5 See Larrain, op. cit., p. 141.
6 This position is based, primarily, on his proposed thesis that an unspecified number 
of Islams and modernities exists in point of fact. See Al-Azmeh, Islams and 
Modernities.
7 Aziz Al-Azmeh, “Fak al-irtibat baina ’l-‘urubah wa ’1-Islam” (“Disengaging 
Arabism from Islam”), Al-Naqid (“The Critic”; a monthly cultural review in Arabic), 
March, 1991, p. 21.
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8 See G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy o f  History, New York: P.F. Collier and Son, 
1902, pp. 163-6. Quoted in A.L. Macfie (ed.), Orientalism: A Reader, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2000, pp. 13-5.
9 Al-Azmeh, “Disengaging Arabism from Islam”, loc. cit.
10 Ibid.
11 The assertive tone here clearly reflects the author’s personal stance. It should not be 
taken to imply a collective position.
12 Fukuyama’s essentially Hegelian thesis proposing “the end of history” proffers the 
other side o f the argument. See Francis Fukuyama, The End o f  H istory and the Last 
Man, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992.
13 Al-Azmeh, “Disengaging Arabism from Islam”, loc. cit.
14 Re-centring is contextually analogous to (if less fashionable than) the popular 
notion of “deconstruction”.
15 See Deleuze and Guattari, op. cit., pp. 67-8.
16 Quoted in Shaker Nuri, “Ma‘rad Adunls” (“Adunls Exhibition”), Al-Quds al- 
‘Arabi, London, 9 January 2001, p. 12.
17 A reference to the term originally coined by Marshall McLuhan.
18 Quoted in Nuri, op. cit.
19 The centrality of the notion of complementarity to Goethe’s poetry is reflected in 
his observation that
He who knows himself and others,
Will also recognize that East and 
West cannot be separated.
Quoted in Clarke, op. cit., p. 3.
20 M.A. al-Jabiri, Al-Turdth wa ’l-haddthah (“Heritage and Modernity”), Beirut: Al- 
Markaz al-Thaqafi al-‘Arabi, 1991, p. 15.
21 Ibid., p. 16.
22 Abu Nuwas: b. 140/757, d. 198/813.
23 Abu Tammam: b. 189/805, d. 232/846.
24 4Abd al-Qahir al-Jurjani: d. 471/1078 or 474/1081.
25 Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 110.
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26 Salma Khadra Jayyusi, Modernist Poetry in Arabic, research project financed by 
the Rockefeller Residency Fellowship, University of Michigan (Center for Near 
Eastern and North African Studies), 1987-8, p. 27.
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6. On Some Categories of Periodization:
Origin, Beginning, Register
The idea of periodization in modern Arabic literary historiography
represents perhaps the classic case of an organically oriented process of
theory-making.1 More than ever, some Arab literary historians and critics
have tended to see the expedient notion of “beginning” not for what it is
but as embedding a biological concept of “origin”. In his study on
conformity and creativity, Adunls has noted a close connection between
Arabic culture’s conventional view of the concept of “origin” (asI) and
the concept of “originality” (asdlah). This relationship is, he explains,
akin to that of the branch to the tree, the new to the old. Seen in these
terms, the old alludes to a hallowed “origin”, while newness denotes a
“replicating” (an nasj (ala minwdl) oldness. In other words, al-asalah
(originality) is viewed, within the context of conventional Arabic culture,
as synonymous with what Adunls calls minwaliyyah, that is, replicability.
If he is to be an original/authentic Arab, the poet, Adunls insists, must not
merely write in Arabic but “replicate ” his ancestors ’ forms o f  literary,> 
2expression.
These literary historians and critics seem, in fact, to be acting out a 
methodological linearity whereby time is viewed in terms of one­
dimensional space, represented by a line: a line that unfolds itself in a 
succession of “origins” rather than simply proposing a convenient point 
of reference. Adunls is explicitly careful to deny any validity to linear 
methodology:
In this perspective, poetry is conceived [not] as a series of 
emergences or surprises, but as uninterrupted linearity with a 
uniform colour and texture. The problem facing innovators has, in
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effect, become that of producing the different. This is the 
problematic of innovation, which the age of al-Nahdah failed to 
comprehend.3
In misreading the register4 of expedient beginning as origin/source/cause, 
these literary historians and critics have persistently failed to see that the 
procedure of collocating through the common sense operations of 
periodizing is in reality no more than a practical device for determining 
an indicator or a convenient point of departure. As such, it is hardly 
surprising that the value-laden concept of sacred “origin” should have 
been constantly substituted for the less contaminated notion of 
“beginning”. “Origin” and “beginning” have, it is true, been viewed, 
through the lens of cultural etymology, as proffering equally effective 
meaning and performative power; yet this should not be taken to imply a 
flattening out of all differences between the two terms. The concept of 
“origin” has in fact begun to show signs, within the context of ideological 
semantics, of wearing out its welcome; in a shifting force field it now 
seems very much to belong to an ideologically sensitive etymology. This 
is evident in Edward Said’s powerful argument against the biological 
inevitability grounding the concept of “origin”. Central to Said’s thought 
is the binary opposition between “filiation” and “affiliation”. “Filiation,” 
he explains, “reflects a biological inevitability, the fact of son-ness, of 
being the product of a parent. Affiliation is instead a choice, in which 
something chooses to be associated with a metaphorical parent, or even a 
sibling.”5
Said’s proposition of replacing “filiation”, a biologically oriented 
term epitomizing the notion of cultural relationship based on the concept 
of “origin”, by “affiliation”, a dynamic term whose connotation refers to 
an alternative cultural relationship based on the modern idea o f  ‘free
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choice ”, may be seen as an illustrative attempt, on the paradigmatic level, 
to dismiss the concept of “origin” as redundant, while simultaneously 
questioning the validity of any definition of culture as pure, unadulterated 
and essentialized formulation of identity.
That said, it may be useful to reiterate that critical examination of 
the notion of “beginning” must not entail viewing it, contextually, as a 
trend-setter or as a profoundly effective catalysis, acting out a teleological 
schema; for teleology implies a final purpose, an ultimate goal, an end- 
state to which a “beginning” is designated to be working. Such a notion 
would, in effect, merely transform “beginning” from an obliterated 
“origin” into a functioning “origin” that establishes its determinate 
duration by reference to a continuous presence5 in the temporal version of 
reality.
With this point once recognized, the cultural etymology of 
“beginning” can swiftly circumvent the ideologically suspect search for 
“origin”. “Beginning” then emerges as a simple point of reference, an 
evidently flexible index for convoluted processes of historical sequencing 
and literary re-arrangement. Once this is accepted, then a questioning of 
the synonymous nature of “beginning” and “origin” becomes the 
springboard for a range of possible processes facilitating the elimination 
of a persistent confusion.
In his critical introduction to modern Arabic poetry. M.M. Badawi 
touches on aspects of this confusion. He rightly points out that the new 
form, far from being an entirely novel departure, is actually the 
culmination of a long series of experiments starting early in the last 
centuiy, and that
externally the new form had been developed before the Iraqi poets
[Badr Shakir al-Sayyab and Nazik al-Mala’ika] by the Egyptian
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Muhammad Fand Abu Hadid and the Indonesian-born Egyptian
Bakathlr, in their attempt to write (or translate)7 poetic drama.8
Badawi concludes, nonetheless, that “it is . . . futile to try to establish 
which modem Arabic poet was first to use this form”, and that, in any 
case, “there isn’t any glory attached to it” .9
The idea of being the first, of initiating a highlighted beginning, of 
reading (or misreading) the notion of “beginning” into the concept of a 
“glorious”, indeed literally sacred “origin”, has resulted in a persistent 
confusion aptly described as “futile”.
This is partly explained by ongoing twentieth-century experiments, 
on the level of theory and practice alike, to break through the impasse of 
fixed pattern in the poetic form, and in a prevalently medieval mindset. 
As a critical term, modernism is both: (a) the name10 given to literary 
movements adopting specific devices and formal techniques, and 
emphasizing the need for a modernized outlook free of the old world 
view; and (b) a particular category of writing, related to “newness”, 
which in some way recognizes a more or less open and universalized 
version of reality. In other words, the concepts of newness (innovation 
and renovation) embedding these experiments and movements are not the 
result of a single specified “origin”. Rather, they have rapidly emerged 
from a concatenation of various causes related to an early modernist 
pioneer period preceding the 50s, in which certain aspects of Arabic 
literary theory and practice were explored and underwent change. 
Jubran’s experiments in the new form of poem-in-prose and his Romantic 
rebellion11 against the changelessness, if not stagnation, of his times are 
prime examples of the significant revolutionary forces that made the 
modernist enterprise possible.
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The Surrealist movement,12 which flourished within the 30s and 
40s, was full of brio and bravura. Its growing sophistication and
13intellectual prowess reflected a considerable degree of voluntarism, 
whereby actors were assumed to act “voluntarily” and not as conditioned 
by accepted values and the dominant social structure -  hence the all- 
embracing, cosmopolitan connotation of their unfettered contribution to 
modem literary theory.
What is interesting is that these experiments did not simply follow 
one another in a continuous sequence, susceptible of representation by a 
single orderly line of progression; what we have here is periodizing rather 
than benchmarking. Periodizing is the wider-ranging term of the two, to 
be seen not merely as reflecting a set of results, independent of the 
process by which literary historians/critics arrive at these, but as 
essentially involving the process itself. As such, the two experiments in 
poetic form that heralded the free verse movement of the 50s -  al- 
Mala’ika’s poem al-Kulera (“Cholera”) and al-Sayyab’s volume Azhdr 
Dhabilah (“Wilted Flowers”), both of which appeared in 1947 -  emerge 
as instances deeply rooted in the temporality of benchmarking: they are 
important by virtue of their straightforward order of appearance. 
Nevertheless, these attempts of al-Mala’ika and al-Sayyab, to use Salma 
Khadra Jayyusi’s evaluative argument, “assumed a more crucial role 
because they were better poets and produced their work within authority 
and a spirit of leadership, and because the atmosphere was not ripe, 
artistically and psychologically, for the kind of new experiment they 
offered”.14
Their outlook, at this stage, is marked by a constant preoccupation 
with formal experimentation. On the other hand, al-Mala’ika’s theoretical 
contribution to the Arabic modernist movement seems far from profound. 
Her critical introduction to her collection Shazaya wa ramad (“Shrapnel
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and Ashes”), explaining the mechanism of free verse and setting out what 
she felt to be the technical reasons underlying it, is aptly described by 
Jayyusi as “naive” and as “dwarfed” by her later writings on the same 
subject at the end of the 50s, as published in her book Issues in 
Contemporary Poetry, 1962.15 Yet there is, I feel, more to al-Mala’ika’s 
theoretical contribution than this. If it is true that experiments in poetic 
form have the potential for revealing the presence of embedding 
theoretical compositional principles, which serve as instruments for 
probing the nature of poetry writing itself, then such experiments can, in a 
sense, be viewed as critiques in their own right.
This is, of course, applicable to all models of transformation in 
modern Arabic literature. However, for the modern reader or critic, the 
desire to examine closely the theoretical foundations of the poet’s (or 
novelist’s) art comes into sharp conflict with the equally modern 
imperative to explain a literary work without reference to the person who 
wrote it.16
In sum, periodization cannot be imposed upon literary history by 
arbitrary stop rules, rules that are not necessarily self-perpetuating. Unless 
a “beginning” is seen as more than a “benchmark” -  as a situation in 
which the self-perpetuating connotation of a defined critical period is 
deemed appropriate to its context -  the critic cannot recognize the 
presence of a “register”. The notion of “register” in a text springs from
*• 17 *the metaphorical adaptation of an originally musical concept. In this 
context it refers, broadly, to the poetic frequency and to the mode 
(medium) which is adopted for communication. As such, the “register” of 
the poetic form that heralded the free verse movement in the 50s became 
recognizable when the new form found “acceptance” throughout the Arab 
world. In other words, this “register” of acceptance is to be seen as 
specifically “connected with the names of the Iraqi poets al-Sayyab and
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al-Mala’ika” and informed by “the use of the single foot (tafTla) as the 
basic unit, instead of a fixed number of feet or a combination of certain 
different feet per line”.18
Another switch of register is epitomized by the rejection, on the 
part of the young avant-garde generation, of what al-Mala’ika calls the 
“monotonous pattern”; and this is further characterized by “their yearning 
for independence in the choice of their own form, of a new and more 
realistic attitude to life, and of their preference of content to form”.19
None of this was wholly “modern” for Yusuf al-Khal, a Syro- 
Lebanese poet, literary critic and translator who, in 1957, in collaboration 
with Adunls and other younger poets, launched his influential magazine 
Shi'r (“Poetry”), which played a pivotal role in the development of 
modern poetry and literary theory. In the same year, al-Khal referred to 
the new poetry as al-shi ‘r al-hadith (“modern poetry”), a term that was to 
supersede the name al-shi ‘r al-hurr (“free verse”) under which the 
movement had been known up to then. The overall term “modem 
poetry” connotes no seamless garment, but rather a convoluted constmct 
involving perpetual innovation in form, content and tone. As a complex 
hybrid, it has become particularly open to other registers. Thus the gist of 
al-Khal’s concept of modernity/modernism is in effect defined not only 
by what the latter is but also by what it is not. For him, contemporary 
Arab poets were continuing to write poems in which “the unity of the 
verse rather than of the whole poem was adhered to, just as in Classical 
poetry”. They also, according to al-Khal,
persisted in the same objectives and themes of the old poets, and 
their outlook to things, their “cosmic experience of life” still 
stemmed from an “ancient, ruminative mentality”.
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Their minds, he explains, were
drowned in emotional Romanticism, sentimentalism and 
Naturalism, and were still lurking in the dark [recesses] of form, 
primitiveness, introversion and occultism, afraid to face
r% -I
themselves.
This switch of register is, then, marked by the emergence of al-shi (r al- 
hadith, a new term whose denotation has long since moved beyond 
reference to a “name”22 in offering alternative epistemologies and 
affirmative new accounts o f  poetic experience. This is an important 
development; for it has consequently invalidated a multiplicity of critical 
terms previously given to the bulk of the new strands of poetry written in 
the 50s. Terms such as al-Nuwaihi’s al-shi‘r al-jadid (“new poetry”), or 
al-Mala’ika’s al-shicr al-hurr (“free poetry”), or Mandur’s al-shi‘r al- 
mahmus (“whispering poetry”),23 set forth not by stealth but in a fanfare, 
are now -  outside the realm of literary chronology, at least -  no longer in 
circulation. In this sense the process of modernization has changed the 
modalities o f  poetry but not the basic concept. These modalities can now 
be seen as no more than conscious attempts to stem the tide of a 
seemingly endless rhythmic repetition -  without betraying their inherent 
naivety or preconceptual status.
Why should this be so? It is no answer simply to say that these 
older critical terms were initially acknowledged as legitimate by 
particular critics at one time, only to be dismissed as redundant at 
another. If, on the other hand, we consider that there is more to 
modernity/modernism than formal newness, we shall be led to recognize 
the significance of critiques of modern poetry as proposed by Adunlsian 
theory and practice, asserting as these do a paradigmatic shift whose
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assumptions bring into play, at every instant, an ontologically bound 
poetics.
For Adunls, then, a switch of register is a transforming system, a 
switch entailing an all-embracing theory of change. Such a theory is the 
epitome of a persistent desire to break free from a seemingly inexorable 
mould. It effectively ushers in an emergent mode o f  progress rather than 
a process.
Having set up an alternative truth claim, Adunls writes 
dismissively of the totemization of form and conformity. In his 
Muqaddimah lil-shi V al- ‘Arabi (“An Introduction to Arabic Poetry”), any 
notion of conforming to the supposedly prior status o f  form  is 
consistently rejected. His scepticism is evident in the following somewhat 
ironic observation:
In the practice of formalist poets, the old concept of poetics has 
been repeatedly degraded -  at the hands of some poets to a void 
rilled with tintinnabulation.24
Written in 1971, this dramatic assumption of the end of formalist diktat 
had a pronounced vogue in the interminable period following the collapse 
of the conventional Arabic literary canon, capturing the spirit of 
modernity at a time when paradigm shifting was proceeding apace.
Viewed from such a perspective, what has been said about the 
theory and practice of poetry can now be seen as safely applicable, in a 
broad sense, to the history of fiction-making, and, more narrowly, to a 
study of the emergence of the novel within the framework of a changing 
Arabic narrativity. In other words, the notion of “beginning”, as a key 
concept imposing itself on the history of the novel, can also be conceived 
as conflated with the deeply rooted sense of “origin”.
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Consider, for instance, the case of the Egyptian modernist 
Muhammad Husain Haykal (1888-1956), who, fearing for his social and 
cultural status, felt unable to put his name to his novel Zainab, published 
in 1913.25 Haykal, now hailed by some critics as the initiator of a new 
genre, wrote the work in Paris under the pseudonym “Misri fellah” (“an 
Egyptian fellah”).26 The reason behind this eccentric decision is perhaps 
best explained by the claim, reiterated in many accounts of the Arabic 
novel, that the “literary establishment” was inclined to consider the novel 
“morally dubious and aesthetically inferior”.27
In this light the novel might be seen as a genre newly introduced 
into the conventional canon of Arabic literature. Yet this proposition of a 
spurious genre transgressing the boundaries o f literary canonicity fails to 
stand up to closer examination. Nothing shows this better than the moral 
argument propounded by Immanuel Kant, philosopher of the European 
Enlightenment, who adopted an equally hostile stance towards the 
reading of novels. According to Kant, whose paradigmatic writings mark 
the eradication of the medieval world view, the reading of novels is
the worst thing for children, since they can make no further use of 
it, and it merely affords them entertainment for the moment. Novel- 
reading weakens the memory. For it would be ridiculous to 
remember novels in order to relate them to others.28
In what follows, Kant rises, gradually, to a veritable crescendo of 
didacticism:
Therefore all novels should be taken away from children. Whilst 
reading them they weave, as it were, an inner romance of their
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own, rearranging the circumstances for themselves; their fancy is
OQthus imprisoned, but there is no exercise of thought.
The reasoning behind this negative appraisal of the novel, which dates
orv , * * •back to Kant’s early “pre-critical” period, is not essentially dissimilar to 
that attributed to arguments in relation to the Arabic literary canon, 
casting doubt, as it neatly does, on the genre’s moral and aesthetic 
validity (though it could be argued that such an ultra-didactic stance is not 
wholly representative of the western canon, albeit constituting an integral 
part of it). In other words, the dynamics of interpolating a European 
literary genre (as in the case of Zainab) into the sequence of the 
conventional Arabic canon, and depicting it as the “beginning” of the 
modern Arabic novel, can be seen as not merely limited to the borrowing 
of the novel form itself. The process of cultural appropriation has a wider 
context here. And because of this dependence on context, the content of 
appropriation will be most burdened by the moral implications 
surrounding the history of the novel.
In this way the terms of the debate on the rise of the Arabic novel 
can be shifted into new territory. It is often claimed, as noted above, that 
the development of an Arabic genre replicating the European novel form
01
of the nineteenth century may be partly elucidated by the “fact” that the 
Arabic canon has always viewed fiction as morally and aesthetically 
inferior. Such a view is now, it would seem, less deeply rooted in Arabic 
thinking. The Egyptian novelist and short story writer Gamal el-Ghitani, 
who has long championed the call for an authentic form of fiction, insists 
that proclaiming Zainab as the first attempt to write a modern form of 
fiction in Arabic is a proleptic proposition. This error in chronology is, he 
stresses, the result of taking the wrong turn:
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From the beginning, Arabic fiction took the wrong turn. We have 
always had our own forms of storytelling -  and I do not mean just 
One Thousand and One Nights, but also a great number of much 
more modest and less well known folklore epics, most of which 
were rendered orally and never recorded. But unfortunately the 
Arab writer at the turn of the century preferred to imitate European 
fiction. Such imitation went so far as to give a false image of life in 
Egypt. For example, in Zainab, Muhammad Husain Haykal’s novel 
which is considered the first attempt to write a modem form of 
fiction in Arabic, there is a scene in which a man confesses his sins. 
This is obviously a sheer imitation of French fiction, namely of 
Catholic writers, since in the Islamic tradition there is no such thing 
as a confession.32
This passage underlines, profoundly, the imperative need to re-assess the 
flawed notion of “beginning”, here rather seen in terms of a “wrong turn” 
taken by Arabic fiction. A critical evaluation of this notion will note, 
immediately, a tendency on the part of many critics to view a flawed 
“beginning” as just a case of de facto “origin”. In other words, the 
critique of literary stock-taking proposed here rests on the assumption 
that the present periodizing of the history of the novel has to be seen as 
mere pseudo-history. In presenting this “beginning” as a more or less 
arbitrary interruption, one that fails to appreciate the strength of the 
Arabic narrative tradition, el-Ghitani is at pains to emphasize that any 
totalizing discourse of modernity and narratology, excluding the 
legitimacy of authentic ethnic expressions of identity, is neither a 
“beginning” nor an “origin”.
Let us, finally, say a few words about the boundaries of the two 
main categories of periodization, determined by their own relatively
autonomous logic and dynamic. Not only in formal terms, but in 
substantive ones too, the propositions of “beginning” and “origin” are 
both mutually exclusive and mutually antipathetic. Beneath these 
seemingly interchangeable terms there are, at bottom, two sharply distinct 
processes of sequencing.
1 The process is piquantly linked to the concept of ancestral continuity. Thus the 
notion of “beginning” is viewed here as an “origin”, imbued as it is with the strong 
need to emphasize -  without substantive proof -  an apparently inevitable sense of 
historical continuity. As an illustration of this attempt to imply a possible total 
literary/cultural history, coupled with a deliberate abandonment of the notion of 
discontinuity, we may note Muhieddin al-Ladhikani’s book A b a ' al-hadathah al- 
Arabiyyah (“The Progenitors of Arab Modernity”) (Cairo: Al-Hay’a al-Misriyyah al- 
‘amma lil-Kitab, 1998). In viewing a group of highly significant prose writers o f the 
early ninth century (al-Jahiz, al-Hallaj and al-Tawhldi) as the ancestral originators of 
Arab modernity through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, al-Lazikani appears to 
underline the biological notion predominantly entailed in the logic of canonical 
ancestry. (See pp. 7-15.)
In terms of Michel Foucault’s very suggestive tools o f analysis, we may say he 
apparently overlooks the fact that the history of ideas is persistently discontinuous, 
and, as such, permanently fractured in terms of such concepts as break, displacement, 
gap, interruption, mutation, rupture and shift. See Foucault, Archaeology o f  
Knowledge, pp. 3-10, 12-15, 33-5, 40-1, 110-14, 127-8, 151, 152.
2Al-Thdbitwa ’l-mutahawwil, vol. 3, pp. 141-3.
3 Ibid., p. 230.
4 I am here using the term in its linguistic sense, to mean that our knowledge o f a 
text’s appropriateness within its context allows us to judge whether or not it deviates 
from “register”.
5 See Makaryk (ed.), Encyclopaedia o f  Contemporaiy Literary Theory, p. 462; Said, 
Beginnings, preface to the 1985 edition.
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6 The durable presence of a functioning “origin” denotes a continuous influence. The 
notion of “beginning”, by contrast, need not be conceived as exercising any such 
influence; it does not designate an “origin”.
7 This is a reference to Bakathlr’s idea of translating Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
into blank verse. “The method he employed in combining blank verse with ‘free- 
verse’ was also used by Abu Shadi in his poems which he described as nazm or shi ‘r 
mursal hnrr.” See Moreh, op. c it, p. 201.
8 Badawi, op. cit., p. 226,
9 Ibid.
10 Yusuf al-Khal’s name for the new poetry, al-shi V al-hadith (“modem poetry”), has 
served as a “register” o f acceptance, supplanting, as we shall see below, all other 
suggested names. In other words, the concept of modernism represented by the term 
connotes far more, in terms of ideas, than the mere technical innovations exemplified 
by the notion of “beginning”. The gist o f this model for modern poetry was proposed 
in a lecture delivered by al-Khal at al-Nadwa al-Lubnaniyyah in Beirut. See Jayyusi, 
Trends and Movements, Vol. 2, p. 569.
11 In this sense Jubran’s Romanticism has been hailed by many critics as a catalyst for 
the emergence of modernism. Jubran the romantic, that is to say, sowed the seeds of 
modernism.
12 There were two strands within the Surrealist movements. The first was that founded 
in Egypt and represented by George Hunein (1914-1973), along with a number of 
other revolutionary artists, writers and activists having direct links with the Surrealist 
movements in Europe. The second strand was that represented by two Syrians, 
Orkhan Muyassar and ‘Ali al-Nasir, who, in 1947, published a joint collection of 
poems entitled Siryal. In Egypt a large group of foreign writers brought to Cairo and 
Alexandria the revolutionary concepts of Surrealism and Trotskyism. Muyassar wrote 
an introduction to Sirycil, attacking the illiteracy of Arab literary taste -  a tacit 
admission, perhaps, that literary taste was not yet ready to appreciate such extreme 
forms o f expression. In 1992, Adunls published his seminal comparative study Al- 
Sufiyyah wa l-suiydliyyah (“Sufism and Surrealism”), pointing out the influence of 
the first on the second and thereby domesticating the cultural connotations of 
Surrealism.
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13 Voluntarism, in this context, implies the contention that the human will is the only 
factor in bringing about a radical change in a pre-modern society.
14 Modernist Poetry in Arabic, p. 28.
15 Ibid.
16 T.S. Eliot’s ideas of objectivity and impersonality have set the agenda for Arab 
modernists’ opposition to impressionistic criticism. The arguments set out by Barthes, 
Foucault and Derrida to support the concept of the “death of the author” have been 
presented as trend-setting slogans indicating the position taken by modernist 
European and Anglo-American criticism. As such, the concept has remained merely 
decorative in its use!
17 Hawthorn, op. cit., p. 151.
18 Badawi, op. cit., p. 225.
19 Jayyusi, Trends and Movements, Vol. 2, pp. 568-9.
20 Yusuf al-Khal joined the Syrian National Socialist Party in his youth, and his 
concept of modernism is deeply rooted in the teachings of the Party’s founder, Antun 
Sa'ada, who “had a lasting effect on his poetry and writings, even after he ceased to 
be officially connected with the party”. See Meisami and Starkey (eds.), 
Encyclopaedia o f  Arabic Literature, Vol. 2, p. 429.
21 Quoted in Jayyusi, Trends and Movements, Vol. 2, p. 570.
22 As a name, “modem poetry” is an integrating term whose domain conjoins a host 
of uncorrelated accounts of poetic experience. As such it may be seen as an umbrella 
term.
23 There is a long list of names. See, for instance: Jayyusi, Trends and Movements, 
Vol. 2, p. 569; and Moreh, op. cit., pp. 323-4 (a glossary of terms).
24 Adunls, Muqaddimah lil-shi'r a l-‘Arabi (“An Introduction to Arabic Poetry”), 
Beirut: Dar al-4Awdah, 1971, p. 39.
25 Translated into English by J.M. Grinsted, London, 1989. Cited in Meisami and 
Starkey (eds.), Encyclopaedia o f  Arabic Literature.
26 See Yahya Haqqi, Fajr al-qissa al-misriyyah (“The Dawn of Egyptian Fiction”), 
Cairo: Al-Hay’a ’1-Misriyyah al-‘ammah lil-Kitab, 1975.
27 Meisami and Starkey (eds.), Encyclopaedia o f  Arabic Literature, Vol. 1, p. 231.
28 Immanuel Kant, Education, trans. Annette Churton, Michigan: University of 
Michigan Press, 4th print, p. 73.
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29 Ibid.
30 That is to say, his work on education precedes his two epoch-making works 
Critique o f  Pure Reason (1781) and Critique o f  Practical Reason (1788), and does 
not, as such, embody a full commitment to his idealism.
31 This “fact” has now become controversial. Zainab -  supposedly the first novel in 
modem Arabic literature, influenced by western models of fiction rather than being 
developed directly from indigenous Arabic narratology -  was actually sidelined by its 
author twenty years after its publication. In 1933, Haykal published Thawrdt al-adab 
(“The Revolt of Literature”), a collection of critical writings in which he strongly 
promoted the idea of indigenous literature (adab qawmi), stressing the continuity of 
the Egyptian (Arab/Islamic) narrative tradition.
In The Genesis o f  Arabic Narrative Discourse: A Study in the Sociology o f  
Modern Arabic Literature, Sabri Hafiz challenges “the widely held assumption that 
Arabic culture stagnated before its contact with the West at the beginning o f the 
nineteenth century”. In other words, Arabic narratology is rather presented as a 
convincingly continuous discourse.
32 See Gamal al-Ghfrani, “The Quest for the Authentic and Innovative”, interview in 
Banipal: Magazine o f  Modern Arab Literature (London), No. 13, Spring, 2002, pp. 
10- 11.
Similar scepticism is expressed in Roger Allen’s Introduction to Arabic 
Literature. “In any historical survey o f the development o f the novel, Haykal’s 
Zaynab [.sic] clearly occupies an important position; the Egyptian countryside is 
lovingly depicted with the overwhelming sentiment of a writer recalling it from 
abroad in its most idealistic and romanticised garb {although it needs to be added that, 
even when compared with the descriptive detail o f  al-Muwaylihi’s work o f  a decade 
earlier, Zainab comes up short on authenticity).” Roger Allen, An Introduction to 
Arabic Literature, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 184.
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7. On Defining Modernity/Modernism in Terms of what it is Not
It seems appropriate, in this section, to examine the paradigm of 
modernity/modernism as a system of relationships that embody the 
tension between innovation and convention, thereby producing a Janus­
faced phenomenon that looks, simultaneously, in two contrary directions: 
those of negation and affirmation.]
This point of departure -  the proposition of a binarity of competing 
accounts -  leads on to the problem of an array of definitions which appear 
to cancel themselves out: to the problem, in other words, o f defining 
modernity in terms o f what it is not.
Prominent among those interlocutors providing interesting 
observations in an ongoing, cacophonous debate is the Moroccan theorist 
AJB. al-‘Ali. The observations in question, made in a piece entitled “Al- 
Gharb hadathah wa taqlid” (“The West is Modernity and Tradition”),2 
imply that the affirmation of what the paradigm of modernity is can be 
securely effected via the lens of the negation that is its antonym.
Al-‘Ali is particularly averse to any view that “modernity”, as an 
omnibus category, should be viewed, through the emotional perception 
of popular discourse, as synonymous with the “West”. An insistence (he 
argues dismissively) on the interchangeability of these two contextually 
distinct terms means that openness to modernity is premised, by 
ideology-bound proponents of an “absolute antagonistic position towards 
the West”, as tantamount to “on the one hand whole-heartedly embracing 
the values of the West, and, on the other, adopting it and adapting to its 
lifestyle and methods of thought”.
Such a contention, he explains, rests squarely on a double 
misunderstanding; for those maintaining such a position seem neither 
willing “to re-examine the West as a separate cognitive category
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(enclosed within its own limits), probing into the circumstance of its 
historical inception, nor capable of delving into the fundamentals of the 
concept of modernity”.
Because, al-‘Ali suggests, the term is used so variously, emotively 
and often fervidly, “modernization” is viewed by these ideology-bound 
proponents as a wilfully acted out process; and the very fact that they are 
intrinsically selective allows them the possibility of opting for “the parts 
they deem befitting” while rejecting “the parts they think inappropriate”. 
The bottom line, al-cAli concludes, may be effectively summed up in the 
following question: “What if the concept of modernity itself should turn 
out to be the catalyst, the determining factor in the process of change?”
To put the matter rather more intelligibly, the process of 
modernization may be construed here as an irresistible “historical 
inevitability (qadar tarikhi), a vast invasive movement, influencing both 
individuals and societies”. As such, modernity should be viewed “not as a 
monolith of overlapping concepts and notions posited for adoption; not as 
a philosophy to embrace or advocate; not as a cultural vogue to follow, 
mimic or reject; but as a mode of being”.4
In sum, modernity is a human condition, a cultural disposition, a 
complex cluster of concepts and notions that are continually produced 
and reproduced in theory and action: “rationalism, industry, design, 
planning, the relationship of man with time and space.” The upshot of all 
this is an inexorable inevitability:
Escaping this raging torrent [of modernization] is a mere illusion, 
equal only to the illusion of viewing “modernity” and the “West” 
as contextually synonymous, thus erroneously positing one 
common monolithic framework conjoining the two categories.
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The relationship of these somehow distinct keywords, acting out beyond 
their domain of validity, renders them neither symmetric nor 
commutative; for, as a concept:
The West is a blend o f  modernity and tradition, selfhood and 
otherness, heritage and contemporaneity. It is not the paradigmatic 
monolith perceived by its ideology-laden opponents, who 
persistently overlook a complex of internal differences and 
nuances, while postulating the West as a cultural enclosure solely 
identifiable with modernity.
Al-‘Ali makes these points with a view to indicating (albeit obliquely) 
that the paradigm of modernity is strictly non-temporal,5 existing outside 
the seemingly discordant cultural polarization of East versus West. His 
purpose is to stress; (a) that modernity should not be perceived as an 
ideologically contaminated concept; and (b) that the process of 
modernization springs primarily from a reliance on unconscious as much 
as conscious convergence — indeed interaction -  encompassing 
permanence and change.
In a sensitive study, published in English under the title 
Occidentosis: A Plague from the West,6 the Persian writer Jalal c Ali 
Ahmad, who came to prominence in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, 
proffers a distinct yet not unrelated example of the categories of the 
“West” and “modernity” being lumped together in some kind of 
monolithic paradigmatic unity.
The author’s main thesis (which follows an extreme polemic line) 
is aptly encapsulated as follows by an Iranian critic:
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Iran has been stricken by a condition which he likens to an 
infectious illness and which he calls Gharbzadagi, a difficult term, 
which has here been translated by Robert Campbell as 
“Occidentosis”. He depicts Iranians, and in particular the educated 
classes, as having been hypnotized and debilitated by a western 
education and the influx of western consumer goods. In particular, 
he is worried by the way in which Iran is being overrun by 
machines which he identifies as the new weapon of colonialism. 
The expert technicians and advisers from the West that are needed 
to maintain and utilize the machines have replaced the old forces of 
colonialism, while Iran’s own educated classes stand cowed and
Q
subservient to their masters from the West.
Unsurprisingly, this infectious “Occidentosis” is then posited as the 
embodiment of a fusion between the two contextually distinct domains of 
“West” and “modernity”. And one result of this fusion is described by the 
author as “the rootlessness and lack of direction of ‘occidentotic’ 
Iranians”.9
This is, of course, an uncompromising value judgement; one 
stressing the “negative” impact of modernity on the educated Iranian 
elite. Such a notion -  of an all-pervasive experience of rootlessness and 
lack of direction undermining occidentosis-stricken Iranians -  springs 
from the ongoing process of modernization, and is viewed, by the author, 
from within the context of a westernization conceived as its cultural 
synonym. Herein, clearly, lies a disqualification of the whole notion of 
modernization. Seen as a shorthand term for westernization, it confirms, 
albeit uncritically, the proposition of an absolute dualistic opposition of 
the two poles of the essentialist dichotomy of “Orient” versus “Occident”.
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The critic quoted responds to this proposition, pointedly, in the 
same passage, rejecting as redundant the whole notion of an Oriental 
exclusivity .10 For him, “this is in fact one of the phenomena of the malaise 
of modernity”, and is consequently “just as applicable to many in the 
West”.
The point about the foregoing disputational account, outlining 
certain examples of what modernity is in terms of what it is not, is that 
the examples in question portray modernity as an all-encompassing 
category; one which -  grounding a primordial condition -  subtends, albeit 
obliquely, so many different phenomena: cultural, ideological,
psychological, and so on. The very concept of the modern is thus too 
frequently robbed of contextual specificity in order to function as a 
preponderant framework for a “mode of being”.
A more relevant and particular example of theory-making, 
informed specifically by modern Arabic poetry, is set out in Adunls’s 
delineation of what he pointedly terms “superficial modernity”. Such a 
version of modernity (Adunls explains), holding forth as it does on a 
cluster of seemingly self-evident truths, “is engendered partly by a fear of 
confronting the true state of Arab culture and partly by an understanding 
which stops at appearances, giving rise to many illusions” .11 For Adunls, 
there are a number of illusions acting as specific obstacles to the 
development of modern poetry.
The first illusion, springing from a false belief regarding the nature 
of modernity, is epitomized by the concept of al-zamaniyyah 
(temporality). Modernity, Adunls argues, is erroneously viewed by some 
as “the quality of being directly connected with and alive to the present 
moment”. Thus, “to seize the movement of change in this moment is 
proof of modernity”. For him this is a misconception, based, quite
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evidently, on linear thinking -  a process whereby time is seen as 
embodying or resembling a single line of progression:
It is obvious that these people view time as a series of regular 
uninterrupted leaps forward, so that what happens today is 
necessarily an advance on what happened yesterday, and what 
happens tomorrow is an advance on both.
Such a view is widely held; and it shifts the debate to the idea of 
mu ‘asarah (contemporaneity), to the concept of rahiniyyah (currentness), 
or of belonging to a present time persistently occurring as the contextual 
deteiminant of meaning.
The alternative concept implicit in Adunls’s position is thus more 
unequivocally hostile to linear thinking than might at first sight appear. It
is a concept, indeed, whose connotations propose a seamless web of
* 12 unsettling assumptions: discontinuity, interruption, rupture, shift.
The evident misconception of modernity becomes all the more
revealing, in the light of Adunls’s account, when viewed from within
what happens to poetry. As he cogently argues:
The mistake of this tendency is to turn poetry into a style, ignoring 
the essential point that most modem poetry goes beyond the present 
moment, or goes against it. Poetry does not acquire its modernity 
merely from being current. Modernity is a characteristic latent in 
the cultural structure of poetic language.
The upshot is that, as a manner of expressing thought and feeling in 
language, “style”, the seemingly unassailable domain, is for Adunls the
98
antonym of poetic language. He is thus, in a sense, resolutely dismissive 
of the constrictive connotations embedded in the very concept of style.
As for Adunls’s contention that modem poetry goes either 
“beyond” the present or “against” it -  thereby ruling out as unviable the 
notion of rahiniyyah (currentness) as some kind of “now” surrounding us 
-  this must be seen as reflecting an underlying tendency to perceive 
modernity as a culture of opposition. In other words, modernity is 
viewed, through the lens of an oppositional criticism, as symptomatic of 
the ills that need to be diagnosed.
The second illusion is “the desire to be different from the ancients 
at all costs”. This illusion stems from viewing the paradigm of modernity 
as the result of an open-ended tension between tradition and innovation. 
Yet the tradition of, for example, such poets as Abu Nuwas (755-813) or 
al-Niffari (d. 1291),13 reveals, so Adunls tells us, no mode of 
conventionalism. Those adhering to this illusion, he notes disapprovingly, 
“think that merely to be different from what has gone before is proof of 
modernity”. Such a position (Adunls continues) asserts an “instrumental” 
point of view, “which turns creativity into a game of opposites, like the 
doctrine of al-zamaniyyah (temporality)”. There is no reference here to 
the limits of “difference” as a criterion for successful inquiry. Adunls’s 
present concern is rather to highlight the “game” implied by the “doctrine 
of temporality”:
One sets “ancient” times against “new” times, the other, the 
“ancient” text against the “new” text. Thus innovation in poetry 
resembles waves on the surface of the water, vanishing one after 
another, despite the fact that a brief glance at the poetry of Abu 
Nuwas or al-Niffari, for example, reveals it as more modern than 
much of the counter-poetry of poets who are alive today.
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Here is a straightforward advocacy of a decontextualized model of 
modernity. Modernity is ultimately a timeless phenomenon, a context- 
free category; and poetry, for Adunis, consists principally in creativity, 
which is timeless too, regardless of when or where. The closing sentences 
o f Al-Shi 'riyyah al- ‘Arabiyyah are emblematic of this:
Modernity should be a creative vision, or it will be no more than 
fashion. Fashion grows old from the moment it is born, while 
creativity is ageless. Therefore not all modernity is creativity but 
creativity is eternally modern.14
In the present context, what merits attention is what is implied by 
Adunls5s disapproval of the “doctrine of temporality”. Far from 
embodying any attempt to dehistoricize modernity by viewing it in 
absolute terms as a timeless category, his argument tends to suggest the 
following: (a) that modern poetry does not converge with the present 
moment, but rather goes beyond it; and (b) that it is therefore at cross­
purposes with the present, if not at actual loggerheads with it. For Adunls, 
then, the relationship of modernity and time is not synchronic, even if the 
factors it brings into play do belong to the same moment in the present.
The third illusion brings us once more to Adunls’s stance on 
cultural mimicry: on the act of appropriating from another culture, or 
copying or slavishly imitating it. It is in this context that mimicry is 
viewed as grounding an implicit assertion of the notion of “authenticity”, 
thus suggesting the construction of false identity. In the present case, the 
idea of being the willing subject of a continuous play of European 
cultural prowess highlights the threat intrinsic in mimicry: namely, the 
tendency to view other cultures as essentially superior.
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Cultural authenticity, as set forth in modern Arabic poetry, 
addresses a broad phenomenon through a specific case. For Adunls, 
authenticity is first and foremost a matter of identification.
The West is supposedly the source of modernity. There is no
l ^modernity outside western poetry and its standards: to be modern 
it is necessary to identify with western poetry. From this there 
arises an illusion about norms where standards of modernity in the 
West, springing from a specific language and experience, become 
the standards for a language and experience of a different nature.16
The method employed here is straightforward: it is a matter of 
cutting the ground from under the feet of some Arab critics by showing 
that “difference” is crucially important. The term “difference” refers, 
persistently, to a preoccupation with the ideas of cultural identity and 
contextual specificity.
The notion of “difference” would appear to have its origin, 
primarily, in French critical theory. Fundamental to the approach of 
Ferdinand de Saussure is the view that language itself works as a system 
of difference. In Adunls’s argument, on the other hand, the emphasis is 
not on language in a broad sense but more specifically on the language of 
poetry, perceived as designating “different” cultural identity. The other 
determiner noted by Adunls is “contextual”; it is constituted, formulated 
and defined by “difference” as positing the interrelated conditions in 
which Arab culture exists. If these assumptions are viewed as plausible, 
the core of the Adumsian critique of difference begins to look less 
essentialized17 -  in marked contrast to an Orientalist ontology that fixes 
its gaze on “difference” as a self-perpetuating point of reference, posing 
the problem in terms of a polarized divergence between East and West.
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Another way of putting this is to note the centrality, in Adums’s
— 18 * observations above, of what he calls wahm al-mumathalah (the illusion
of identification), involving the concept of Eurocentrism -  the conscious
or unconscious process whereby European cultural assumptions are
deployed as the norms of the natural and the universal. For Adunls,
Arabic literary theory, rather than adopting a process of identification, is
open to the possibilities of reconstructing relations of difference, through
an emphasis on the destabilizing process of “disidentification”. Once
again, it is the fact of difference-inclusion that is emphasized.
Tending as it does to eschew the negatively oriented tendency of
ideological otherness, this tentative position may be seen as tactical rather
than strategic.19 It does not negate current affinities with western literary
theory; it simply implies, albeit obliquely, an attempt to redress the
balance.
The fourth illusion has, as its focus, the long-running debate that 
arose following the emergence of prose as a modern poetic form; the 
central issue at stake, in this ongoing dispute, being the complex question 
of conformity. Addressing this question in relation to modernity, Adunls 
notes as follows:
There are those who believe that simply to write in prose, because 
it is different from the old metric writing and conforms to models 
of poetic prose in the West, is a way in to modernity.
This, he continues, leads on to the erroneous conclusion that “all metric
on * 4writing is derivative and old fashioned and all free verse is innovatory 
and modernist”.
As a technical feature, “versification” is seen here not as a process 
of nazm comprising structured technical devices of verse (patterns of
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variation and repetition involving rhythm and sound), but rather as a 
process of sha ‘rcrnah (poetization), namely turning prose into free verse 
without following any rhyme scheme. The main innovation in this respect 
is that the rhythmic flow is based on the free expression of unfettered 
thought or emotion.
The argument, Adunls points out, begins to lose coherence when 
free verse is elevated to the level of superior art form per se. Conformity 
to models of poetic prose in the West is conceived, consequently, as a 
substitute for critical evaluation of the status, rank or merit of this “new” 
form.
Turning to the other possibility embedded in his central 
observations, Adunls suggests a similar emphasis:
This is the reverse of the traditionalist concept that metre in itself is 
poetry, and prose of whatever kind is the antithesis of poetry. The 
emphasis is placed not on the substance of poetry but on its 
external form.
Yet the presence, or absence, of some formal devices of poetry 
poses far more than a question of aesthetic style or poetic methodology. 
Adunls is well aware that literary rules, whether primary or derivative, 
can never ensure genuine end-product poetry. “Neither metre nor free 
verse,” he insists, “is enough in itself to ensure that the final product will 
be poetry.” Indeed:
We all know verse which has metre and rhyme but is nothing to do 
with poetry, and supposedly poetic contemporary free verse which 
is similarly devoid of poetry.
103
Adunls’s reading of and response to the distorted impact, on 
modern Arabic poetry, of some models of western poetic prose is for the 
most part insistently contextual. His intention, one may assume, has not 
been to trace external influences on Arabic literary theory, but to assert 
the presence of culturally contextual differences between the general 
tenets of two distinctive poetics. Thus the focal point is not the common 
tenets reflecting certain common features, that is, affinities. The emphasis 
here is rather on the misrepresentation of modern Arab poetics, whereby 
persistent negative strands are highlighted.
The fifth illusion concerns “content”, the term being used by 
Adunls to designate the theme of a work, the statement of its meaning, 
the connotation of its central idea.
A poetic text, he argues, cannot be seen as modem merely because 
of an implicit connection with current issues.
Those who subscribe to this illusion believe that every poetic text 
which treats contemporary issues is necessarily modern, a claim 
which does not stand up to examination, for a poet can treat these 
themes according to his intellectual understanding of them, while 
his artistic approach and manner of expression remain traditional.
In the light of the above, it would appear that the stress in neo- 
classicist poetry has been placed, all too evidently, on modernizing the 
content of the poem to provide a norm, a benchmark for its modernity. 
Adunls goes on to say:
From the Iraqis, al-Rusafi (1875-1945) and al-Zahawi (1863-1936), 
and the Egyptians, Hafiz Ibrahim (1872-1932) and Ahmad Shawqi 
(1868-1932), up to the present, there are numerous examples, as
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there are in the work of all those poets who express their “modern” 
ideological belief in their poetry.
These examples of “neo-classicism” share a common ground. They are 
posited as invalidated models whereby “newness” has now become 
virtually redundant. By reducing the concept of modern poetry to 
“content” as opposed to “form”, these models effectively project a 
seamless web of connotations lacking in freshness and originality. 
Consisting as they do of conventional thought, emotion and attitude, they 
not only reiterate a cluster of overused devices of poetiy slavishly 
retrieved from the past but also seek persistently to reproduce them.
One strand of this revivalist movement emerges clearly in what
— 2 1 “ *Adunls dismisses as shi ‘riyyat al-kaldm al-qadim, meaning the poetics
of old modes of expression.
Having established (following Saussure) that al-kaldm., speech (“la
parole”), or mode of literary expression, must now be viewed as distinct
from al-lisan, language (“la langue”) -  as being the subjective,
autonomous and unconfined deployment of language, and understood in
terms of the dynamics of feeling and emotion uncontrolled, therefore, by
the mechanism of language alone -  Adunls now proceeds to investigate
the revivalist and neo-classicist with specific reference to samples of
Shawqi’s poetiy, viewing these as the pattern par excellence for flawed
attempts to modernize poetry. One such sample is a qasida (poem) whose
subject matter (or “speech”) is the city of Paris. This subject matter,
Adunls notes, comprises three elements: love, praise (jnadlh) and
reminiscence (dhikra).
Shawqi’s diction draws on classical Arabic poetry; and, as such, its
metaphorical performance seems increasingly conventional. The
denotational and connotational relationships grounding the structure of
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the poem result in the reproduction of images, allusions and concepts that 
do not correspond to Paris, the “modern” city which is the subject matter. 
The poet here describes a state of war: the beloved attacks her lover with 
the “weapon” of her eyes; the eyes are as “swift” as a sword, etc.
The diction is based, in short, on a view of love from a strictly 
conventional perspective, maintaining a crudely mimetic function within
a framework of pre-modernity. Similarly, the element of praise (;madlh)
• * 22  * * reiterates the same old cluster of words: Paris is jannah (“paradise”); it
is the culmination of “glory”, “wisdom”, “science”; and it is, furthermore,
“the epoch, the queen of time, the righteous, the beam of civilization”.
This is the Paris of the present time. As for the past, Paris is envisioned as
“a lion and a gazelle”.
Moving now to the “speech” of reminiscence (dhiltra), this is 
presented by Shawqi as a window on a long-running poetic diction. For 
him, Adunls explains, Paris is seen as a “playground for youth”, and 
“poetry alone is worthy of lavishing praise on it”. In one sense, the notion 
of the poet’s intended newness gives way to a verbal play of signifrers 
(words) producing and reproducing unsurprising signifieds (concepts). As 
such, the self-identity of the signifieds repeats itself ceaselessly, 
remaining, thus, in a state of permanent fixity.
Finally, there is (as noted in this brief expose) a certain web of 
words that, when set against the poem’s subject matter, are still more 
infelicitous, in the sense that they disclose unremittingly ideology-laden 
connotations. Take, for instance, some of the core vocabulary noted by 
Adunls as possessing an unmistakably theological pedigree: “paradise”, 
“abundance” (,kawthar),24 “heaven”, “revelation” (wahy). For Adunls the
* 25 *employment of such terminology is intrinsically duplicative. It is more 
intended than attended, and, as such, must be seen in terms of rote 
learning and parroting: the poetic diction is the result, constantly, of a
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mechanical use of memory. As a result the ideological underpinning of 
this diction emerges as the direct efflux of a collective memory, being 
regurgitated before an audience rather than offering any intimate model 
of autonomous poetic subjectivity. What we have here, in fact, is a classic 
example of “denotation” whereby a “clichegenic”26 vocabulary is 
associated with the closure of meaning. On the other hand, as Adunls is 
anxious to stress, the introduction of a prefabricated poetic diction is 
indicative of the blockage of “connotative” flow.
Having provided examples of how ideologically structured 
terminology works, he concludes that the diction of Shawqi’s poem is no 
longer capable of producing kaldm in the sense of being a “speech”; of 
being, that is, a personal language actually used by the speaker as 
opposed to language broadly based on a system of signs (lisdri). As a 
result, a depersonalized model of kalam, drawing heavily as it does on a 
repository of hackneyed words and expressions whose communicative 
function predominates in practical and emotional language, is the price 
the “revivalist” poet must pay for his stress on conventionality -  a feature 
in evidence in numerous texts lacking either individuality or originality. It 
is this ideological use of al-kaldm (or mode of literary expression) that 
leads Adunls’s search to an unflinchingly ideological structure, 
embedding Shawqi’s poem. Predictably enough, this demonstrably 
evident structure is the outcome of a retrieval of a “common discourse” 
(khitdb mushtarak), proposing the function of clichegenically-oriented 
words. This is exactly what the poetic diction has done in its capacity for
27
(in Adunls’s terminology) “weaving a Salafi texture with a Salafi 
loom”.
The crucial point for Adunls is that al-kaldm, being a personal 
language, is context-sensitive. Yet the poetic diction in Shawqi’s poem is 
both ideology-oriented and context-free. It has, Adunls explains, become
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a collective kaldm conjoining “the rites of Salafi lore and its manner of 
expression”.28 What all this amounts to is that Shawqi has wilfully 
deployed al-kaldm in an ideological manner, thus persistently repeating a 
“collectively inherent discourse”. The poem is, in other words, an 
“ideological construction”.
How then (Adunls asks) may this “ideological structure” be 
unveiled? The answer he proposes may be summed up as follows:
(a) On the level of kaldm (“parole”), that is, individual utterances and 
their meanings, Shawqi is “not an individual uttering his own words 
but a speaker repeating common utterances”. As a poet, therefore, he 
is not present in his own self but in this (clichegenic) kaldm, 
regurgitating a Salafi poetic discourse; and, in consequence, the 
ideological dimension is not individualistic but collective, the poetic 
voice purely conventional. Yet convention, here, does not innovate 
but rather lends support to the power of a ruminant “parole”.
(b) On the level of lisdn, that is the workings within language that 
underlie its system of rules and distinctions, Shawqi seems to “opt 
for particular words”. These words imply the importance, indeed the 
glory of Paris, the subject matter of his poem.
(c) The nature of Shawqi’s speech is “neither argumentative nor 
contemplative nor informative”. It is a patronizing speech suggesting 
a process of patronage whereby Paris -  which is representative of a 
kind of reality different from Egyptian or Arab-Islamic reality -  
becomes subservient to an entirely dissimilar speech modality.
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(d) Shawqi’s speech is the retrieved form of Salafi power. The meaning 
and form of Paris is, in this sense, contained by this power.
(e) The concept of the “other”, depicted by Paris, is therefore “a 
representation or extension of the ‘se lf as presented by Shawqi’s 
speech”. When, Adunls insists, the “other” is viewed as an extension 
of “m yself’, this amounts to a process of negation -  in other words, 
his/her separate identity has been negated. Hence the conclusion that 
the poem points out two absences: Paris and the poet. The study of 
Shawqi’s poem thus confirms the arguments proposed by Adunls 
with regard to al-Nahdah, the term used by Arab writers to describe 
the process of Arabic literary and cultural revival which took place 
during the second half of the nineteenth century and early years of 
the twentieth. This process of renewal, it is often claimed, anticipated 
later trends and movements leading to modernist poetry.
It follows, not unexpectedly, that these and a host of other questions 
have persistently accompanied that reversion to a classical poetic diction 
which was central to al-Nahdah's model of modernization. However, the 
great merit of Adunls’s critique of this ideological reversion has been to 
force the trajectory of argument beyond Shawqi’s sterile “newness”, 
which long seemed modern Arabic poetry’s only alternative. In a sense, 
indeed, the essence of this critique has become the focal point for Arabic 
literary theory today.
1 A line in an anonymous pre-Islamic poem may conveniently serve to confirm the 
dynamism of this polarity: “Beauty is revealed by its opposite.” A synthesis 
combining different versions o f the poem, which is contested between forty Jahili 
poets, was recently produced in a spirit of open modem vision. See Kamal Abu DTb
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(ed.), Al-Dwrah al-yatimah (“The Orphan Pearl”), with detailed study o f the text, 
Beirut: Mawaqif Publications, 2000.
Opposites play an important part in the Greek world view: Plato and Aristotle 
analyzed change as a passage from one opposite to another. Goethe and the 
Romantics endorsed the notion that the world essentially involves opposition or 
polarity. See Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999, p. 206.
The binary use of opposites is highly characteristic of structuralism, though 
Derrida has called this methodology into question. Deployment o f the method o f polar 
opposition is proposed here in a pragmatic sense. As such, the validity of the concept 
of polarity is regarded as determined solely by the practical consequences of this 
deployment.
2 Al-Haydt (Arabic) daily, London, 6 January 2002, p. 20.
3 The term “omnibus” is used in a multiplicity of disciplines (and has perhaps been 
overworked of late in Arabic writings). Modernity appears “omnibus” in its capacity 
to include a considerable variety of disputatious propositions.
4 Al-‘Ali seems here to be in full agreement with Hisham Sharabi, who also depicts 
modernity as a “mode o f being”. In contrast, however, to Sharabi’s piquant conclusion 
that this “mode o f being” is not a model to aspire to or an example to imitate, al-‘Ali 
stresses that Arabic thought has no choice but to take on board the extra intellectual 
baggage contained in modernity. For Sharabi, intellectuals o f the post-colonial 
periphery, including the Arab world, “can ill afford the risk of philosophical and 
theoretic skepticism [involved in modernity]; and even were they to take this risk, it 
would -  probably -  only lead them to political paralysis”. See Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, 
p. x.
5 The validation of this conclusion is underlined when modernity is not conceived as 
historically too narrow. Consider, for instance, Jurgen Habermas’s argument:
People considered themselves modern during the period o f Charles the Great 
in the 12th [szc] century, as well as in France of the late 17th century at the time 
of the famous “Querelles des Anciens et des Modemes”. That is to say, the 
term “modem” appeared and reappeared exactly during those periods in 
Europe when the consciousness of a new epoch formed itself through a 
renewed relationship to the ancients — whenever, moreover, antiquity was 
considered a model to be recovered through some kind o f imitation.
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See Jurgen Habermas, “Modernity -  An Incomplete Project”, in Vincent B. Leitch 
(ed.), The Norton Anthology o f  Theory and Criticism, New York and London: W.W. 
Norton and Co., 2001, p. 1749.
The negation o f the notion of “temporality” (aTzamaniyyah) is emphasized in 
Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 86.
6 Edited by Hamid Algar, trans. R. Campbell, Berkeley, California: Mlzan Press, 
1984. The work is cited here as illustrating the impact of modernization on post­
colonial periphery regions. Written originally in Persian and dealing with distorted 
change in Iranian culture and society, the book represents — with regard to Arab- 
Islamic culture -  a distinct but not unrelated experience.
7 An ardent critic o f the Iranian fascination with the West, Jalal ‘Ali Ahmad, author of 
Gharb-zadagi (variously translated elsewhere as “West-struckness”, “Westoxication” 
and “Euromania”), appears to launch his attack on the West from within a firm sense 
of Iranian identity based on Islamic sentiment. His sudden rise to prominence 
following the Iranian Revolution reflects Islamic fundamentalist credentials. 
Nevertheless, the book’s authority, according to a scholar o f modern Persian 
literature, “is founded on a close familiarity with the other”. It is well known, he 
writes, “that it grows out of a reading of Heidegger’s dialogue with Ernst Jiinger on 
the shortcomings of European culture in Uber die Linie” See Michael Beard, 
Hedayat’s Blind Owl as a Western Novel, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990, p. 224.
8 See M. Momen’s review of Occidentosis in the British Society fo r  Middle Eastern 
Studies Bulletin, ed. J.D. Latham, Vol. 14, No. 2, London, 1988, pp. 227-8.
9 Ibid.
10 This rejection o f the notion of “Oriental exclusivity” in a sense underlines Michael 
Beard’s remark on the same point, cited above.
11 Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, pp. 86, 87, 88.
12 Adunis’s critique of conventional methodology recalls Foucault’s concept of 
discontinuity. For the conventional literary historian, time is made up of a multiplicity 
of instances which he must remould into a continuous narrative. In contrast, Foucault 
(as has been previously pointed out) stresses the idea of history as discontinuous, 
made up of a series of breaks, displacements, gaps, mutations, shifts.
I l l
13 Al-Niffari was a Sufi thinker and poet “who left behind him a series of ‘revelations’
(Kitab al-mawdqif and Kitab al-mukhatabat) purporting to have been received from 
God in a state of ecstasy, possibly by automatic writing”. See A.J. Arberry, Sufisrn: 
An Account o f  the Mystics o f  Islam, London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1950, 1979, p. 64.
In his Al-Sufiyyah wa ’l-suryaliyyah (“Sufism and Surrealism”), pp. 185-93, 
AdunTs refers to the writings o f al-Niffari as emblematic o f what he aptly calls “the 
poetics of thought”. His reading of this curious and interesting Sufi theorist has led 
him to the discovery of the poetry of thought.
14 Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, pp. 101-2.
15 In this sense the opponents of modern Arabic poetry effectively support Europeans’ 
belief in their own superiority by accepting the cultural assumptions o f Eurocentrism.
16 AdunTs, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 87.
17 “Difference” here is not an absolute category.
18 This is the expression used by AdunTs in the Arabic text of An Introduction to Arab 
Poetics. See A l-Shi‘riyyah al-Arabiyyah , Beirut: Dar al-Adab, 1985, 1989, p. 94.
19 AdunTs’s view of Arab civilization confirms this point. Consider, for instance, the 
following passage:
Modernity in Arabic poetry had its origins in a climate which brought together 
two independent elements: awareness of the new urban culture which 
developed in Baghdad in the eighth century, and a new use o f the language to 
embrace this awareness and express it in poetry. It developed in a spirit of 
opposition to the ancient, at the same time interacting with non-Arab currents. 
The whole thrust of Arab civilization testifies to this, for it is a synthesis o f  the 
pre-Islamic period and Islam, from whence it derives its origins and heritage, 
and o f  other cultures -  Persian, Greek and Indian -  through adoption and 
interaction, permeated by the most ancient elements deposited in the historical 
memoiy: Sumerian, Babylonian, Aramaean and Syriac.
See Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 89.
20 Derived, that is, from traditional taqlidi poetry.
21 A chapter in AdunTs’s Siydsat al-shi'r (“The Politics of Poetry”), Beirut: Dar al- 
Adab, 1985, pp. 89-105. The Arabic term al-kaldm, as used by AdunTs, is different 
from its use in 7/m al-kaldm (the science of debate), denoting rather an argumentative 
discipline of Islamic thought broadly referred to as theology.
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22 Jannah (“garden”) is used in the Qur’an to refer to paradise and thus has a religious 
connotation. The Qur’an describes it as: the garden of delight; the garden of eternal 
life; the garden of refuge; and paradise. See Jan Knapp ert, The Encyclopaedia o f  
Middle Eastern Mythology and Religion, Shaftesbury, Dorset: Element Books, 1993, 
p. 169.
23 See AdunTs, Siydsat al-shi ‘r, p. 91.
24 Al-kauthar means “ample”, “plentiful”, “abundant”. The religious connotation of 
the word is reflected in the name of the Qur’anic Sura entitled Al-Kauthar. 
Unbelievers would taunt the Prophet with the fact that he had no son, and therefore no 
one to uphold his religion after him. See Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, The 
Glorious Qur'an, text and explanatory translation, New York: Muslim World League 
Publications, 1977, p. 735. In Islamic mythology, al-Kauthar is the name of a river in 
heaven.
25 That is, amenable to repetition.
26 This neologism is borrowed from the sociologist Anton C. Zijderveld. See A.C. 
Zijderveld, On Cliches: The Supersedure o f Meaning by Function in Modernity, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 26.
27 Al-Salafiyyah is the name of a reformist movement associated with Muhammad 
‘Abduh (1849-1905), the Grand Mufti o f Egypt. ‘Abduh’s emphasis on the need for 
an Islamic renaissance based on a modem world view has been influential in many 
Islamic countries. However, the failure o f the Salafi movement to advance Islamic 
modernization resulted in the subsequent debasement of the term “Salafi” itself.
28 Siydsat al-shi'r, p. 92.
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III. Modernism: Closing the Synthetic Circle
The foregoing arguments, discordant if nonetheless interrelated thus far, 
will vary from writer to writer by virtue of the semiotic logic involved; 
and indeed, the sense of most other terms relating to modernity, and to 
modernism in its various fields, will depend on who is producing the 
meaning, and on how each person understands “meaning” itself, which 
always bears the interpretative marks placed upon it by the cultural 
context.
Giving a broader sense to articulation will, as such, place these 
seemingly floating arguments and counter-arguments in context. It will 
raise the problem of definition and underline the adaptability of literary 
theoiy, which continuously remakes meanings (where the old ones are 
insufficiently precise for the puipose in hand), rather than seeking the 
precision of an accomplished, self-confirming stability.1
Yet this is only part of the complex process of articulating, and of 
providing a framework for closing the synthetic circle. What the notion of 
a framework for synthetic closure might entail here is the emergence, 
through the construction of an overall pattern -  achieved through the 
inteiplay of the modern and its antithesis -  of a sense of an open-ended 
final stage of reasoned argument based on modernism and its antonym. 
Far from being fixed in some essentialized monolith, such a framework 
ensures, albeit tentatively, that the meanings and significations of 
modernity/modernism are not reducible to any single trend or approach.
The other complicating factor is that the epithet “modern” (as has 
been obliquely pointed out) refers to a vibrant project that is still in flux, 
being permanently made and remade, and subject to the continuous play 
of contradictory versions of internal contexts and external influences built
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up by such cultural transmitters as literary and critical works, 
universalized ideas and globalized media.
AdunTs’s account of the permeability and complementarity of 
culture clearly leads on to an immensely powerful notion of cultural 
interaction, which is necessary if any effective creativity is to take place 
at all:
The effectiveness of Arab creativity . . . demonstrates that no 
culture exists in isolation from other cultures -  they give and take 
from each other; they influence and are influenced. It also shows 
that the first condition for this process of interaction is that it 
should be characterized by creativity and particularity at the same 
time. This combination carried Arab-Islamic civilization at its most 
mature to the West by way of Andalusia.2
Modernism 3s antithetical terms
It might be argued, conversely, that a further important point should be 
underlined here. As a term, the “modern” has come to be linked with a 
cluster of associatory concepts, such as the antithetical terms “ancient”, 
“traditional”, “authentic”, “pre-modern”, “anti-modern” and 
“postmodern”. From this springs the problem of positing, erroneously, 
one “pre-given” version of cultural identity, fixed and rooted in some 
mythologized past. Cultural identity always refers, in this slower rhythm 
o f modernization, to the notion o f  renovating rather than innovating, 
correlative to a misleading interpretation of an essentialized model of 
asdlah (authenticity). Much Arabic anti-modernist poetry and theoiy is 
self-consciously atavistic. A matter of crucial concern, still, in 
contemporary literary theoiy is the claim -  advanced by some writers of 
mainstream Islamist revivalism, both pre-modern and anti-modern -  that
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the new paradigm can be embraced only at the expense of the old. The 
implication here is that the very concept of renewal must be based on 
understanding the present not on its own terms but m terms of the past. 
The notion of newness must (it is suggested) be altered, even subverted -  
for is it not constantly at loggerheads with essentialist a priori 
assumptions about a changeless sense of authenticity? This notion of a 
sense of authenticity -  permanent, immutable and everlasting -  is best 
exemplified in M.S. al-Raffi’s portrayal of the concept of innovation. 
Consider, for instance, his understanding of this term as posited in Tahta 
raydt al-Qur’an (“Under the Banner of the Qur’an”): “Innovation means 
that an innovationist writer is a plagiarist living off European books . . . ” 
Such a writer is, he adds significantly, “an atheist without a religion”.4
From this standpoint, then, innovation is perceived disparagingly as 
an act of ignominious appropriation, a deliberate abdication, on the part 
of the writer, of his own sense of cultural identity. In this lingering 
context, innovation thus becomes “no more than mere fiction; a betrayal 
of truth itself’.5 In sum, “fiction” is seen, from this fundamentalist 
perspective, as emblematic of inauthentic reality, and as denoting, 
specifically, a culturally contaminated state of “otherness”.
“Fact”, by contrast, is viewed as implying a sense of belonging to 
the authentic self, to the literalness implicit in a permanently fixed, 
indigenous and uncontaminated reality. It is precisely in this locus that 
the theological connotation of authenticity is pointedly emphasized. By 
stressing the notion of faithfulness to, and emulation of, a fossilized 
origin, an “authentic” writer becomes the replicator o f a primordial 
model, equipping its quintessential epitome with fundamentalist 
pretensions. Thus, innovation should finally be rejected (without adequate 
grounds) as intrinsically inauthentic.
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Sayyed Qutb, an exponent of Islamic anti-modem 
fundamentalism,6 adopted just such a line. For him, Arab culture should 
emulate, strictly, the churlish purism of Ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328),7
o * •whose exclusivist, radical and dogmatic postulations brought him into 
conflict with the Mamluks of Egypt, and led to his consequent 
imprisonment. In M a falim f i  ’l-tariq (“Milestones Along the Way”), Qutb 
links his position to Ibn Taymiyyah’s regressive cultural model, asserting, 
with disapproval, that the majority of present-day Muslims are living as 
Jahilis (i.e., following the pagan ways of Arabs prior to the coming of 
Muhammad and the revelation). Hence his insistence, all-encompassing 
and relentless, on a reversionary form of cultural identity, effectively 
embodying a call for a return to the values of the Qur’an, and for 
following the example of al-salaf al-salih (pious epigones).
This paradigm of revivalism, standing over against global secular 
modernity, is by no means as homogeneous as it is commonly taken to 
be. Nevertheless, the following examination of the discourse of cultural 
authenticity, which is the inner core of Islamic revivalism, seems tailor- 
made to encompass Islamic history as an ontologically differentiated 
cultural register; for, in A. Al-Azmeh’s apt words, “history”, viewed 
through the lens of fundamentalism,
takes place in two registers, one of which has a decided ontological 
distinction over the other: the authentic and the inauthentic, that of 
the Islamic self, and that of its corruptions by otherness, such as 
non-Islamic people and religions, schisms, heresies and manifold 
enemies. The one is posited as original, hence necessary and in 
accord with nature, for Islam is a primeval religion (din al-fitra), 
and the other is posited as contingent, mere history, the passage of
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time as sheer succession and pure seriality, bereft of significance, 
and therefore of quality.9
This binary either/or framework, which is key to Islamic 
revivalism, would appear to suggest, albeit obliquely, that its avowedly 
essentialist posture is indicative of a form of orientalism in reverse. In 
this sense, Islamic revivalism’s repudiation of cultural otherness must be 
seen as an explicit affirmation of the ontological differentialism often 
proposed in the construction of the “Orient” in European thinking. Not 
only does Al-Azmeh express repeated disapproval of the essentialism 
proposed by two seemingly discordant modes of cultural identity; he is 
also at pains to call into question the very notion of one sole modernity. 
For him, clearly, a multiplicity of modernities exists. Hence:
Modernity -  and indeed, modernism in its various fields -  is not 
confined to Europe, but is universal civilization, which from 
mercantile beginnings came utterly to transform the economies, 
societies, polities and cultures of the world, and to reconstitute the 
non-European world in terms of actually existing historical 
breaks.10
It should now be clear that the reversionary model of renewal, 
epitomized by al-Nahdah which occurred during the second half of the 
nineteenth and early years of the twentieth century, has since become
ever more intensified, thus re-establishing its link to religious literalism.
11 12 Writing in 1992, Akbar Ahmad asserted that postmodernism has now
become reconcilable with Islamic revivalism; for, if modernism is viewed
as emblematic of western domination, postmodernism (he argued)
represents the recovery of a tradition existing prior to the domination of
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the modem. As such, the logic implicit in western postmodernism, in its 
current phase of religious resurgence, suggests a restatement of a shared 
common cultural root, an emphasis on what “Orient” and “Occident” 
have in common. Such a position seems, paradoxically, to overlook the 
fact that the mythic-religious, as epitomized in postmodernism, is simply 
a shorthand term fo r  a more rigid variance o f ontological differentialism, 
whereby the very process of displacing the essentialized components 
present in modernism runs counter to the pursuit of a possible vibrant 
theory of change.
To return to the central point, the binaristic structure -  within 
which the realm of the “authentic” and the “inauthentic”, the “self5 and 
its “otherness55, are always and eternally separate and can never be linked 
-  implies an extreme form of essentialism. And this is the locus where 
literary fundamentalism slips into solipsism. Hence a solipsist discourse,
► • I Tepitomized by the assumption of moral superiority, operates only 
through the positionality of an essentialist dualism, one best defined in 
terms of the impossibility of cultures living in enclosures -  rupture being 
their only messenger.
The following definition marking the limits of the freshly coined 
term “Islamic literature55 imposes, within the context of the newly 
emergent concept of literary fundamentalism, many theological 
constraints. A. Zayed writes as follows:
Islamic literature is based on Islamic thought, on Islamic 
perception of the world of ghaib, i.e., the world of the invisible, the 
world of divine secrets, and the world of shahdda, i.e., the world of 
attesting to the truthfulness of Islam.14
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In similar vein, discussing the realm of “otherness”, this same 
writer deploys the circular reasoning implicit in the tautology:
Literature that is not in full agreement with Islamic principles, and
produced by non-Muslim writers, is deemed non-Islamic . . .  be it
15Christian, Jewish, Buddhist. . . existentialist or secularist.
This tendency to prejudge other cultures on the basis of absolute 
commitment to a faith is inevitably negative, and it serves to promote 
racism. And what is true of religion, as epitomized by literary 
fundamentalism, is true of ethnicity in western thought. Ontological 
dijferentialism. is, then, the doctrinal core o f  both religion and ethnicity. 
In this way, literary fundamentalism stands ethnicity (the discredited 
generalization of race within western thought) on its head.
On the other hand, the concept of Islamic literature, the outward 
manifestation of political fundamentalism, suggests that cultural 
authority resides not in literature but in religion. The arbitrary paradigm 
shift implicit in such a position must not, nevertheless, be seen in terms of 
creative resistance, but simply as a reaction to an increasingly dominant 
secular modernity.
It may be useful, finally, to note that this dualistic aspect of 
fundamentalism is best illuminated in terms of ‘Abdul Jan Muhammad’s 
proposed “Manichean allegory”,16 whereby implacable opposition is 
ceaselessly produced between a binarity of irreconcilable forces. The 
fundamentalist world view projected by this allegory -  exemplifying a 
dualistic representation of good versus evil -  is emblematic of A.B. 
SaTs redefinition of the concept of “Jahili literature”.17 Adopted by Ibn 
Sallam al-Jumahi with a view to dividing Arabic poetry into jahili (pre- 
Islamic) as opposed to Isldmi (Islamic), this keyword has recently been
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re-interpreted by Sa‘i as a pointedly theological term. By thus 
propounding a Manichean framework of good versus evil, within a 
discourse of anti-modernity, the connotation of jahili (denoting, basically, 
the time of ignorance) is persistently robbed of its literary significance as 
a classificatory critical tool. For Sa‘i, the basic denotational reference of 
the keyword jdhiliyyah, from which the adjective jahili is derived, needs 
to be reformulated by a process of reversion (rather than conversion), so 
as to accord with the authenticity of a religious origin that can never be 
allowed to slip from view. The term was coined, he claims, solely to re­
establish the moral framework for comparing two equally theology-laden 
options: al-huda (the right path) and al-dalal (straying from the right 
path).
The reasoning behind this attempt to set literature within a 
hierarchic order, subservient to religion, is woefully exiguous. It can only 
be understood in terms of theology -  literature’s conceptional antonym -  
and never in those of literature itself. Whilst strict adherence to literalism 
is the epitome of “Salafi” (atavistic) fundamentalism, with its closed 
system of finality, literature remains a paradigm in motion, resisting, in a 
semiotic sense, the decidability of denotation, or of closure of meaning. 
To conclude: the objectionably destabilizing certitude of the mythic- 
religious implied by reading “Salafi” fundamentalism into literary theory 
does little more than provide convenient labels for the valorization and 
recognition of prejudices as a coherent force in their own right. These do, 
nonetheless, act as points of reference established to displace secular 
modernist assumptions, and to undermine literature’s conception of a 
“truth” produced and defined in a “worldly” context, i.e., present in the 
world and informed by the world.
At issue, then, is the question of “truth”, or of criteria for 
determining what counts as ultimate truth; of turning theology or mere
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belief into effective epistemology.18 For “truth”, or ultimate truth, as 
viewed from a fundamentalist perspective, is absolute. It lies solely 
within the certitude of literal interpretation, which references a vantage 
point beyond time and space.
Hence, for Qutb, the authority of Salafism19 rests on its appeal to a 
scriptural warranty; it operates wholly on the level of presumptive self­
evidence;
The question Islam puts forth, and to which it gives answers, is:
20Who is more knowledgeable, you or God?
As a fixed form of self-dramatizing Salafism, created and defined 
in terms of its own deliberate and arbitrary cultural atavism, such 
theological absolutism may be viewed as the register highlighted by the 
newly emergent concept of “Islamic literature”. Paradoxically, a similar 
kind of clumsy engineering -  ethnic in this case -  has long been evident 
in the orientalism of von Grunebaum, the historian of Islamic cultural 
stationariness and repose.21 Radical critics, notably Edward Said and 
‘Abdullah L‘aroui, have shown the utmost distaste for this aspect of the 
irreversible states of “otherness” contrived by orientalism; and, in the 
light of von Grunebaum’s constant positing of a monolithic paradigmatic 
unity, whereby Islam is viewed as a permanently fixed cultural form
“constantly erecting barriers and defences around itself in order to
* * * 22 * * maintain its identity against external intervention”, it is hardly
surprising to find L‘aroui’s comment that such a stance in fact recalls,
irresistibly, the newly founded variance of Salafi populism. Writing in
1973, L‘aroui makes the following observation:
The adjectives that von G ru n eb au m  unites with the world of Islam
(medieval, classical, modern) are neutral or even super-redundant:
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there is not a difference between classical Islam and medieval 
Islam, or just Islam.23
With these negative features of the pre-modern caught in a state of 
timelessness, it is not difficult to see why the images of Islam projected 
by Islamic fundamentalists and western pundits of orientalism should 
converge, albeit inadvertently, to provide an effective common focus. 
Both sides “speak the same language of ancestral authenticity and 
identity”, as Al-Azmeh aptly puts it. “The result of these symmetrical 
world views,” he concludes, “is a cultural essentialism which is a 
postmodern form of racism.”24
There are, then, three objections to be made against this extreme 
form of essentialism, upheld by proponents on the two sides of the 
argument: first, such an essentialism is premised on the assumption that 
Islam is one hegemonized collective singularity, capable o f  pre-empting 
the workings o f literary innovation; second, the imposition of monolithic 
uniformity postulates an unchanging organized whole that acts as a 
collective single force; third, the identification o f Arabic culture with 
religious parameters involves judgements which, in effect, increasingly 
construe this culture as predictable and therefore controllable.
Having thus explored some aspects of modernism’s antithetical 
terms, and of the workings of these terms, we may now proceed to close 
the circle by reverting to the relevant focal point: namely, the complex 
relationship between cultural identity and modernity/modernism.
From fate to choice
Viewed, following the Habermas model of an ongoing modernity, as a 
voluntarist endeavour, identity emerges “not so much as what one is as 
what one wants to be”. As such, “in the construction of the future not all
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of one’s own historical traditions are equally valid”.25 Similarly, the 
criteria for defining identity may be seen, at least in part, as related to 
experience and education; we are dealing not with a pre-given innateness, 
but rather with an open-ended option that is remorselessly selective. In 
the words of Jorge Larrain:
The very fact that identity is inherently selective allows the 
possibility that, although a nation cannot choose its traditions, it 
can at least politically select how to continue or not to continue 
with some of them.26
Another way of viewing cultural identity is to argue that, whatever 
precise formulations this may assume, it is (as a cultural construction 
informed by “becoming” as much as by “being”) clearly bound up with 
the notion of a teleological movement from “fate” to “choice” -  though 
such a movement may not necessarily be conscious. The strongest 
statement of the case against an essentialism grounded in the workings of 
fate rather than choice is to be found in a passage by Adunls, in which he 
takes poetic experience to entail a blend of primordial sentiment and 
modernist sensibility:
As a starting point, the poet views things as nameless, and the 
world as an uncontemplated domain. Through innovation, the poet 
forges a world that is neither determined nor defined, a tentative 
world without pre-given identity, a world whose identity is 
incessantly becoming, an infinite world.
If the poet is ceaselessly transforming, in this complex 
relationship with an indeterminate and undefined world, then it is 
possible to stress that he does not possess a pre-given, fully
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accomplished identity. The poet creates his identity while shaping
* 27his work; he makes and remakes himself while producing his art.
This suspension of memory is clearly temporary, not permanent. It is a 
precondition for subsequent re-discovery.
Saming and differing
► * 98Cultural critics and, in particular, exponents of secular criticism such as 
Edward Said, work with a cosmopolitan literary sensibility, drawing on 
an open-ended model of how tradition may act upon literature. Speaking 
of the rise of the modern Arabic novel -  which lacked any tradition, in the 
strictly European sense, out of which to develop -  he notes how the new 
genre was effectively bounded by a theology-laden world view. This 
world view, setting forth modes of representation of reality that are 
clearly culturally Islamic, had been brought to a perfected state by the 
Prophet; and, as such, Said implies, its concept of completeness is 
premised on an innately provided feature of a corresponding 
Weltanschauung governing a cluster of deep psychic levels of formation 
implicit in customs, conventions and life in general. As he says:
It is significant that the desire to create an alternative world, to 
modify or augment the real world through the act of writing (which 
is one motive underlying the novelistic tradition in the West), is 
inimical to the Islamic world view. The Prophet is he who has 
completed a world view, thus the word heresy in Arabic is 
synonymous with the verb “to innovate” or “to begin” . Islam views 
the world as a plenum , capable of neither diminishment nor 
amplification. Consequently, stories like those in the Arabian 
Nights are ornamental, variations on the world, not completions of
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it; neither are they lessons, structures, extensions, or totalities 
designed to illustrate either the author’s prowess in representation, 
the education of a character, or ways in which the world can be 
viewed and changed.29
The connotation of this articulated reading of a pre-modem Islamic 
world view into a modern literary context, and vice versa, involves, albeit 
obliquely, the role of a deeply rooted system of belief in literary 
formations; a system noted by Said in his seminal work on cultural 
critique, Beginnings: Intention and Method, Yet, if he attempts to ground 
a close fit between a pre-modern Islamic world view and a modern work 
representing the emergence of “autobiography” (which barely existed as a 
genre in Arabic literature), his critique whereby one paradigm acts upon 
the other is, even so, never contaminated by essentialism. The 
autobiographical narrative adopted by Taha Husain (who is often 
described as a renovationist rather than an innovationist) in his three-part 
work Al-Ayyam (“Streams of Days”) is cited by Said as an example of 
“unique fusion between the traditional Islamic and Occidental cultures”; 
and the result is aptly described as “wholly special”.
This notion of a unique “fusion” (an image apparently springing 
from physics and justifiably applied to literary objects) provides us with a 
procedure for separating out two oppositional notions: “saming” and 
“differing”.
“Saming” is not, it should be clearly understood, a shorthand term 
for (in al-Rafrii’s disparaging expression) “plagiarizing” form and genre, 
or for emulating specific structural properties of a literary domain where 
the protagonists are made to act like European characters. And, when 
Said suggests that “at the same point writers in Arabic became aware of 
European novels and began to write works like them”, he is not implying
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any causal chain of origin traceable back in time. What he appears to be 
suggesting is that the outcome of this complex conscious/unconscious 
relationship of resemblances and affinities is never an “inauthentic” or 
“blurred” copy of an appropriated item. Rather, the resulting text is the 
creation of a self-referential specificity which, in the final analysis, 
aclmowledges the laws o f  its own autonomous necessity. This text, 
entailing a “unique fusion”, has its place within a shifting force field of 
relevancy. Hence, “saming” leads not to a blanket “sameness”, but to 
“difference”, even differentness.
The notion of “difference” highlighted here is, therefore, a clearly 
“positive” one. There is also a second and quite distinct perspective, 
which likewise suggests a process of “saming” but can in fact be seen as 
exemplifying negative difference; this is the perspective proposed by the 
problem of “periodization” already discussed (see section II, chapter six, 
above).
This is, undoubtedly, one of the knottiest problems to confront 
Arab intellectuals seeking to redefine the place of Arab culture vis-a-vis 
the paradigm of western modernity. Periodization is, in a sense, a mode 
of interpretation, whose outcome has been the supersedure of traditional 
Arab literary terms by modern western ones. Central to the terminology 
of periodization is the concept of Nahdah. To use this term in relation to 
certain movements of Arab thought and. literature in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries is to imply that these movements were 
equivalent to European Renaissance. Does such an implication propose a 
possible erroneous symmetric relation between two experiences already 
defined by their different histories -  indeed, a conceptual incongruity?
Albert Hourani whose writings on Arab history and culture are 
attuned to modern perceptions and concerns, has suggested an 
explanation:
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This way of looking at the matter reveals a perhaps unconscious 
belief that the history of Arabic or Islamic culture is or ought to be 
similar to that of western European culture. When we look closely 
at what is called al-Nahdah, however, we shall find it does not bear 
much resemblance to the European Renaissance. That was a 
movement which came from within European civilization; starting 
from a revival of knowledge of ancient Greek culture, it led to a 
reassertion of the value of the individual and of life in this world, a 
greater emphasis on the sovereign independence of human reason, 
and a flowering of the arts, in particular painting, sculpture and 
architecture. The movement o f Arabic thought and writing for  
which the word Nahdah is used may have had characteristics in 
common with this, but it was a more limited movement and one o f a 
different kind.30
In order further to underline the negative accounting implicit in the 
foregoing example of “saming”, the passage goes on to maintain that the 
outcome of this seemingly “innocent” application of borrowed 
methodology is actually far from innocent:
When I read about a thinker like the Iranian ‘Ali Shari‘ati, it seems 
to me that he is not using the idea of Islam in order to generate new 
and important ideas about the social order, he is rather using social 
ideas taken from the outside world in order to give a new 
interpretation of Islam. Once a thinker follows that path, he will 
find himself faced sooner or later with those great problems which
31writers of the “liberal age” posed and could not answer.
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Daryush Shayegan, in his Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic 
Societies Confronting the West, sums up the deadlock:
Throwing Islam roughly over secular concepts such as democracy, 
socialism and liberalism results in hybrid mixtures, explosive 
cocktails which fill minds with confusion rather than helping to 
solve our problems.32
With regard to this situation, a spade is called a spade:
Herein lies the failure of the Nahdah, as well as that of the 
Thawrah (the era of revolutions beginning in the 1950s). The 
people of the Nahdah, subjugated by the West, never realized that 
behind western power lies a changed vision of the world; that 
between their Islam and modernity lay a deep gulf which could not 
be bridged by a return to their ancestral values nor by a reform of 
the ShaiTa. What was needed was a change o f  register, of 
wavelength; the public domain needed to be swept clear of 
nostalgic mythologies to make room for the establishment of 
another perspective, another value system.33
Mutuality, complementarity, permeability and plurality 
It should now be clear from the above that the negative “saming” implicit 
in renovation-based notions of modernity like those of Nahdah and 
Thawrah34 can help us conceptualize a critique for the subsequent 
valorization and recognition of innovation-based modernism. AdunTs’s 
dictum that the effectiveness of modernism lies in Arab creativity, and 
that cultural identity “is present not in producing the similar but the 
different”,35 suggests that the new paradigm shift is more universal; that
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is to say, more affected by an all-embracing world view, though not 
necessarily less ethnocentric or context-bound:
The new in Arabic poetry . . . however unequivocal its formal 
break with the past may appear, is nevertheless identifiably Arab in 
character; by this I mean that it cannot be understood or evaluated 
within the context of French or English modernism, or according to 
their criteria, but must be seen in the context of Arab creativity and 
judged by the standards of artistic innovation particular to Arabic.
The best way, then, of explaining what is meant by “universalism” 
and “contextualism” in this sense is to redefine these concepts in terms of 
their points of convergence and divergence. The universalist assumption 
is as follows:
There will be a convergence between the languages of two cultures 
into a single new language that will burst the provinciality of both 
earlier languages. The question that the genealogical pluralist will 
ask, however, is why only one language of perspicuous contrast is 
the result? What seems likely is that each culture will formulate a 
new language in which it now sees itself as seen by the other. But 
these languages need not converge. Each language may have valid
* ^ ”7reasons for preserving its own differences from the other.
One might still argue, of course, that the concept of “universalism”, 
as viewed from a hegemonic European perspective, remains an 
inescapable euphemism for a latent, vigorous European ethnocentrism. 
Let us, though, consider what Adunls has to say on the subject of 
innovation-based modernism.
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As a universalist who believes that Arab modernists nonetheless 
have their own different histories, narratives and teleologies, Adunls 
views universalism (which is the inner core of modernism) as neither 
unflinchingly singularist nor exclusively European. Thus, paradoxically, 
his position on culture proposes an insistently Arab impulse towards 
universalism as opposed to purism. For him, the universalist tendency 
within culture has a very precise locus in the experience of interaction, 
direct or indirect, to which Arab civilization testifies. In other words, it is 
articulated in a synthesis of the pre-Islamic period with other cultures: 
Persian, Greek and Indian. But the dynamism of this great synthesis (in 
the Hegelian sense of the term) does not stop here; it ascends to generate 
a new thesis.
The interaction produced by thought processes pursued with an 
open vision goes further. It has its most ancient elements in the Sumerian, 
Babylonian, Aramaean and Syriac civilizations, whose influence on 
Greek civilization is no longer a matter of serious dispute; the 
indebtedness of Greek civilization to Near Eastern civilization appears 
less provocative today than it did two decades ago. Then there is, as 
Adunls points out, the Andalusian cultural model of interaction, which 
earned Arab-Islamic civilization to the West by way of Arab Spain.
From this perspective, Adunls emphasizes the concept of a “single 
universal civilization” which “has its own specificities, obvious or 
hidden, that depend on the level of creative presence in various people. 
This suggests that modernity is also a climate of universal forms and
* TOideas and not a state specific to one people.”
What emerges from these comments is that modernism may be 
viewed in the light of four interconnected concepts:
(1) mutuality;
(2) complementarity;
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(3) permeability;
(4) plurality.
The first concept, mutuality, underlines the fact that no culture exists in 
isolation from other cultures, and that they give and take between one 
another. The second concept, complementarity, shows that the dualism of 
the “civilized” West and the “backward” East is false. In fact, the 
East/West polarity, clearly characterized by a seemingly endless 
encounter based on ambivalence, serves to place the two opposing 
categories in a possible complementary relationship with one another. 
Something of the tone of this complementarity is captured in the 
following remark by Adunls:
One cannot conceive of Europe as a detached entity, separate from 
the legacy of al-Andalus. And if the media is insistent in unifying 
the world and turning it into a global village,40 then the concept of 
time may have, subsequently, to be seen as a continuum 41
The subtext, epitomized by the duality of East and West, is thus 
recognizably ideological rather than ontological; the third of the above 
concepts, permeability, establishes that, in complex reality, “cultures 
influence and are influenced”; and the fourth concept, plurality, leads us 
to realize that, as Al-Azmeh points out, modernity itself is plural. 
Modernity’s pluralism may be underlined once more by reference to 
Gerald Delanty’s study of modernity and postmodernity. He notes:
Modernity was European and later American, with its roots deep in 
the aesthetic and political movements that animated the West since 
the Enlightenment. By the late twentieth century, modernity lost 
much of its Europeanness, not least because it has now become
132
necessaiy to speak of modernities rather than any particular model
42o f modernity.
In sum, the concepts of mutuality, complementarity, permeability 
and plurality are somewhat disputatious, in that none of them possesses 
fixed definitive components. They are persistently susceptible to change, 
both in definition and in connotation. The boundaries of this 
susceptibility have been and will be tested and explored, with a view to 
constructing an articulate definition of an autonomous, though not wholly 
separate model of modernity/modernism.
Theory o f convergence
What, then, does all this tell us with regard to convergence, to a common 
point, between two seemingly conflicting cultural models, manifested in 
the mythical dichotomy of “East versus West”? Is there some 
intermediate space where cross-cultural exchange is rendered possible 
without necessarily “saming” two different but not essentially 
differentialist cultures? What remains, in the last analysis, of the idea of a 
common world view, one that stresses mutuality, complementarity, 
permeability and plurality, without necessarily downplaying the central 
critical concept of oppositionality? Moreover, if the polarity of East and 
West is now outrunning its useful course, how do Arab modernists view 
the possible critical reading of texts in which two paradigms meet and act 
upon each other?
For Adunls, and for other innovation-based writers on modernity 
and modernism in its various fields — writers who, in contrast to the 
revivalists, or renovationists, of al-Nahdah, believe the past can no longer 
be understood in its own terms but should rather be viewed in the light of 
present concerns -  the desire to break through entrenched barriers leads
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on to a variety of proposed routes to modernization. This is made possible 
by virtue of a cluster of conceptual bridges providing notional links 
connecting the present to the past. Can such conceptual bridges be in fact 
located?
As has already been explained, modernity in Arabic poetry was not 
discovered from within the prevailing Arabic literary canon and its 
systems of knowledge. It was Adunls’s reading of French poetiy43 which 
established some of these conceptual bridges, supplying the link between 
the modernism of Baudelaire and the Abbasid “modernity” of Abu 
Nuwas (755-813), and between the cryptic qualities of Mallarme’s 
aesthetics and the mysteries of the poetic language of Abu Tammam 
(805-845). And it was his reading of Rimbaud, Nerval and Breton that led 
him to discover the modernity of Sufi writers such as al-Niffari (d. 
350/961), al-Hallaj (d. 309/922) and Ibn ‘Arabi (d. 560/1164).44
Such points of convergence have constantly provided Arab 
modernists with the thesis that modernities/modernisms located in 
seemingly different traditions may have different histories and teleologies 
but are not necessarily incommensurable one against the another. This is 
specifically exemplified in Umberto Eco’s postulation that books excel in 
converging on a common point. “It seems,” he says, “a good Borgesan 
procedure to assume that books speak to one another . . . ”45
Such a postulation, premised on understanding of the past in terms 
of the present, proposes a taxonomy of works entailing a paradoxical 
relationship, whereby culture of the past is permeable to culture of the 
present, and vice versa. Moreover, such works advertise their modernity 
and refer us constantly back to this veiy specific relationship. Consider 
the conclusion reached in Kamal Abu DIb’s examination of al-Jurjani’s 
theoiy of poetic imageiy: that the importance of the work of this highly 
prominent figure (d. 471/1078) for Arabic literary theory “transcends the
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boundaries of Arabic culture, as it remains relevant and vital with 
reference to modern literary theory as well”.46
In the following passage, Abu Dlb sets out a framework for a 
theory of cultural convergence:
A fundamental feature of modern Arabic culture is the dynamic 
way in which modern writers have come to look at our literary 
tradition. This dynamism springs from the interaction between the 
influence of western criticism and literature and a surging spirit of 
revival in Arabic culture. A change of sensibility has affected, to 
varying degrees, modern views on most aspects of the tradition. 
New approaches to poetiy, prose, and other literary forms have 
been developed. The veiy nature and function of poetry, in 
particular, have been examined within a different framework where 
the triangular relationship “poet-poem-audience” acquires new and 
more comprehensive dimensions 47
He further emphasizes the extent of this transformation in the 
following statement:
The process began towards the end of the last centuiy and 
continues today more mature, vigorous, and sophisticated but, 
above all, with greater awareness of the most fundamental currents
* • * •  48which prevailed in the tradition and shaped it.
This process is in no way nostalgic. It is, on the contrary, 
consciously forward-looking. It attempts, selectively, to rediscover the 
newness of al-Jurjani’s critical vision. Having established this from an
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inherently structuralist perspective, Abu Dib now concludes that al- 
Jurjani is
a creative genius to whom the tradition provided the living 
foundation on which, through a critical and selective process, the 
new system of criticism was to be built: new because it constituted 
a fresh perspective and provided sensitive tools for the examination 
not only of works of art or poetic imagery, but the critical tradition 
itself. To use Eliot’s words, al-Jurjani may be Said to have lived 
“not merely in the present, but the present moment o f  the past”. 
And with this solid foundation he proceeded to explore new 
horizons never, or only vaguely, hinted at before.49
Abu DIb’s investigation into al-Jurjani’s theory of poetic imagery has 
turned on the issue o f  the relationship o f  literary criticism to the concept 
o f interdisciplinarity and the broader cultural studies it foregrounded at a 
later stage. There have, up to now, been few works dealing with this 
issue, and still fewer having specific reference to linguistics rather than to 
an overall critique of literature.
It can be argued, in other words, that, in focusing its analysis on an 
expanding field of cultural inquiry, this mode of literary criticism has 
become responsible fo r  the opening up o f the interdisciplinary structure 
o f the humanities. It is worth noting, in this connection, that the Arabic 
word adab carries implications not of “literature” alone but of a 
somewhat wider area of “humanities”.
This broad conception of interdisciplinarity, implicit in adab, has 
given rise to a cluster of cultural critiques, characteristically pluralist in 
their readiness to take account of the various new theories assuming 
prominence within western thought. It has, in addition, supplied a
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possible link between the past and the present, whereby concepts reach 
out to other concepts, and books converse with other books, irrespective 
of time and place. Hence, the “present moment of the past”, the specific 
moment of convergence, which Arab modernists take as their point of 
departure, assumes a crucially important role in many works on literary 
theory. In their book Al-Nazariyyah al-lisaniyyah wa ’l-shi ‘riyyah f i  7- 
turdth a l- 'Arabi min khildl al-nusus (“Theory of Linguistics and Poetics 
as Seen in Arabic Tradition Through its Texts”), A. Muheiri, H. Sammud 
and A. Mseddi explore “a complementary view of language in its many 
facets, including transforming it from a tool for dialogue to a producer of 
aesthetic innovation”.30 This, as they explain, permits the proposition of 
“a linguistic and poetic theory located in Arabic tradition”.51
Seen from a modern position, the fundamentals of this proposed 
theory are presented under four rubrics: “the issue of defining language, 
the problematic of the structure of parole, the question of referentiality, 
and the issue of the literariness of parole.”
As these rubrics suggest, the book aims to provide an account of a 
possible modern theory of literature, one that accords a high priority to 
the concept of interdisciplinarity. The locus of this latter is associated 
primarily with the establishment of a common ground conjoining 
seemingly autonomous strands of knowledge -  strands represented by 
selected extracts from the writings of literary theorists, philosophers, 
historians, scientists, philologists, grammarians, essayists, qadis (judges) 
and mutakallimun (theologians). As such, the book’s role is to give 
conceptual articulation, through epistemological configuration and in 
terms of the modem, to the choices made by its editors from the writings 
deposited in the treasure house of memory culture. In addition, the writers 
included serve to make it clear that modern literary theory is posited as 
insistently polymorphic, multi-dimensional and multi-layered cultural
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critique. This is particularly apparent in the orientation of the book’s 
subjects, which veers towards those thinkers whose writings embody a 
modem stance within the trajectoiy of an Arab age of humanism.
To reiterate, this way of re-reading texts by revealing their 
modernity, i.e., the sustainability o f  their creativity, should be understood 
not as a denial of the historicity of literary theory, but as a recognition 
that modernity should be viewed as an affectively creative vision -  failing 
which it will be a matter of mere drifting fashion. Fashion, to repeat 
Adums’s observation, is distinct from creativity: “it grows old from the 
moment it is born, while creativity is ageless.” As a corollary of this: “not 
all modernity is creativity, but creativity is eternally modern.”53
Of all the writers on the newly established modern linguistic 
paradigm -  emphasizing as this does, in a Jakobsonian sense,54 the 
concept of literariness that makes a given work a work of literature — A. 
Mseddi perhaps comes closest to embracing the determinants for the 
exercise of reconstructing the past in terms of the present. His 
contribution to the subject may be found in a study entitled Al-Taffdr al- 
lisdni f l  ’l-hadarah al- Arabiyyah (“Linguistic Thinking in Arabic 
Civilization”). Mseddi’s most interesting argument appears to be based 
on the novel assumption that “Arabs today confront their tradition not as 
one possessed by them but as one that is assumed to be so”.55 It follows 
that “regaining possession of it means retrieving it”; and this retrieval 
implies “examining it via an all-embracing methodological 
perspective”.56 The eventual conclusion is that “contemporary critical
* • 57approaches have to be read into tradition itself’. In consequence, the
retrieval of tradition “negates, through temporal discontinuity, the
*• * • • concept of its literal durability”. The theoretical foundation of this
interpretative re-reading, leading to the retrieval of tradition, lies in a
belief that “every reading, as is known in general linguistics, is a
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decoding of an autonomous message”, and that “re-reading is a renewal 
of the decoding of its message and a proof of its sustainability”.59
This same principle of establishing “the present moment of the 
past” holds true for Mazen al-Wa‘ir’s book Jumlat al-shart ‘ind al-nuhat 
wa ’l-usuliyin al- ‘Arab f l  daw ‘ nazariyat al-nahu al- ‘alami li Chomsky 
(“The Conditional Clause as Seen by Arab Grammarians and 
Foundationalists in the Light of Chomsky’s Theory of Universal 
Grammar”).60
The Borgesan61 notion of books conversing with other books, 
irrespective of time and place, is implicit in the following passage:
It might be pointed out, without nationalist or religious bias, that 
Chomsky has succeeded, after forty years of labour 011 a theory of 
universal grammar, in reaching the same conclusions as those 
already arrived at by al-Khalll and Slbawayh.62
The upshot is:
These conclusions have been regularly alluded to by Chomsky in 
various sources, including his own writings and interviews.63
The writings of numerous other modernist critics and 
commentators could be adduced here. However the ground-breaking 
study by Mohammed Arkoun, working on the idea of a rational 
humanistic age existing in the tenth century (i.e., before the emergence of 
humanism in its orthodox forms) is more than simply representative. 
Originally published in French, the book appeared in Arabic under the 
title N az‘at al-ansanah f l  1-fl.kr al- ‘Arabi: jil  Ibn Miskawayh wa 7-
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Tawhidi (“Humanism in Arabic Thought: The Generation of Ibn 
Miskawayh and al-Tawhidi”).64
At the centre of the classical civilization of the fourth/tenth century, 
the works of Ibn Miskawayh, a philosopher and cultural historian who 
served at the courts of the Buwayhids65 in Iran and Iraq, are emblematic 
o f a recognizably humanistic age, one articulating Arab, Greek and 
Persian cultural strands. For Arkoun, in his attempt to reconfigurate the 
connotation of an avowedly vibrant humanism, the interdisciplinary 
features of adab, meaning literature in the broadest possible sense, are 
synonymous with the multi-dimensional domain implied by the Latin 
word humanitas, from which the Renaissance term “humanism” is 
derived. A humanist age, he explains, is an attitude of mind. The inner 
core of this open-ended position, representative of an innovative 
movement, is religion, literature and philosophy.
In this sense, Arkoun points out, the humanist movement was a 
coherent and recognizable system of life and thought, marked by 
substantial cultural, economic, social and political accomplishments. Yet, 
while “humanism” has taken on new connotation in its European context, 
it has gradually lost its vitality within Arabic culture.
In sum, the comparative approach entails looking beyond the 
immediate processes of cultural mutualization and reciprocity. Analogies 
may indeed be sometimes straightforward, crude or simple. At other 
times, however, they can be complex and interesting.
Affiliation versus filiation
What is criticized in the viewpoints outlined above effectively comes 
down to one core point: that the essentialism implicit in cultural 
determinism is frequently linked to the filial notion of origin, which is 
itself central to the idea of biological parenthood grounding critical
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concepts in a chronological order ruled by what has gone before. Edward 
Said’s binary opposition between “filiation” and “affiliation” supplies the 
critical tools we need to grapple with the nature o f  the relationship 
between current Arabic literary concepts and modern concepts located in 
a Eurocentric literary theory. Filiation reflects a relationship determined 
by fate rather than choice. This relationship is intrinsically organic, being, 
as such, controlled by biological inevitability; and this inevitability, by 
virtue of celebrating an ethnocentrist line of cultural ancestry, provides a 
gesture of resistance to the idea of choice set forth in the project of 
modernity. By contrast, affiliation (tabanni) is a voluntarist act associated 
with the choice of a metaphorical rather than a biological parent. One of 
Said’s primary aims in rejecting the cultural biological parent, as implied 
in its self-confirming notion of a fixed and stable “origin”, is to 
emphasize that there is in literature no “beginning” but only a series of 
false origins.66 The possibility of a beginning or beginnings is 
nevertheless not to be excluded; for, unlike the filial (essentialist) idea of 
“origin”, which can only survive if nourished by notions that it is 
intrinsically “divine, mythical and privileged”,67 the affiliative notion of 
beginning or beginnings is constantly rewritten by and through the 
metaphorical notion o f  affiliation. As such, it is “secular, humanly
/T O  „
produced and ceaselessly re-examined”. Such a stance, as Said points 
out, “has been an enabling one for much that has been of interest in 
critical work”.69
Having argued the case against essentialism, along with the cultural 
determinism that is its prime mover, he proceeds to elucidate a central 
point of view made in his Beginnings: Intention and Method: namely that 
modernism is
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an aesthetic and ideological phenomenon that was a response to the 
crisis of what could be called liation — a linear, biologically
* 70grounded process, that which ties children to their parents -  
which produced the counter-crisis within modernism, that is, those 
creeds, philosophies and visions re-assembling the world in new,
n i
non-familial ways.
If this interpretation of the notion of “beginning”, viewed as a 
substitute for “origin”, is accepted, then the idea of other beginnings, 
periodizing a cluster of “modernisms”, begins to look less suspect; so far 
from proposing an essentially derivative concept, Arabic literary theory 
may be viewed as firmly located within a framework conjoining 
complementarity, permeability and plurality. This mutualizing framework 
is persistently present in
a universal civilization which from mercantile beginnings came 
utterly to transform the economies, societies, polities and cultures 
of the world, and to re-constitute the non-European world in terms
79of actually existing historical breaks.
The upshot of all this is, then, a view of a new emergent 
universalism, epitomizing the possibilities inherent in the metaphor of 
affiliation.
In The World., the Text and the Critic, Said seeks to address, in a 
theoretically demonstrative manner, the possibilities of affiliative 
relationships. He elaborates on the view that theoiy is, first and foremost, 
the product of a constant circulation of ideas:
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Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel -  
from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period
7^to another.
Cultural and intellectual life is seen as nourished and often sustained by 
this regular circulation:
Whether it takes the form of acknowledged or unconscious 
influence, creative borrowing, or wholesale appropriation, the 
movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a 
fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity.
This movement, he suggests (albeit obliquely), is existent outside 
Europe’s mythical self-representation; it provides a framework for a two- 
way relationship:
There are particularly interesting cases of ideas and theories that 
move from one culture to another, as when so-called Eastern ideas 
about transcendence were imported into Europe during the early 
nineteenth century, or when certain European ideas about society 
were translated into traditional Eastern societies during the later 
nineteenth century. Such movement into a new environment is 
never unimpeded. It necessarily involves processes o f  presentation 
and institutionalization different from those at the point o f  origin™
The crucial point here is that the claims of “purity” implied by a 
filial Eurocentric model of modernism are always suspect, not only 
because they obey the inexorable laws grounding a singularity of 
“origin”, but also because they persistently downplay the way the
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movement of concepts from one point to another, from locus to locus, is 
emblematic of any condition of intellectual activity.
Travelling concepts
We have already examined the mutualizing aspect of Said’s anti- 
essentialist notion of “affiliation”: that the metaphoricity of affiliation is 
centrally characterized by the idea of an emergent redefinition of 
universalism, a two-way relationship grounding a combinative principle 
of a conjoined world view; one whose function draws on consensually 
held notions of complementarity, permeability and plurality.
These affiliative notions may, if pushed sufficiently far, be seen as 
entailing the possibility of a new epistemological paradigm, an all- 
embracing point of cultural convergence, something akin to an episteme 
as proposed by Foucault:
. . .  a world view, a slice of history common to all branches of 
knowledge, which imposes . . . the same norms and postulates, a 
general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought that the men 
of a particular period cannot escape -  a great body of legislation 
written once and for all by some anonymous hand.75
This redefinition of universalism, as a thing written “by some anonymous 
hand”, features in the very process whereby filiation is replaced by 
affiliation. Said describes this process as “affiliative”, that is, recognizing 
the diversity of a newly-founded universalism built on intellectual 
freedom. The following definition proposed by some “post-colonial” 
critics makes the argument for constructing an alternative to “filial” 
universalism -  one that is avowedly affiliative and transcultural:
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No true universalism can be constructed without recognizing that 
there is a diversity of universals on which analyses are based, and 
that these are often quite particular . . . 76
To illustrate what is at issue here, let us take two particularly 
significant cases of affiliative relationship, one provided by Taha Husain 
(1952), the other by Adunls (1973). Here we have two different models, 
each drawing, for their terms of reference, on Auguste Comte’s concept
77 »of the “static and dynamic”, and reflecting, within the locus of modem 
Arabic literary theoiy, an openness to intellectual diversity.
Something of Comte’s distinction between social statics and 
dynamics is evident in Taha Husain’s conscious application to Arabic 
literature of what that founder of modern sociology termed laws of 
motion within societies. The connotation of these processual laws, 
borrowed from the physical sciences, has been altered by Comte to 
accommodate a scientific theoiy of social change. The social term “static 
and dynamic”, translated by Husain as al-thabit w a’l-mutaghayyer, is
7£ •postulated in his book Alwan (“Variations”) as a travelling concept 
whereby sociology is being replaced by literary theory. Hence his attempt 
to rewrite Comte’s concepts with a view to probing the effects of two 
seemingly divergent terms: Arabic tradition and literary modernity.
The traditional components present in Arabic literature are seen by 
him as safeguarding its stability and sustainability. Yet there are, Husain 
points out, other, renovatory components whose presence strikes a 
precarious balance with the components informing Arabic tradition:
Like other living literatures and social phenomena, Arabic 
literature consists of two sets of components referred to by Auguste
* • 7 QComte as the static and dynamic.
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What distinguishes our literature, Husain argues, is that “a balance 
between tradition and renovation, tajdld, has always been persistently 
maintained”. Nevertheless:
The occasional absence of continuity, resulting from an ascendancy 
of the elements of the static, has brought about neither literature’s 
inertness nor its demise. The occasional ascendancy of the dynamic 
has not, on the other hand, resulted in terminating literature’s
* * * o nexistence or the disruption of its sense of continuity.
Husain’s attempt to rewrite Comte’s binarity is, then, an endeavour to 
understand the complex relations between the constituent parts of one 
verbal creation representing the body of literary history. Seen from this 
perspective, appraisive critique can be construed as a study of Husain’s 
uniform literary discourse rather than of particular specimens subject to 
differing interpretations according to period. In this sense, literary history 
is proposed as part of poetics, the ground upon which literary theory is 
based.81
Adunls’s influential and polemical critique of Arabic culture, Al- 
Thabit wa ’l-mutahawwil, rewrites Comte’s “static and dynamic” in its 
turn, with an emphasis on re-evaluating the entire Arabic tradition 
(turath).
Nevertheless, this study, with its attempt to unmask the stasis 
inherent in the literalism at the core of hegemonic Salafi thought, cannot 
be accurately viewed as representing an attack on traditional Islamic 
values, but rather as calling into question the work of “canonized” writers 
from a consciously alternative modernist perspective; for, while Adunls 
does indeed embark on a reappraisal of the writings that the literary
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“canon”83 views as privileged, his main objective is to bring forward for 
consideration the more radical alternatives present in the writings of 
poets, thinkers and Sufis whose “modernism” flourished during the 
Abbasid period.
In this sense, AdunTs’s version of the static and dynamic follows 
his own individual line of inquiry: a line determined by a close reading of 
classical Arabic culture in terms of the concerns of the present. As such, 
he is bent on undermining the assumed validity of literalistic misreading 
of a permanent, prescriptive and all-encompassing “canon” whose status 
has been insistently elevated over tradition (turath).
The concept lurking behind the “canon” is not, Adunls suggests, 
one of open-endedness. Rather it blatantly sets forth an absolute 
interpretation of tradition, one favouring textual closure, total submission 
to authority and a vigorous sense o f  epistemological finality.
It is worth stressing, in this connection, the significantly theological 
nature of the term “canon”, referring to a set of privileged writings that 
effectively comprise a list of books representing a culture or tradition. 
The term cannot, in fact, be Said to have a synonym in Arabic. Even so, 
the theological connotation is made regularly evident in Adunls’s 
disparaging account of the textual literalism embedding a self- 
legitimizing canonical, imperative and long-standing interpretation of 
Arabic tradition. Hence, in the light of the counter-canonicity proposed 
by his rejection of any arbitrarily elevated “canonical status” conferred on 
a set of works and concepts, regularly received as representing the Arabic 
literary and cultural tradition, it is reasonable to view Adunls’s critique as 
emblematic of an effective attempt to question the very meaning of 
literary value.
His account of the permanent versus the changing is, then, closely 
wedded to his modernist position. The past, he argues, cannot be
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understood in its own terms, let alone in terms of the mythic-religious 
based on textual literalism. It has to be seen alternatively, in terms of the 
complex concerns of the present.
The precise relationship between these two opposites, in this 
unsettling critique, comes out clearly in Paul Nwayia’s introduction to 
Adunls’s book. The relationship, Nwayia claims, is “one which has 
persistently led to violence resulting in the elevation of the static over the
Q A
dynamic, thus impeding the emergence of innovation”. The bottom line, 
he goes on, is “the consequent identification, in Arabic-Islamic culture, 
between language and religion, poetry and ethics, literary and theological 
traditions”.85
In other words, the term “static” is used here to designate the idea 
of a stasis, permanence, lasting stability embodying some omniscient 
quality; one denoting a privileged “Qur’anic” text possessed of the biaxial 
principle of changelessness and inimitability (Vjaz). This quality, with its 
conforming evidence compelling unquestioned acceptance of a “divine 
truth”, has the enforcement mechanism of absolute authority.
The decisive point in all this is Adunls’s postulation of the 
significance
of elevating the “static”, seen as a fixture of an ideologically 
empowered literalist reading of the Qur’anic text, over the “dynamic” 
implicit in the interpretation, or interpretations, of it in terms of the 
present. The text, he points out, is proposed by literalists as the “final 
epistemological authority”, one that is doxastic, that is, predicating a 
belief-based view unaffected by the compelling principle of rationality.
As for the dynamic, the changing, which is the opposing strand in 
the binarity, this is defined as either “the thought asserting the possibility
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of re-interpreting the Qur’anic text in terms of the present in order to 
articulate an ever-changing vision of the world” or as “the thought which 
does not view the Qur’anic text as its frame of reference, thus stressing
Q / l
reason, caql, instead of naql, the literally interpreted tradition” as its 
vantage point.
To paraphrase Adunls, we might say that any viewpoint on the 
literalness shaping the Salafi-laden canon -  and on its alternative, the 
polymorphic and multi-dimensional readings proposing a counter- 
canonical modernist position -  should take into account that, historically 
speaking, the static has not been immutably permanent, nor has the 
dynamic been constantly changing. The “canon” thus remains in practice 
a matter of ongoing dispute. This, in turn, proposes an extension to the 
binarity, one put forward as suggesting a possible definition of 
modernism in relation to tradition. Modernism can be seen, in Adunls’s 
words, as “the utterance of what is absent in our tradition, or the utterance 
of the unknown, on the one hand, and the acknowledgement of the
87infinitude of knowledge on the other”.
As for Salafism, he goes on, its point of departure lies in the 
assumption of “perfection” seen as a pre-given quality inherent in the 
Qur’anic text. This quality negates any necessity for change. The fact that 
Arabic language/culture is posited as being modelled on, even grounded 
in, this fixedly essentialized concept of perfection does imply, in the final 
analysis, that all idea of change must be firmly rejected.
In view of this, Adunls’s conclusion is hardly surprising:
The need for the thought of the other in general, and for promoting 
the notion of innovation in particular, is seen -  in consequence -  as 
superfluous. What Arab society requires is to turn the past into a 
persistently changing present.88
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Let it be repeated: the crucial point here is that the modernist position, 
grounding Arab innovationists as distinct from the renovationists of al- 
Nahdah, appears to demand a radical transformation of the meaning of 
the past. The critic can no longer interpret past texts in their own terms 
but in terms of present premises. Changes in experience of the present, 
through processes of epistemological configuration, transform, 
unfailingly, the very meaning of the past. The past is no longer something 
which already exists; it is a matter of becoming as much as of being.
It should now be clear, in view of the above, that the full impact of 
a literalist reading of the Qur’anic text upon Arabic literary theory can 
only be understood as the symptom of an absolutism central to an all- 
embracing literary canon. The concept of a Salafi-bound canon is viewed, 
in consequence, as standing in a persistently subordinate relation to the 
Qur’anic text. The subject of an unfailingly destabilizing criticism, this 
non-symmetric relation between the sacred and the worldly, the secular 
and the religious, appears to have very notable implication for Adunls’s 
rejection of making literature subservient to theology. The effect of 
coupling the former with the latter, he pointedly explains, is largely 
conveyed through two highly stylistic qualities present in the Qur’anic 
text: kamal (perfection) and i'jaz (inimitability). These supposedly 
unrivalled qualities come to mean, in traditional Arabic criticism, that no 
text can ever attain the standard example represented by Islamic scripture.
As for any attempt to retrieve a past, pristine purity, motivated by 
notions of submission to the one “true” orthodoxy, be that religious or 
secular, Adunls finds the correlate to this in what he aptly calls the 
“epistemology of finality”. If, as some might argue, he exaggerates here, 
he nevertheless does so in the service of pointing out
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the significance of the stress put, in particular, on the precedence of 
textual literalness in Islamic epistemology, and, in general, on 
orthodox theological and foundational literalness in the case of
89religious or secular postulations.
What, then, can we deduce from this brief skim over the spatio- 
temporal movement of a critical concept? A developed concept, as it 
exists at the end of a journey, is inconceivable without an absorptive 
capacity fo r  transforming and being transformed. As such, Husain’s 
version of Comte’s term at the end of a trans-cultural journey from one 
discipline (sociology) to another (Arabic literary theory), over a 
considerable temporal and spatial distance, seems as dissimilar to, as 
plainly different from, its sociological point of departure as it could 
possibly be. This transformational capacity is further enhanced in 
Adunls’s illustrative attempt to extrapolate a theory of modernism by 
probing the possible theoretical dynamics that would reveal the laws of 
motion grounding an alternative Arabic culture. He believes, rightly, that 
such a theory must be interdisciplinary in character, entailing what might 
be regarded as a total cultural act; yet such an act has been constantly 
impeded by the subservience of culture to an absolutism embodied in the 
literal interpretation of a theology-based literary canon.
The bottom line is this: a travelling concept, in the sense indicated 
above, may be seen simply as designating a frame o f  reference, a point o f  
departure, rather than a cause or origin. An origin is exclusive, and 
exclusiveness is a primitive characteristic. It implies, relentlessly, the 
power to exclude; it is both pre-modem and anti-modem. A frame of 
reference, in contrast, is inclusive and expansive.
151
Concluding remarks
Let us recapitulate. The attempt, in the preceding articulated definition of 
modernism, to set out a conceptual model positing an account of literary 
theory has led to three principal conclusions.
First, the problematic embedding this model-building exercise 
(with its emphasis on movement from the unidisciplinarity of literary 
criticism to the interdisciplinarity of cultural critique) is designated by the 
proposition of what might well be called a consciously parallactic 
process, one that involves a constant shift in the point of observation.
Second, this construct, represented by what is primarily a verbal 
creation, is expressed not in the form of a chronological record of 
modernism’s significant events and unique specimens of literature, but 
rather in a narrative that propounds a paradigmatically modern 
conception, one that defines literary history not solely as a method for 
setting past events in order of occurrence but as a “critique” par 
excellence: as a deliberative act o f criticism defined as “part o f  
poetics L90
Third, the model providing the preceding construct -  a construct 
that attempts, selectively, to appropriate particular critical devices, 
concepts and postulates developed by modernist writers on literary theory 
-  has depended, throughout this expose, on the assumption of a possible 
demise o f  boundaries; one whereby texts are implicated equally, with no 
distinction between literary works and theoretical discourse (philosophy, 
sociology, anthropology, psychoanalysis, etc.).
The central contention of this endeavour to construct a conceptual 
model is that re-readings of theoretical writings on modernity, modernism 
and modernization may be viewed as attempts to rethink the critical 
positions embedding poetry writing and fiction making as avowedly 
demonstrative processes denoting modes o f critique, criticism o f
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criticism, metatheory, or just literary theory. On the other hand, the 
specimens of poetry or fiction used to reconstruct possible articulated 
definitions are posited here as instruments for inquiring into the nature of 
writing, thus providing, albeit obliquely, a taxonomy of approaches 
towards, and insights into, literary criticism and cultural critique.
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IV. Modernism: Literary Theory’s Frames of Reference
Since the articulated definition of an all-embracing concept of 
modernism, encompassing literary theory, is an essential part of the 
attempt to construct, over the three previous sections, a hypothetical 
model whose correspondence to textual reality one consistently seeks to 
verify -  and is therefore also essential for an ongoing discussion of 
theory’s points of departure -  it will be helpful to sum up the basic 
assumptions underlying this theory and to show how a taxonomy of 
frames o f  culture-sensitive reference fits into it.
Modern Arabic literary theory, it is now clear, is no seamless 
garment, but rather a complex verbal creation. It refers not only to a 
specific incipient paradigm whose suggested accelerated process of 
change hovers somewhere between questioning and certitude, but also to 
the effacement of older categories of canon and discourse characteristic 
of the mode of expression encoding the literary representation of cultural 
experience.
All the relevant frames of reference examined in the proposed 
taxonomy are therefore viewed, under a classificatory umbrella, as 
dynamic concepts. Whatever form of argument is deployed, concepts are 
crucial to the process of reasoning, since the modern theory advanced 
throughout this model-building has been constructed in terms of concepts 
-  not because the connotation of the modem is well established, but, on 
the contrary, because it is not. Concepts, in this sense, are more than 
proper nouns or names for the paradigmatic changes to which they refer; 
they are polemically empirical notions extrapolated from the experience 
o f current Arabic culture.
It is the case, nonetheless, that these concepts are viewed here as 
serviceable experimental terms, composed of features positing a present­
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ness that gives modem theory its character -  in this instance (for 
example) the unbound quality of timeless newness; that is, a state of mind 
not tied to any particular temporality. Clearly, the concept of a timeless 
newness long predates the emergence of modernism; and, as such, it 
resides not in one period, or one time frame (the present), but in various 
time frames.
Let us now review some of these frames of reference.
Universalism
In contrast to universalism -  a term inextricably bound up with a 
modernism whereby an all-embracing dominant culture is held to be true 
for all humanity -  an alternative concept, developed within the context of 
Arabic literary criticism, would appear to question the very assumptions 
underlying Universalism’s Eurocentric theoretical basis.
These assumptions, establishing as they do a hierarchical division 
between Europe and its other(s), are viewed by Arab modernists as 
wholly erroneous, for the simple reason that they are historically poorly 
sourced. The intellectual bases of this position are twofold.
First, as ‘Atif Faddul rightly points out, most of those modernists 
(including Yusuf al-Khal and AdunTs) who were behind Shi'r, the 
influential periodical launched in 1957,
were at one time or other members of the Syrian Social Nationalist 
Party (SSNP) and came under the influence of that party’s 
ideology. The SSNP held that Greek civilization originated in the 
Near East, and hence they did not consider the western civilization 
that developed from it as alien.1
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Thus, one of the principles on which the ideology of the SSNP was based 
appears perfectly compatible with the concepts of cultural mutuality, 
complementarity and permeability. This is made explicit in the principle 
formulated by the movement’s leader, Antun Sa‘adah, as early as 1948:
The Syrians’ genius and mental superiority over their neighbours 
and others is indisputable. They civilized Greece and laid down the 
basis of the Mediterranean civilization which the Greeks shared
o
with them at a later period.
In other words, the idea of a splendid ancient Greece, whose 
civilization has often been described as emerging like a “miracle”,
emblematic of its own intrinsic genius and owing nothing to its
■2
neighbours, is vigorously contested. This is exemplified, albeit broadly, 
in an assertion made in AdunTs’s introduction to a book on contemporary 
Syrian art:
Sumerian, Babylonian, Canaanite and Pharaonic mythology 
reappeared in one way or other in Greek and Roman myths, only to 
be rewritten, under a halo of sacralization, in the Bible (the Old 
Testament) and the Qur’an.4
The second intellectual basis for contesting a Eurocentric 
viewpoint lies in Arab modernists’ rejection of the founding assumptions 
underlying a Eurocentric narrative of world history -  a narrative that has 
virtually reduced Arabic culture’s contribution to Western Europe, 
through the Middle Ages and the Renaissance of the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, to that of merely “transmitting” Greek knowledge, 
philosophy and science. As such, the high points of the Arab cultural
163
achievement during that period appear to be exiled, irretrievably, to a 
state of perpetual suspension. In his World Philosophies: An Historical 
Introduction, David E. Cooper comments as follows:
It is not necessary to be a devotee of “political correctness” to 
regret that the great preponderance of histories of philosophy, 
many passing themselves off as “general”, deal only with western 
thought. A few Arabs are sometimes included, but, so to speak, as 
honorary westerners, deemed worthy of inclusion for their 
commentaries on Aristotle and hence influence on medieval 
Christian thought.5
Some of the more critical accounts, dealing, specifically, with western 
literature, propose a more radical framework. Take, for instance, E.L. 
Ranelagh’s implied assumptions of an alternative universalism, born out 
of dissatisfaction with current ethnocentric European narrative. In her 
work The Past We Share: The Near Eastern Ancestry o f Western Folk 
Literature, she writes:
We are taught that our civilization stemmed from classical and 
Christian roots, Graeco-Roman and Judeo-Christian, and that the 
classical elements had been largely lost until their discovery, 
known as the Renaissance. But now that the world is smaller, 
communication easier, organized religion more relaxed and 
scholarly exchange more widespread, our common ground with 
Arabian tradition is being recognized. Medieval culture was in fact 
Greek, Latin and Arab.6
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The case for a common ground, one that recognizes the intellectual 
interplay between Arabic culture, pre-Islamic and medieval, and 
European culture, offers a multiplicity of arguments against the 
essentialism of an ethnocentric model, so pointing the way towards a 
potentially more balanced concept of the universal.
A good example of a step in this direction, entailing an attempt to 
locate common ground with a view to arguing against some pre-given 
racial or psychological essence of the Orient in general and Arabic culture
in particular, is set out by M.A. al-Jabiri in his Al-Tnrath wa ’l-hadcithah
— 1(“Tradition and Modernity”). This venture focuses on European
thought’s model of history-writing, whereby a cultural narrative is present
as a “continuum” -  a continuous, homogeneous, uninterrupted sequence,
stemming from Hegel’s scathing verdict on the “Orient” back at the
* * 9beginning of the nineteenth century.
Another important discussion of the increasingly negative impact 
of ideology on ethnographic European epistemology can be found in 
Muhammad Waqidi’s book A l-‘Ulian al-insaniyyah wa ’l-ideologiah 
(“The Humanities and Ideology”).9
Mythology
This concept is closely related to the “Tammuzi movement”,10 whose 
preoccupation with the question of national rebirth, and emphasis on the 
use of Middle Eastern myths in Arabic poetry, was symptomatic of a 
paradigmatic shift towards modernism. The impulse behind this interest 
in mythology, which dates back to the late 1950s, may be described as 
unmistakably modern.
As Salma Khadra Jayyusi points out, the use of Tammuz and Ishtar 
(‘Ashtarut) in Arabic creative writings appears as early as Gibran’s 
narrative piece “Liqa’ ” (“Encounter”) in Darn1 a wa ihtisdma (“A Tear
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and a Smile”) (1914).11 However, the Tammuzi movement’s 
preoccupation with Middle Eastern myths found outlet in two principal 
ventures.
The first was to retrieve old Syrian and Mesopotamian gods, as 
being emblematic of life and rebirth in the Near East, and to employ 
them, through a process of epistemological configuration, in constructing 
a vision of the future in terms of present concerns. In 1957, Jabra Ibrahim 
Jabra translated into Arabic part (4) of Sir James Frazer’s The Golden
• 1 oBough, which dealt, specifically, with the myth of Adonis. The worship
1 ^of Adonis (as this eminent British anthropologist pointedly explains)
was practised by the Semitic peoples of Babylonia and Syria, and 
the Greeks borrowed it from them as early as the seventh century 
before Christ. The true name of the deity was Tammuz: the 
appellation of AdunTs is merely the Semitic Adon, “lord”, a title of 
honour by which his worshippers addressed him. In the Hebrew 
text of the Old Testament the same name, Adonai, originally 
perhaps Adoni, “my lord”, was applied to Jehovah. But the Greeks 
through misunderstanding converted the title of honour into a 
proper name.14
The Tammuzi movement, ephemeral as it may now seem, produced a 
considerable number of works by “distinguished modern poets such as 
Khalil Hawi, ‘Ali Ahmad SaTd (Adunls), Badr Shakir al-Sayyab, Jabra 
Ibrahim Jabra and Yusuf al-Khal”.15
These poets sought, in the light of the new attitude to pre-Islamic 
mythology, to underline a longing for national and cultural revival. Yet, 
for all that, their emphasis on what M.L. West significantly calls the 
“East Face of Helicon”,16 in reference to the cultural elements imported
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by ancient Greece from the Near East, is simply a shorthand way of 
proposing a redefinition that would recognize the validity of a new, well 
sourced universalism — one fully prepared to grapple with the elusive 
notion of “convergence”, anticipating the emergence of a common 
cultural ground that would reshape the essentialist binarity of “Orient” 
versus “Occident”.
The second venture was to make mythology speak to epistemology; 
that is, to transform mythical cognition into an instrument of historical 
investigation. In this sense, myth was no longer regarded as a narrative 
supplying a “gnosis”, a piece of esoteric knowledge lacking factual basis, 
but rather as a model of implicit epistemology as opposed to explicit 
ideology; one possessing its own way of expressing historical reality. An 
example of this is provided by AdunTs in what he aptly calls “material 
intertextuality”; a term denoting the geographical connection linking the 
“texts” of East and West, and the “ethereal intertextuality” implying a 
different kind of connection, one in which significant mythic-religious 
“textual” elements derived from the literatures of the Near East had been 
transplanted into the body of classical Greek culture.
The issue of reading epistemology into mythology is raised by 
AdunTs’s citation of the myth of Cadmus and Europa. In his account of 
the Cadmus myth, which provides a symbolic origin for the invention of 
the alphabet, the notion of a piece of knowledge with truth-generating 
capacity is firmly emphasized. The myth tells the story of Cadmus, the 
son of the Phoenician king Agenor, who was ordered by his father to go 
in search of his sister Europa. Unless he could bring her back, he himself 
was never to return to Phoenicia. Cadmus, who gave Europe its name,
i nwas the first to introduce the use of letters into Greece.
If we are once prepared to accept the notion of cultural 
complementarity, along with its associated ideas, as the basis for de-
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esserializing the roots of “modernism” and dislodging the belief in its 
enforced differences, then, clearly, the employment of this primary 
epistemological instrument has far-reaching implications. Within a multi­
cultural frame, the emphasis on “reciprocity” -  regarded by Al-Azmeh as
1 o
“an assertion of mutual legitimacy” -  means that modern Arabic theory 
can use it to challenge the historicity of the very assumptions predicating 
the dominant paradigm of “modernism”.
Difference
This is a concept central to essentialist and totalizing viewpoints on 
culture and identity. More specifically, there is, in modern Arabic literary 
theory, an implicit distinction to be made between “difference” and 
“differentness”. The former term provides a broad framework for 
comparison between a theoretical position embodying a Eurocentric 
model of modernism and an alternative model positing cultural identity as 
a paradigm in motion: one that is being constantly made and remade. The 
latter term refers to a fixed position, one that embraces the terminology of 
cultural differentialism. This negative reference, proposing a state of 
ontological differentness, takes up Al-Azmeh’s argument (1993), which 
connects, albeit obliquely, two seemingly conflicting web-spinning 
registers: the populist cultural stance of Islamic fundamentalists (Arab or 
otherwise) and that of some western pundits who celebrate an 
impermeably unchanging model of cultural essentialism. The two sides 
(Al-Azmeh trenchantly argues) are in fact speaking the same self- 
indulgent language of ancestral authenticity and identity.
In his over-arching study Orientalism (1978),19 Edward Said 
examines the processes whereby the category of the “Orient” has been 
and continues to be constructed within European thought, pointing out the
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resultant ontological and epistemological distinction between “Orient” 
and “Occident” .
Drawing on Said’s thesis, Rana Kabbani employs the sceptical 
approach characterizing Oliver Goldsmith’s Citizen o f the World, to point 
out what might be termed an “invented difference”: a fabricated mode of 
ontological differentness par excellence. In Europe's Myths o f Orient 
(1986), she writes as follows:
Goldsmith’s citizen is a studious, cultured, polite and reserved 
man, in fact, as unlike the traditional stereotype of the “Oriental” as 
can be imagined. This, he soon discovers, is a shortcoming on his 
part, for he repeatedly disappoints his European hosts, who find 
him wanting in barbarity. Their demand is for an “Oriental” 
Oriental. . .  ”20
Incommensurability
This is a term from scientific theory, here used to indicate the problematic
facing Arabic literary theory whenever a comparison is suggested
* • 21 * •between its model, regarded by some critics as derivative, replicative 
and consequently inauthentic, and a monocultural European model 
described as primary, original and authentic.
The problem with such a comparison lies not in any lack of 
common basis for comparison between two virtually asymmetric models, 
but rather in the way it is repeatedly employed within an axiology- 
oriented context, whereby the notion of comparability proposes a 
correlation based on the value-laden concept of mufadalah, as opposed to 
the value-neutral concept of muqaranah.
Trendism
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Within the preceding model-building exercise, this term represents the 
contrary of creativity, which is regarded as the backbone of modernism. 
The cultural connotation of trendism has reference to an ephemeral 
category that should not be construed as free-standing, but rather bound 
to an endlessly changing concept of fashion, and to what is emphatically 
not literature in the full sense. Based on an uncritical adherence to 
fashion, it is a concept whose negative influence on Arab culture is 
expressed in AdunTs’s distinction between fashion and creativity: 
“Fashion grows old from the moment it is bom, while creativity is 
ageless.”22
Autonomy
The concept of “autonomy” derives from Pierre Macherey, and is used 
here -  over against the concept of independence -  to describe modem 
Arabic literary theory, viewed as a totality identical with itself. As such, 
an autonomous Arabic theory does not derive from any epistemological 
break with a dominant European cultural model. Rather, it establishes, in 
its own way, a distinct if ambivalent position separate from it. As such it 
is not totally independent. “The notion of absolute independence 
generally characterises that mythical thinking which attests to entities
» k * •  • 9^already formed without explaining their origins and development.” 
Voluntarism
“Voluntarism” is employed here, with respect to modern Arabic literary 
theory, as an epistemological instrument to explain the movement of 
culture from “fate” to “choice”. This movement proposes “change” as a 
voluntary act, one determined by the self-conscious thrust of the will. 
According to AdunTs: “Arabic poetry worthy of being called original is
24one . . . emanating from the will to change.”
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The discussion of modernism by the innovationists has, over the 
three decades or so since 1970, produced a considerable amount of 
critical writing, most of which will be seen to have supplied a highly 
conscious impetus towards the development of a new paradigm.
Rewriting
The idea of rewriting a concept, a critical term or a method highlights the 
oppositionality between two divergent approaches: namely “application” 
and “re-invention”. The distinction between these two terms, as set forth 
by George Tarablshi, proposes an intrinsic difference in reasoning. In an 
attempt to re-appropriate the language of psychoanalysis from literal 
interpretation, he argues that his role, as a critic of culture, is to “re­
invent” Freudian analytical theory, that is, to domesticate it to an 
alternative context of relevancy, in opposition to any arbitrary 
“application” of its distinguishing postulates and premises.
Such rewriting suggests a possible synonymization with 
contextualizing. It insists on context-boundedness of understanding. 
Understanding is always a matter of application. It grows out of a 
particular context, and, as the context changes, so the need for re­
interpretation arises accordingly. The travelling concept of the “static and 
dynamic”, moving from the context of Auguste Comte’s sociology to that 
of Taha Husain’s literary criticism, and thence to AdunTs’s cultural 
critique, provides a well-founded argument against textual closure, 
whereby employment of a term is confined to the context in which it has 
originated.
Supersession (ibdal)
This has been an important feature of modern Arabic literary theory since 
around 1970 (the approximate starting date for “innovative” as opposed
171
to, and distinct from, “renovative” modernism). The term denotes a 
paradigmatic process of substitution whereby the latter is being displaced 
by the former.
Examples of supersession (ibdal) may be found in the fields of 
history-writing, literature and literary theory.
First, Bassam Tibi, in his Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry 
(1971), discusses al-Husari’s theory of pan-Arab nationalism versus pan- 
Islamism, stressing that the former is secular in the European sense, and 
that its affinity with Islamic philosophy is fortuitous and only 
occasionally formal. This affinity, he further points out, has -  in 
conjunction with the pioneering work of the early Syro-Lebanese 
Christian nationalists and those orthodox Muslims who unintentionally 
secularized Islam -  created a fertile soil for the diffusion of al-Husari’s 
theories within a profoundly Islamic society.
On the basis of all this, Tibi concludes, a process of substitution 
has occurred. We find ourselves, he implies, in a Foucaultian sense, in the 
presence of a rupture, a paradigmatic shift, an axial motion of 
displacement and replacement:
. . .  it is possible to refute the claim that pan-Arabism is the 
historical continuation of pan-Islamism. There is a great deal of 
evidence to suggest that pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are two 
rival political movements. This is also clear from the fierce 
hostility expressed by the still powerful Muslim Brethren towards 
the Arab nationalist movement.25
Second, viewing cultural change as a continual process of 
substitution is clearly present in the following lines from AdunTs’s poem 
“Qabr min ajl New York” (“Grave for New York”):
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Thus I end all rules
and for each movement I make up its rule,
Thus I advance, but do not proceed, 
and when I proceed I do not return.26
Third, Muhammad Bennls has extrapolated from Arabic the 
concept of ibdal, or supersession, as an indicative keyword explaining 
how innovative modernism came into existence in an area within which a
ryinew paradigm has emerged.
Permutation (tabdil)
In Arabic, the words tabdil (permutation) and ibdal share a common 
etymological ancestry; while the former denotes a change in the order of 
things observed, the latter refers to a process of substitution whereby one 
paradigm displaces/replaces another. Bennls identifies the term tabdil in 
poetics as emblematic of the concept of configuration present in the 
writings of renovative modernists.
Contextualism
This term refers to the view that modern Arabic literature’s borrowings 
from western sources have been affected by the domestic context in 
which they are used. At this point the process of borrowing is seen by 
innovative modernists not as one of replicating an appropriated origin, 
but rather as a process of cultural translation and transvaluation.
In this sense, contextualization supplies a procedure for organizing, 
and being organized by, the notion of cultural relevancy.
Register (dlwan)
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Modern literary theory began with the recognition and valorization of the 
genre of poetry as a category describing and prescribing the most 
prominent mode of expression in Arabic literature.
Poetry is regarded as the diwan, or register, of the Arabs; it is the 
repository of their traditional lore, values and criteria. With the 
emergence of the novel as a fully accomplished art form, a switch of 
register occurred, so sparking off an ongoing debate regarding the two 
competing genres central to the study of current literature.
Affiliation
Said’s importance vis-a-vis the interpretation of modem Arabic literary 
theory lies, at heart, in one specific notion; that his proposed paradigm of 
“affiliation” is not simply preferable to that of “filiation”, its antonym, 
but also constitutes an alternative method of examining the way theory 
crosses the essentialized foundational boundaries separating cultures into 
entrenched, pre-given and fixed entities. In terms of the paradigm of 
filiation, biological inevitability reflects the notion of a reactionary 
impulse, one suggesting race-designate cultural identity. Affiliation, by 
contrast, is a dynamic concept imbued with the modern notion of choice, 
whereby a “metaphorical” parent displaces/replaces a static ethnicity 
thriving on the enmity of the “other”.
Convergence
This is a concept proposed within the foregoing model of literary theory 
to explain its movement towards a common point; the claim being that 
different cultures share a universal rather than a uniform character. It 
underlies a theory making possible an in-between space where cross- 
cultural exchanges may take place.
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An example of convergence may be seen in AdunTs’s attempt to 
provide conceptual bridges linking French modernism and Abbasid 
modernity; Sufism with surrealism. Other examples can be found in
OR * * •Kamal Abu DIb’s recognition (1978) of an existing link between al- 
Jurjani’s theory of poetic imagery and current literary theory; or in Mazen 
al-Wa‘ir’s combining of Arabic grammar29 and Chomsky’s theory of 
universal grammar; or in Muhairi, Sammud and Mseddi’s joint 
exploration of further points of convergence that link Arab poetics with 
current linguistic theory central to the western canon.
In a comparative perspective, the concept of convergence resists all 
notions of a stable cultural identity; for such notions undermine the 
historicity and changeability of a given culture.
Secularity
The concept of a secular critique probing the complex ambivalent 
relationship between Islam and modernity is brought into Arabic literary 
theory via four principal routes:
First, AdunTs’s thesis of the static and dynamic in Arabic culture. 
Stated broadly, this thesis underlines the significance of the stress placed 
on literal textual interpretation in Salafi Islamic epistemology, as a 
serious obstacle underlying the desire of mainstream writings on Arabic 
culture, stifled as these are by religious orthodoxy, to modernize without 
attempting to secularize.
Second, Mohammed Arkoun’s critique of the discourse of Islamic 
fundamentalism, within which one may detect an underlying 
deconstructive streak. Arkoun’s critique proclaims the imminent 
supersession of the concept of “Islamizing modernity” by that of 
“modernizing Islam”.
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Third, in Al-Usul al-falsafiyyah lil- ‘ilmaniyyah (“The Philosophical
TO   fFundamentals of Secularism”), ‘Adel Daher offers a philosophical 
approach, while an interdisciplinary approach is employed in A. Al- 
Azmeh’s AT Tlmdniyyah min manzur mukhtalef (“Secularism from a 
Different Perspective”).31
Fourth, the resurgence of fundamentalism and the emergence, in 
consequence, of the newly termed concept of “Islamic literature” as an 
alternative to “Arabic literature”, thus placing literature, within a 
hierarchic order, as subservient to theology.
Innovation
“Innovation” is used here to indicate a dominant analytical paradigm 
pointing to the notion of “creativity”. This notion is regarded by 
modernist writers as being identiflably Arab in character, and modem 
Arabic literary theory must, in consequence, be viewed in the context of 
creativity and judged by the standard of innovation particular to Arabic.
The study of “innovation”, as distinct from “renovation”, is central 
to the present model-building of modem literary theory. While innovative 
modernism proposes radical changes in literary theory by bringing new 
assumptions into play, the notion of renovation implies, by contrast, an 
adherence to revival, renewal and rendering old literary assumptions as 
good as new.
What this apparently rigid dichotomy boils down to in practice is 
that a great leap towards “differentness” has occurred; one that rejects the 
notion of emulating the past, yet falls decisively short of advocating any 
break with it.
Counter-canonicity
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“The canon” is the term used to indicate the seemingly unassailable 
dominance exerted by texts recognized, through the course of Arabic 
literary history, as exclusively superior, authoritative and prescriptive.
This dominance of an institutionalized curriculum is seen by some 
modernists as emblematic of an irreversibly established ideological 
figuration. Now, however, the conception of “present-ness” as a paradigm 
superior to the past has effectively put an end to the veneration of the 
tradition in question, paving the way for the exploration and discovery of 
texts previously excluded, as minor or irrelevant, by a persistently 
controlling canon. Examples of such texts, now held up for critical 
consideration, are provided in the works of Sufi writers like al-Niffari, al- 
Hallaj and Ibn ‘ Arabi.
Counter-canonicity is, then, the term indicating a deconstruction 
and reconstruction of the canonicity within which Arabic tradition is 
located. In this sense, the past can no longer be perceived in its own terms 
but in terms of present concerns.
Interdisciplinarity
The paradigm shift from a unidisciplinary literary criticism to an 
interdisciplinary cultural critique was already heralded at the turn of the 
last century, when the “literary” nationalism of the Christian Arabs 
became politicized.
In his critical inquiiy into Arab nationalism (1971), Bassam Tibi 
reaffirmed the imminence of the shift, albeit obliquely, with the following 
statement:
At first, the nationalists tried to point to the existence of an Arab 
people who were different from the Turks by referring back to 
Classical Arabic literature. Then equality, and national cultural
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autonomy within the Ottoman Empire, were demanded for this 
Arab nation. In both cases the advanced bourgeois society of the 
West was the model.
It may be worthwhile to note, in the present context, that the 
concept of adab in Classical Arabic literature -  which implied, among 
other things, manners, refinement and culture -  has bome persistent and 
identifiable humanistic overtones. The corollary of this interdisciplinarity 
is exemplified in the many varieties and inflections of writings attended 
to within the framework of a broadly-based concept which is never static 
but always open to further possibilities.
With the publication of Adums’s influential study34 of the literary 
canon in Arabic literature (1974/1977/1978), followed by M.A. al-Jabiri’s
35inquiry into Arabic culture and its epistemological systems (1984/1986), 
an interdisciplinary approach would appear to have emerged, one 
whereby complex questions such as cultural identity have come to be 
closely examined from within literary theory, critical theory, or just 
theory per se.
Beginning
Through Edward Said’s argument (1975) that the notion of a 
“beginning”, as suggesting the starting point of a genre or a movement, is 
preferable to that of an “origin”, this model-building of Arabic literary 
theory, with modernism as its context, is proffered as an attempt to probe 
the problem of periodization; as a critical device for determining the 
points at which something different has occurred.
Unlike the idea of “origin”, which is an irreducibly biology- 
oriented determiner, the notion of a “beginning” entails a thorough-going 
movement from fate to choice. Origin can only be acknowledged -  while
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a beginning, as Said puts it, “methodologically unites a practical need 
with a theory, an intention with a method”.
This argument supplies a possible matrix concept for a closer 
examination of the way modem Arabic theory possesses more than one 
“beginning” for literary genres like poetry and fiction. Adunls (1978) 
rejects the idea of asalah (originality) rooted in as I (origin). For him, 
originality should not be made to conform to “origin” by virtue of a mere 
etymological connection. The original is, in fact, neither imitative nor 
derivative from a fixed origin.
Sufism
Sufism, the mystical movement within Islam, has affinities with the 
modernist movement that are central to contemporary Arabic literary 
theory. Indeed, Sufi practitioners like al-Hallaj, al-Niffari and Ibn ‘Arabi 
have come to be seen, in modern literature, as representative of a 
persistent impulse towards universalism.
These Sufis re-appear in modern poetry as poetic personae through 
which the articulation of a dynamic vision is made possible. The 
convergence of Sufism and surrealism36 on to common ground is, for 
example, the theme of a study in which Adunls presents the two 
universalist movements as commutative, symmetric and co-existive in 
scope.
Modernism
The term is viewed here as a controlling cultural paradigm, being 
associated in particular with the processes of contact and impact. 
Referring to a vibrant movement (or movements) within literature and 
culture in western societies between 1880 and 1950, modernism is
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construed in the present context as emblematic of Europe’s dominance 
effected through acculturation.
The extent of this acculturation, in terms of the methods used in 
comparative literature, falls outside the scope of this present study. 
Modernism is rather viewed, from the perspective of Arabic literary 
theory, as a problematic; one pointing to a theoretical framework within 
which intellectual contact and impact are constitutive of only one 
determiner among many. The corollary of this determiner is the 
recognition and valorization of a total act of stimulus rather than a total 
act of identification and dependency. Yusuf al-Khal has converted this 
position into a self-pleading problematic of change:
The contradiction of being a form inside the modern world and an 
essence outside it compels us to confront the problems of the 
presence of an old society in a modem world and the problems of 
the presence of the modem world in an old society.37
Verbal creation
This is a proposed perspective associated, in the foregoing model- 
building, with an attempt to draw attention to literary theory’s own 
textuality, and so to recognize the generative power embedding its nature 
as, primarily, a verbal creation.
This textuality reflects an emphasis on viewing the world of the 
text (referring to society) as being as textual and discursive as the text of 
the world. In other words, the world of the text is conceived, in this 
verbal creation, as a text; one that is, in a semiotic perspective, subject to 
textual examination.
1 Faddul, op. cit., pp. 3-4.
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Adonis in Syria; Adonis Then and Now.
13 The conventional description of nineteenth-century anthropology confirms that we 
are dealing less with the study of man than with the study of “primitive” man and his 
“native” society. As such, anthropology in its unrevised form came into being through
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PART TWO:
Paradigm-Shifting:
A Functional Articulation
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I. Categories of Change:
The Tool-Makers, the Renovators and the Innovators
Introduction: from structure to function
The previous part of this study was, as repeatedly argued in the foregoing 
pages, constructed by means of a model-building exercise, which, as a 
verbal creation, works itself out and modifies itself as it proceeds. The 
model provides an interpretation of those basic issues that suggest, albeit 
in oblique fashion, the essential notions and mechanisms involved. In 
other words, it is not so much a history o f  literary theory as a study in 
interpretation. Rather than compress so vast and unwieldy a subject into 
an account of events and occurrences, I have sought to identify, probe and 
extrapolate certain issues that are specifically related to a possible 
structural articulation of modem Arabic literary theory.
All this serves to underline how the interpretation provided by the 
foregoing model serves as a representation, that is, as a self-generating 
construct of realness intended to fulfil a purpose: that of seeking to 
appropriate a network of hierarchies, insights, devices and contexts for 
the depiction of “what” is essentially a paradigm in motion -  a sudden 
break rooted in the epistemology o f  becoming.
Thus, the perceived model that has proposed the intellectual tools 
for understanding literary theory must be viewed as an instrumentality 
rather than a functionality. The former advances as an ongoing structural 
configuration, an agency, a means whereby a closer interpretation of its 
cumulative presentation is progressively made possible; the latter 
advances as a functional (complementary) articulation, reworking and 
refitting the concepts, differential and combinal, that will propose a
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repertoire of ways to interpret “how” the suggested model operates or 
performs.
Another way of putting all this is to say that, while the “what” and 
“why” of literary theory are seen as crucial features of its perceived 
model, a complementary articulation is proffered, in the following 
elliptical expose, as a focus for the functionality of paradigm-shifting -  
proposing as it does the “how” of literary theory. This functionality is 
treated as a discursive process predicating a triple movement: from 
renovative to innovative modernism; from unidisciplinarity to concept- 
generating interdisciplinarity; and from literary criticism to cultural 
critique.
* * *
The critical examination of culture has been a major undertaking of 
modern Arabic literary criticism since the end of the nineteenth century. 
In their earliest attempts to comprehend the notions of radical change, 
Arab writers were confronted with the problem of how to “modernize but 
not to westernize”;1 only, they felt, within a context of specific cultural 
identity could a “legitimate” variant of modernity be achieved. It is 
unarguable -  a gross understatement, indeed -  that European concepts of 
modernity/modernism have been powerfully present. They influenced 
Arabic criticism from the late nineteenth centuiy well into the twentieth, 
and continue to be reflected today in what is commonly referred to as a 
“process of globalization”. As such, there is little reason to dispute the 
assertion, often encountered in the writings of Arab critics, that the 
complex notion of cultural change is, in many respects, a matter of self­
scrutiny, of becoming rather than being; a shorthand way, in fact, of 
indicating the possibility of re-defining cultural identity. Amin Maalouf,
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in the course of a thought-provoking inquiry into the sustained question 
of identity, makes a pointed comparison. A constant re-experiencing of 
the cutting edge of this concept of intellectual self-awareness is, he says, 
akin to taming a panther:
Why a panther? Because a panther kills if you persecute it and kills 
if you leave it alone, and the worst thing you can do is to leave it 
alone after you’ve wounded it. But also because a panther can be 
tamed.4
In his On Identity, Maalouf argues for a re-examination of the 
functionality of cultural identity -  personal, national, religious and ethnic. 
Viewed from the locus of an all-embracing modernity, and wedding two 
categories (a deceptively immutable Arabic essence and a ceaselessly 
mutable historical construct) that are seemingly mutually exclusive, 
cultural identity is presented not as a fixed abstraction but as a notion 
embodied in a metaphor, one suggesting that the panther under scrutiny is 
psychosomatic: consisting, that is, of a body (soma) and a mind 
(psyche):5
It is not to be dealt with by either persecution or indulgence. It 
needs to be observed, studied calmly, understood, and then 
conquered and tamed if we don’t want the world to become a 
jungle, or the future to resemble the worst images of the past.6
“Panther taming”7 can, then, work as a pictorial metaphor, one 
expressing the constant attempt to nail down the slippery concept of 
cultural identity. The metaphor can also be re-functioned in relation to a
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particular tradition, namely as a footnote to a Hegelian dialectical 
argument:
Thanks to identity every being remains the same being, eternally 
identical to itself and different from the others. But thanks to 
negativity an identical being can negate or overcome its identity 
with itself and become other than it is, even its own opposite. 
Identity and negativity do not exist in an isolated state. Just like 
totality itself they are only complementary aspects of one and the 
same real being.8
Underlying this argument there seem to be the following 
presuppositions. First, cultural change, whenever the case derived from it 
is cumulatively dialectical rather than uncompromisingly categorical, 
takes place when the thesis (the modern) and the antithesis (the pre­
modern) interact. Second, the ensuing interaction produces, in an ongoing 
progression of paradigm-shifting, a possible synthesis culminating in a 
coherent whole. Yet -  as has been demonstrated throughout the foregoing 
model-building -  no single discipline can produce such a synthesis. Any 
one discipline is bound to abstract its object from the total field of an 
emergent multi-dimensional critique, and so fail to consider culture from 
all points of view. In the case of Sidqi IsmaTl and Zaki Najlb Mahmud, 
for instance, we are offered vibrant examples of embryonic 
interdisciplinarity. A brief review of the investigations undertaken by the 
writers in question, as they focus on the problematic of modernity, will 
shed light on the submergence of a sustained process of paradigm- 
shifting, within Arabic literary theory, from literary criticism to cultural 
critique,9 and, consequently, to a multiplicity of issues arising from the 
latter.
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As a transformational project suggesting the possibility of a theory 
of change, modernity -  and, indeed, modernism in its various domains -  
may be broadly viewed from at least two perspectives. We may consider 
it, first, as it actually unfolds in specific examples of literary (ergo 
cultural)10 criticism: as an axiology-based endeavour, pointing up the 
function of literary criticism turned cultural critique, and, subsequently, 
its implicit correspondence to an emergent system of values. The other 
perspective may be termed both theoretical and methodological, mulling 
as it does over the problematics of innovation and renovation.
This present section of the study will, then, explore these two 
complementary perspectives, with a view to supplying the notion of an 
insistently cumulative/progressive sequence. In seeking, through a 
composite framework of adopting, adapting and relativizing, to explore 
the boundaries of a possible theory of change, we are effectively re­
defining a set of categories in which three types of critic are involved.
The first kind comprises those who renovate/innovate the tools of 
the intellect: namely, the tool-makers who provide, through an 
epistemological reconfiguration, the critical instruments and the 
intellectual framework that comprehends them. It seems quite reasonable 
to suggest that culture-sensitive Arab critics and historians of ideas have, 
over the past three decades or more, succeeded in casting off the certainty 
of an unchanging exclusiveness in favour of a modernist imperative of 
ongoing change. Some, like Sidqi IsmaTl (a conscious and resolutely 
determined tool-maker), have maintained that Arab modernity is a Janus- 
like blend of heritage and innovation, with one face looking towards the 
past in terms of the concerns of the present, the other towards the present 
in terms of a submergent destabilizing world view.
In his Al-Arab wa tajribat al-ma’sat (“The Arabs and the 
Experience of Tragedy”),11 IsmaTl, fascinated by Nietzsche’s obsessive
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preoccupation with the nature of tragedy (as reflected in the latter’s The 
Birth o f  Tragedy),12 acts out, under a parallel homonym, the 
enchantments and disenchantments set forth by the German thinker. 
Designed to be compared and contrasted, this literary critique comes up 
with effectively new arguments, new critical tools; thereby dismissing as 
unfit the old tool-box, with its seemingly inexhaustible reserves of time- 
honoured concepts and value judgements.
Zaki Najlb Mahmud has likewise been highly influential as a 
contemporary cultural critic. In his Fi falsafat al-naqd (“On the
t t 10 t
Philosophy of Criticism”), he deals with questions relevant to the so- 
called “logical geography”14 of the critical concepts of the intellect. 
Clearly, his conception of literary theory goes hand in hand with his 
conception of philosophy, which derives to a large extent from the school 
of logical positivism15 — this last being manifest in his attempt to develop 
a set of rigorous critical tools for a modem culture-sensitive literary 
theory.16
The second category of change entails the renovators: those writers 
whose encounter with European and American literature has led, 
subsequently, to a position whereby modernity is sought through 
renovation of the old form17 rather than through any serious attempt to 
innovate within the paradigm of a new poetics, via changes brought about 
in consciousness.
The crucial point here is the way al-Nahdcih -  epitomizing as it 
does a revivalist movement propounding the superiority of the European 
present over a stagnant Arab culture locked in the past -  is viewed as 
intrinsically renovationist by innovationists such as Adunls, Yusuf al- 
Khal, Kamal Abu DTb, Jaber ‘Asfur, Muhammad Bennls and numerous 
others. For Adunls, one of the failures of al-Nahdah lies in its upholding 
of a negative concept of “otherness”:
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Al-Nahdah has deepened the feeling among the Arabs that the 
“modem” belongs to the other, whether it is about life style or way 
of thinking. Thus our modernity has always assumed a 
confrontation with the West, with an alien and different world. 
Even the quarrel between the conservatives and the innovationists, 
the qudama ’ [the ancients] and the muhdathin [the modern] has 
always been associated, on the level of Arab society as a whole,
with a recurring polemic on the Orient and the Occident and the
18nature of their relationship.
This seemingly unwilled engagement with otherness, emblematic 
of the modernism of renovation, suggests an undecidedly ambivalent 
relationship. Conversely, innovation modernism, with its emphasis on the 
notions of mutuality, complementarity and permeability, suggests the 
contrary: that willed engagement with otherness is rendered increasingly 
possible within the parameters of a global intellectual milieu able to find 
rectitude only in cultural mobility.
Yet, having rejected the founding assumptions underlying a 
reductive, even eliminative Eurocentric narrative of world history, 
innovation modernists do not appear to be in full agreement with the 
meaning of othering or otherness as grounded, for instance, by certain 
post-colonial critics like Gaytari Spivak. In Spivak’s explanation:
Othering is a dialectical process because the colonizing “other” is 
established at the same time as its “colonized others” are produced 
as subjects.19
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Another way of putting all this is to say that the post-colonial 
writer is confronted with the problem of writing in the language of the 
“other”, i.e., the colonizer. If English was to function (as it effectively 
did) as the integrative (filial) factor in the formation of the modem 
literatures of the formerly colonized English-speaking countries, such a 
problem was inevitable.
Be that as it may, the topic concerns us here only in so far as 
Arabic literary theory, being a verbal creation, can claim to be in some 
way different from -  albeit not fundamentally dissimilar to -  post­
colonial theory. The notion of otherness as viewed in Arabic theory must, 
accordingly, be read against the following background: that it is, 
pointedly, based less on filiation than on affiliation.
This position is illustrated in the critical writings of Nazik al- 
Mala’ika, who is a post-renovationist and an exponent of the new poetic 
diction. In her Qadaya ’l-shi‘r al-mu'asir (“Issues of Contemporary 
Poetry”), awareness of the classical tradition, with reference to some 
elements of Arabic culture, including language, is no longer an 
expression of alertness to its gravitational pull; rather, tradition, by means 
of a renovative epistemological configuration, constructs the appropriate
90framework of culture as the source of intellectual legitimacy.
In this sense, consciousness of the classical tradition implies a 
downward movement, through past cultural superstructures, to some focal 
point in the present where all movement ends and begins. However, the 
emphasis on a possible paradigmatic shift, represented by the movement 
from the “pre-modern” -  concomitant with the notion of “fate” -  to the 
“modern” -  concurrent with the notion of “choice” -  will, in a sense, vary 
from one writer to another.
The third category of change is that of the innovators. Innovation 
modernism has been dominant since the seventies,21 exerting considerable
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influence in many cultural areas and re-writing modern literary theory as
a playfully verbal construct -  a discursive creation full of brio and
0 0  • •bravura. Such a creation points up a problematic, an interwoven web of
assumptions held together by a particular unsolved problem. The 
problematic is then denotative of the imminence of a thorough-going 
socio-cultural model of transformation, one whose full implications 
Adunls confronts head on through his suggestion of an interaction 
between the micro and the macro:
To think and write what is truly new means above all to think about 
what has never been thought about and write what has never been 
written: that huge constant area of suppression -  religious and 
cultural, individual and social, spiritual and physical.
1 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs, Summer, 
1993, p. 41.
2 This argument has been taken up by a multiplicity of critics and historians o f ideas. 
The idea of a synthesis o f classical and modem, o f a legitimate fusion of past and 
present, is best explained by Salma Khadra Jayyusi, who argues that Adunls has 
“achieved at once a firm continuity and a definite discontinuity with classical diction 
and style. No deformation was allowed, and no disintegration in the well-built edifice 
of language, in its massive integrity and formidable command. But at the same time a 
completely new syntax, full of classical authority, yet fresh and utterly original, was 
achieved.” See Jayyusi, Modernist Poetiy in Arabic, p. 46.
3 For an analysis o f the concept of cultural globalism and its relevance in an Islamic 
and Arab context, see Turner, Orientalism, Postmodernism and Globalism, pp. 95- 
104. The term “globalism” is used here to accentuate the definition proposed by 
Anthony Giddens: “the intensification o f worldwide social relations which link 
distinct localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
miles away and vice versa.” (Anthony Giddens, The Consequences o f  Modernity, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990, p. 64.)
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4 See Amin Maalouf, On Identity, trans. from French by Barbara Bray, London: 
Harvill Press, 2000, p. 118.
5 See Rycroft, op. cit., p. 173.
6 Maalouf, op. cit., p. 118.
7 The centrality of the human will sets this act of voluntarism firmly within the 
context of choice rather than that of unwilled destiny.
8 See Madan Sarup, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 
London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988, p. 22.
9 For a discussion of the distinction between “criticism” and “critique” in the cultural 
context, see Davis and Schleifer, op. cit., pp. 1-46.
10 The logical edge vis-a-vis the interchangeability o f the “literary” and the “cultural” 
lies in the assumption that language, culture and identity have been proffered, 
throughout the present study, as heuristically intertwined.
11 Sidqi IsmaTl, Al-Mu ’allafat al-kdmila, Damascus, 1980, vol. II.
12 IsmaTl’s interest in Nietzsche’s life-affirming Die Geburt der Tragodie can be 
detected in his own rhapsodized (albeit less passionate) treatment o f the nature of 
tragedy within its Arabic cultural context. See Nietzsche, The Birth o f  Tragedy and 
the Genealogy o f Morals, trans. Francis Golffing, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 
1956.
13 Beirut-Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1979.
14 To determine the “logical geography” of concepts is to “reveal the logic of 
propositions in which they are wielded, that is to say, to show with what other 
propositions they are consistent and inconsistent, what propositions follow from them 
and from what propositions they follow”. See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept o f  Mind, 
London: Penguin, 1954, p. 8.
15 That is, from the range of ideas characteristic of the Vienna Circle of the 1920s and 
1930s. Logical positivism was strongly influenced by the empirical position, and 
especially by the work of Hume. Its distinctive feature was its attempt to develop and 
systematize empiricism with the aid of the conceptual equipment furnished by modem 
exploration of logical and mathematical theory, especially as in the early works of 
Russell and Wittgenstein. See Antony Flew (ed.), A Dictionaiy o f  Philosophy, 
London: Pan Reference, 1981.
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16 The best example o f this can be seen in Mahmud’s efforts to bring literary criticism 
out on the same wavelength of philosophical critique.
17 The point is that Arab critics have always viewed the genre of poetry as “the 
register of the Arabs” (<diwan al-Arab) -  as a distinctive and privileged form of 
literature and thought.
18 See Adunls, Sadmat al-haddthah, p. 284.
19 See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, op. c i t pp. 171-2.
20 This point is further illuminated in S. Moreh’s matter-of-fact obseivation that “the 
fonn of shiT hurr became the sign of progress in Arabic poetry, while the 
conventional fonn of the qasida and even the strophic fonn of the muwashshah and 
other stanzaic forms are considered conservative”. See Moreh, op. cit., p. 287.
21 This is, as noted earlier, an approximate date.
22 See, for example, K. Abu DTb, Jamaliyyat al-tajawur (“The Aesthetics of 
Juxtapositioning”), Beirut: Dar al-‘Ilm lil-Malayin, 1997.
23 Adunls, Introduction to Arab Poetics, pp. 101-2.
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II. Theory in Function:
A Logician’s Landscape
The term “cultural change” is more commonly associated with theoretical 
issues in modem literary criticism1 than with other concerns of 
modernism. As such, it is quite common for literary critics to lump 
theoretical and practical principles together and to offer the same type of 
account in connection with basic assumptions underlying cultural models 
of change. If a general conclusion can be extracted from a different but 
not dissimilar cultural context, Ihab Hassan’s observation about a general 
theory of change appears to have a pointed application to modern Arabic 
literary theory:
We speak much of change and have no theory of it. This may be 
wiser than we suspect; for change must continually surprise itself. .
. Yet human beings in culture continue to innovate or renovate and 
to do this now more than at any period of history . . . This is to say 
we remain creatures of power, language and desire.
Such observations about cultural change raise the question of how to 
confirm or unsettle the following presuppositions relating to modernism, 
and to assess their relevance to the pull of the present:
1. Arabic modernism and European modernism may be described as 
isomorphic, being similar in intention and claim, but different in 
structure and function.
2. For Arab innovation modernists who seek to escape from the cultural 
determinism rooted in ethnocentricity, the appeal of teleology resides
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in its emphasis on the “will”. A teleological horizon entails a wilful 
switch from the traditional notion of fate  to the modem notion of an
optionality governed by a sense o f  purpose.
3. Modern literary theory is an endeavour to abolish history and replace 
it with interpretation.
4. The study of modernity/modernism as a cultural phenomenon takes 
different forms among different groups and different individuals; it is 
more of a “prism” than an “ism”.
5. Renovation, within the Arabic social and cultural context, views 
modernity/modernism as a paradigm of permanence, durability and 
sustainability, fostering as it does a close connection between past and 
present, and elevating the influence of tradition above that of 
innovation.
6. Change (to cite Ihab Hassan’s epigram once more) “must continually 
surprise itself’. We have no theory of change; and because change 
entails a questioning of authority, it necessarily implies innovation: the 
employment of an alternative based on choice.
7. As contextualized within the domain of an ongoingly destabilized 
Arab cultural critique, innovation should be seen as a paradigm in 
motion.
8. As a paradigm in motion, modernism implies a continuous change in 
the meaning of the past, which can no longer be grasped in its own 
terms but in terms of the present.
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9. Modernisms, European and Arabic, are viewed by some Arab writers 
not only as symmetric but also as identical. This position, advocating 
total cultural assimilation, is emblematic of Jabra I. Jabra’s notion of 
the inevitable dominance of an emergent universalizing order of 
culture-power. He makes the point, accordingly, apropos of an all- 
embracing literary canon:
We have to perceive the movement of new Arabic poetry, 
unequivocally and above all, as part of the movement of modern art 
in Europe and the world. For renewal [tajdid\, it must be said, has 
its roots there. It has been brought here as a psychological image, 
not only in poetry but also in political and sociological thinking.4
10. The word taqwTl, denoting a process of “saying on behalf o f ’, evokes, 
albeit in roundabout fashion, what is expressed by the English word 
“ventriloquism”: it postulates an act of impersonation. The term 
contains, within the context of a seemingly inexorable relatedness 
connecting Arabic literary theory to a Eurocentric model, a cluster of 
supplementary concepts, such as: mimicking, mirroring, copying, 
appropriating, plagiarizing, simulating, emulating, replicating, aping, 
imitating, reproducing, recycling. Moreover, it connotes the theatrical5 
rather than the theoretical; for it suggests an act, predicated to function 
in iconic fidelity, of total cultural identification; a 
conscious/subconscious preoccupation with emulating all the 
assumptions held by a superior “other” and attributing them to 
“oneself’. There is, then, no room for variance, difference or 
dissimilarity. The corollary is a celebration of a fixed impermeable 
cultural essence. In emphasizing the singularity of an “essence”
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denoting one essentialized “source” of modernity, Arab writers such 
as Rashad Rushdi in the seventies and ‘Abdul-‘Aziz Hammudah in the 
nineties highlight, albeit inadvertently, the predominance of an 
outward-looking, surreptitious literary fund ament al ism, one that does 
not exist beyond the assumptions and prescriptions of Eurocentrism. 
Hence it is not, in effect, fundamentally dissimilar to the inward- 
looking literalism of “Salafi” cultural fundamentalism. The two 
positions can be viewed, in consequence, as the two sides of the same 
coin.
1 In this context Adorno’s view of a theory of cultural critique is significant. He 
argues that “the position of the cultural critic, by virtue o f its difference from the 
prevailing disorder, enables him to go beyond it theoretically, although often enough 
he merely falls behind”. See his essay “Cultural Criticism and Society”, in Prisms, 
trans. from German by Samuel and Shierry Weber, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 
1982, p. 19.
2 In Ihab and Sally Hassan (eds.), Innovation and Renovation: New Perspectives on 
the Humanities, Madison, Wisconsin: University o f Wisconsin Press, 1983, p. 15.
3 That is, “having the same structure due to resemblance between corresponding 
parts”; the term being “applicable in relating material objects, social organizations, 
works of art, and abstract concepts”. See Flew, op. cit., pp. 182-3.
The word mushdkalah is the Arabic equivalent of “isomorphism”, which is the 
property or state o f being “isomorphic” (mutashakel).
4 Jabra, op. cit., p. 8.
5 The “theatrical” can be vividly seen in “what Jorge Luis Borges hints at in ‘Pierre 
Menard, Author o f the Quixote’, describing a writer, who, emerging from a blur of 
inscrutable philosophical monographs, determines to write the novel Don Quixote:
He did not want to compose another Quixote ~~ which is easy -  but the Quixote 
itself. Needless to say, he never contemplated a mechanical transcription of the 
original; he did not propose to copy. His admirable intention was to produce a 
few pages which would coincide — word for word and line for line — with those 
of Miguel de Cervantes.
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Copying and inspiration may be superficially indistinguishable in their results, but, as 
Borges demonstrates, the identical texts will have profoundly different meanings 
(Nick Groom, The Forger’s Shadow: How Forgery Changed the Course o f  
Literature, London: Picador, 2002, p. 31.
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III. Two Transformational Concepts:
“Cultural Nosology” and “Interdisciplinarity”
(a) Cultural nosology1
An emotive form of cultural sociology, the proposed concept of “cultural 
nosology” has the potential to tell us a great deal about the emotional 
responses to national predicaments and the different phases of disease 
afflicting Arab culture. As such, the transformational concept of “cultural 
nosology” is viewed here as emblematic of the workings of “tragedy”.
In a book entitled Al- ‘Arab zahirah sautiyah (“The Arabs as Vocal 
Phenomenon”),2 ‘Abdullah al-Qusaymi seeks, through a pathological 
exercise in self-criticism, to supply the missing populist perspective in a 
possible cultural nosology: one that launches a scathing attack, in 
hyperbolic language, on Arab culture and society. A different if not 
fundamentally dissimilar kind of cultural nosology may be seen in Sadeq 
al-Azm’s Al-Naqd al-dhati b a 4d al-hazmia (“Self-Criticism Following the 
Defeat”).3 Written after the military defeat of 1967, this book, laden with 
ideology and displaying a positive array of pseudo-scientific Marxist 
claims, proposes an alternative, albeit absolutist theory of change. Of 
clear interest to us here is the very problem that has been left unresolved: 
namely, the problem of modernity vis-a-vis Islamic restorationism with 
its re-assertion of an immutable sense of “authenticity” and “tradition”.
The reverse of al-Qusaymi’s emotionalism and al-Azm’s pseudo­
scientific Marxist absolutism is to be found in the stance of Sidqi IsmaTl, 
where the core of the conception of cultural nosology lies in an emphasis 
on the meaning of “tragedy”. What he suggests in his A l-‘Arab wa 
tajribat al-ma ’sat (“The Arabs and the Experience of Tragedy”) is neither 
a return to an irrecoverable past nor the adoption of an absolutist theory 
of change, but rather a more profound understanding of what is implicit
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in the concept of a “tragedy” antedating the collapse into a seemingly 
uninterrupted state of entropy.
Another way of putting this is to say that Ism ael’s endeavour 
presents an intimate analysis of the concept of “tragedy”, not only within 
the framework of disastrous events taking place in real history, but also 
within the locus of a discursive exercise in intellectual introspection — a 
journey through the mind, through a cross-culture perspective, through 
the past as viewed from the standpoint of the present, and through a 
taxonomy of reflections on fiction, poetry, axiology, psychology and 
philosophy.
The word “tragedy”, in this sense, refers not solely to Arab history, 
to what actually happened; it is fictional as much as factual. The twofold 
movement of this proposition thus appears as a dialectical interconnection 
between rival attempts to deconstruct/reconstruct a possible cultural 
critique of an emergent theory of change.
Finally, so that an analysis leading to self-criticism may initiate a 
passage from mere description of the stages of disease to a critique of the 
disease itself, we need to point out a number of “misconceptions” that 
impede the emergence of a functioning theory of change. These 
misconceptions are enumerated in the closing pages of the book, as 
illustrative of an all-embracing syndrome.
1. The misconception o f  truth
Nietzsche’s observation that there are no truths but only interpretations is 
a splendid example of iconoclastic epistemology. Yet, in the words of one 
contemporary philosopher: “Logic cries out against this remark. For is it 
true?”5 The answer given is a qualified one: “Well, only if there are no 
truths. In other words, only if it is not true.”6
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In contrast to Nietzsche’s extreme relativism, Sidqi Ismael’s 
scepticism is not associated with the form of nihilism that denies the 
possibility of truth. For him the issue lies in the absence (not presence) of 
pluralism in dealing with the concept of truth within the framework of a 
modernizing culture. “Arab thought,” as he puts it, “is still lingering in a 
state of stagnation and populism.”7 Hence, he insists:
Pluralistic expression of opinion is fully dependent on the presence 
of a developed critical position, one demanding the kind of courage 
in which thought can refute inherent assumptions in order to arrive 
at truth. This refutation is imperative to foreground a position of 
“certainty”, a position in which “truth” becomes part of man’s 
existence.8
2. The misconception o f stability9
The notion of stability within a seemingly coherent Arab culture and 
society is based, erroneously, on an ontological and epistemological 
distinction between Orient and Occident. According to this predominate 
discourse of rupture, the Orient is seen as the locus of “spirituality ”, 
while the Occident is posited as the powerhouse of “materialism ”. The 
subsequent rupture becomes, in effect, the originator of the fallacy of 
“authentic spirituality”. Postulated as emblematic of a commutative 
relationship with impermeable, unchanging notions of social and cultural 
stability, this fallacy is illustrative, in consequence, of a pre-modem 
ontological essentialism.
3. The misconception o f revolution 0
The central issue for a theory of change resides in the very notion of 
“revolution”; for change, by its nature, means mutation of the given,
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transforming it into something other than itself. Yet “revolutionary 
consciousness”, which is the core of revolution, is, for Ismael, 
ceaselessly posited as concomitant with the presence of an “elite” or 
“vanguard”. Seeking, as it does, positive responses to the “mainstream”, 
the “elite” seems increasingly open to the idea of viewing revolution in 
terms of a “slogan” with which to flatter and exploit the masses. Thus 
populism becomes a sign of what IsmaTl aptly terms “false 
consciousness”, which appears to be at once stimulus and goad.
4. The misconception o f  individualism11
One of the assumptions associated with Arab culture is that “we are fully 
developed individuals”. This presupposition is deemed to be emblematic 
of a seamless garb of unchanging attributes stretching back in time. 
Hence, the future is posited as emanating not from a response to the 
“tragic” as defined by the present, but from the negative notion of “self- 
indulgence” — which is a shorthand way of pointing up a possible 
abdication of social obligation.
125. The misconception o f  subjectivism.
Loosely speaking, this notion dwells in conjunction with individualism: 
each is in some kind of active relation to the other, with the “se lf5 viewed 
as being made up simply of unrestricted whims, quirks and fancies. 
IsmaTTs definition of subjectivism is a highly tentative one. For him, the 
invisible nature of the “self5 vis-a-vis the presence of the tragic serves to 
remind the reader how the “subject” ceases to function once it is robbed 
of its “object”, which is a distinct socio-cultural formation.
A final word should be said in connection with the above analysis. 
Defined as it is by an unfolding concept of “tragedy” in the senses of the
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fictional and the factual, IsmaTTs scrutiny of the dichotomy between 
tradition and modernity has led him into an acutely critical, albeit 
articulatory, position. Such a position, he implies, can neither be 
permanently fixed nor enter into permanently fixed relations.
Theorist, cultural overseer and literary critic, IsmaTl has effectively 
reasserted the account of a conscious axiologist whose ambivalent 
examination of the old tool-box of time-honoured cultural concepts and 
value judgements has ended in a re-thinlung o f modernity.
* * *
(b) Interdisciplinarity
Parallel with the position of Sidqi IsmaTl, who argues that a possible 
cultural critique should, within a rigorous socio-cultural framework of re- 
evaluation, address the nature of value, its subjectivist interpretation and 
objective qualities, is the critical stance of Zaki Najlb Mahmud, which 
upholds an interdisciplinary approach celebratory of a “relational” status 
of literary theory. A modernist in the mould of logical transformational 
positivist theory, he contends, pointedly, that the concept of 
“interdisciplinarity” provides the foundational interface whereby the 
study of literature covered by the term “criticism” overlaps extensively 
with philosophy, linguistics and psychology. In an essay entitled “Poetry 
Does Not Inform”, he asserts that “art has no meaning and ought not to 
have one”.13
Central to this proposition is the notion that poetry uses words not 
to inform but to suggest. The upshot is that the language of poetry has to 
be understood not as comprising statements of facts (which might be true 
or false), but as invitations to the reader to react, respond and appreciate. 
This claim concerning poetry is addressed by invoking the eleventh-
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century literary theorist and critic al-Juijani, whose theory of poetic 
language he expounds and re-invents, and who, Mahmud believes, has a 
vital role to play with respect to modem criticism; for: “while trying to 
extract signs of inimitability [i'jaz] in the Qur’anic text, he has, 
effectively, restricted his inquiry to the text, searching for the secrets of 
balaghah [the systematic study of eloquence, conveyance and 
persuasion].”14
The underlying source of Mahmud’s enthusiasm for al-Juijani’s 
modernity is thus as much literary as philosophical: it stems primarily 
from his concern about al-Jurjani’s neoteric position. This stance, already 
established during the seventies by Mahmud and others,15 has given 
credence to a major movement designed to repudiate the anachronistic 
assumptions underpinning pre-modem interpretations of literary theory, 
maintained emphatically and with a tenacious classical austerity.
It was, for a time, almost standard practice for university courses in
* 1 fiArabic literary criticism to dismiss philosophy (along with the social 
sciences) as superfluous and unnecessary. Now, however, the modem 
reaction against this view (as exemplified by Mahmud’s critique) has 
finally set in. Over the past three decades, Arab literary critics have begun 
to appreciate that the processes of textual levelling denoting an 
interdisciplinary approach, utilizing philosophy and the social sciences, 
can provide regulating and illuminating insights into the corpus of an 
embryonic modern literary theory.
As an advocate of the methods of the “new critics” in literary 
criticism, and as a proponent, too, of “logical positivism”17 in philosophy, 
Mahmud has, it might be argued, contributed to the rediscovery of the 
notion of viewing “language” as an “interface” connecting Arabic literary 
criticism and philosophy; one whereby these two disciplines meet and act
1 Rupon one another. A close scrutiny of his ideas concerning modernity,
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and indeed modernism, in its various domains, reveals an emphasis on 
four significant critical strands related to a possible literary theory: his 
renovationist/innovationist assumptions, philosophical and literary, about 
the concept of newness; his notion of the critic as double reader; his 
recourse to the relatively unfamiliar classification, on the part of medieval 
Arabic philosophy, of poetry as a “branch of logic”; and his attempt to 
draw particular attention to the “negative” role played by the “irrational” 
in Arabic thought.
L Renovation and newness
One of the most obvious ways whereby reasoning is enacted or produced, 
in the most straightforward logical sense, is tautology. Yet this has 
remained a relatively neglected area for scrutiny in the context of literary 
theory. In his article “Renovation in Modern Poetry”,19 Mahmud 
advances a defence, based on tautology, of the position that our 
appreciation of poetry must entail the juxtaposition of the old and the 
new. “In poetry,” he explains, “there is what one calls the new. And yet 
there is no newness if this term is understood in a literal sense, as 
denoting the supersession of the old by the new, thus eliminating all or 
some traces of the old.”20
To what extent, though, does such a notion of the “new” really 
make sense? The argument here hinges on Mahmud’s concept of 
modernity (and indeed modernism), in the broader sense of critical 
theory, as an act of renovation (tajdid) rather than of innovation (ibtikar). 
For him innovation in its absolute sense is viewed, effectively, as an act 
of coming into existence from nothingness.
Etymologically the term “renovation”, advanced in Mahmud’s 
tautologous proposition, contains a clear implied reference to 
uninterrupted duration and continuity. “Who could claim,” he asks, “that
207
the emergence of al-Mutanabbi has necessitated the elimination of Imru’u 
T-Qais?”21 In the light of this, he might well have been prepared to 
contemporize his list of great works of literature, proposing a universal 
“canon” for all literatures, periods and ages. It would appear that 
contemporaneity has, for him, become synonymous with modernity and 
modernism.
2. The critic as double reader
22 “Unlike some of his contemporaries, Mahmud aims to reconstruct a 
holistic and all-embracing account of what he aptly refers to as falsafat 
al-naqd (“the philosophy of criticism”): a term synonymous with what 
has come to be called “metacriticism” or “criticism of criticism”. For 
Mahmud the text is always of primary importance in critical theoiy. His 
basic assumption is that the critic, in his role of reader, contributes 
something to the text; and, as such (he points out), it can hardly be denied 
that he is the “reader’s reader”23 par excellence. In the light of this 
proposition, then, the critic emerges as a kind of intermediary, a self- 
conscious reader providing the public with one or more interpretations 
out of a multiplicity of divergent possibilities. Mahmud’s reconstruction 
of the interpretative process now begins to take off. He is fully aware of 
the imperfections in what he calls “first reading”. Guided as it is by 
“taste”, the celebrated faculty of liking or disliking in the context of an 
intuitive capacity for discerning excellence, such a first reading must be 
tested, by the critic, against one or more further, “non-impressionistic” 
readings. These lead him on to a kind of critical rationale, and comprise 
an effective exercise in working out how the text is being realized, 
communicated and functionalized.
3. Poetry as a branch o f  logic
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Logical thinking is, in a literal sense, a process of reasoning. It has, 
moreover, an intellectual phase, wherein the meanings of culture are 
examined, analysed, verified and classified. This distinctive function has 
been a major theme of Mahmud’s critical essays treating the relation -  as 
conceived by such Arab philosophers as Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes), al-Kindi and al-Farabi24 -  between logic and poetry.
As a theory, the relation clearly poses a challenge to the traditional 
dichotomy between criticism and philosophical inquiry. By conscious 
reference to the relation vis-a-vis literary theory, Mahmud aims to re-
9 <invent modern poetry as a model for “total” knowledge; and his 
insistence on epistemological “totalization” serves to explain how the 
appeal of logic is used to rediscover the “holistic principles governing the 
function of poetry”.26
4. The “desacralization” o f Arabic traditional thought 
As a logical positivist and pragmatist, Mahmud makes the Arabic and 
Islamic cultural heritage his prime target. His aim in his Tajdid al-fikr al- 
‘Arabi (“Renovation of Arabic Thought”) is to demonstrate how we 
should judge our traditional cultural values and beliefs on the bases of 
their relevance to the present. Tradition, for him, has lost its relevance as 
a point of reference; it has long “revolved around the relation of man to 
God, while modem thought now revolves around the relation of man to
97 * *man”. Moreover, while noting the relevance of the MuTazih tradition 
(833-848), with its insistence on reason ( ‘aql) as an interpretative device, 
he mounts an uncompromising attack on the “irrational” within Arabic 
Islamic culture:
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It [irrationalism] is fit only for entertainment during hours of
• 90leisure, though I would not follow Hume and suggest it be thrown
90
into the fire.
The above point is a crucially important benchmark for establishing 
secular and self-generating modernism.
Secularism is central to Mahmud’s monograph Khurdfat al- 
mitaphyslqa (“The Misconception of Metaphysics”), first published in 
1951 and subsequently revised in 1983:
If you claim that there is a limit beyond which the human mind 
cannot reach out, stressing at the same time that, beyond this limit, 
there exist “things” one is unable to grasp or comprehend, then you 
are contradicting yourself; for the belief that these “things” exist 
beyond the supposed limit is itself a proof that you have already 
crossed into the forbidden zone.30
Mahmud’s programme for the re-appraisal of Arabic traditional 
thought is thus essentially one of “desacralization”.31 In other words, 
rationalism, in this context, implies the effective disappearance of the 
sense of the sacred, or at least the divorce of the sacred from the profane 
-  a secularist presupposition underlying, in essence, a possible new “age
32of enlightenment”.
1 That is, a systematic classification of the stages of disease.
2 Beirut: Dar al- Afaq al-Jadlda, 1968.
3 Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, 1968. Al-Azm’s contribution to cultural nosology, which 
found expression in the works of Arab intellectuals after the Six Day War, was greatly 
esteemed by writers on the process of “self-criticism”, as being one of the most
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important contributions to the debate. See, for instance, Tibi, op. cit., p. xii. In 
hindsight, al-Azm’s point of departure for this critique — with its suggestion that the 
Arab defeat by Israel in 1967 was analogous to the defeat of Tsarist Russia by Japan 
in 1904 -  now seems increasingly far-fetched.
4 This is a possible English equivalent for the Arabic word wahm used in Ismael’s 
text.
5 See Roger Scruton, An Intelligent Person’s Guide to Philosophy, London: 
Duckworth, 1996, p. 27.
6 Ibid.
7 IsmaTl, op. cit., vol. II, p. 265.
8 Ibid.
9Ibid., p. 268.
10 Ibid., p. 270. 
n Ibid., p. 273.
12 Ibid., p. 275.
13 See Z.N. Mahmud, Ma'a al-shu‘ard’ (“In the Company of Poets”), Beirut-Cairo: 
Dar al-Shuruq, 1978, p. 165. This and similar or related ideas have been repeatedly 
spelled out by the theorists of “new criticism”, whose conceptions Mahmud greatly 
admires. See his FI falsafat al-naqd (“On the Philosophy of Criticism”), Beirut-Cairo: 
Dar al-Shuruq, 1979, pp. 32-3.
For W.K. Wimsatt, one of the exponents of the New Criticism, the poem is a 
verbal composition having the character of a stone statue or urn. It does not infonn, 
but simply is. It is an iconic solidity. See his work The Verbal Icon: Studies in the 
Meaning ofPoetiy, London: Methuen, 1970 (first published 1954).
14 Z.N. Mahmud, in Fusul, 12 (1983); cited in Mustafa Abdul-Ghani, Zaki Najib 
Mahmud, Cairo: Al-Hay’a al-Misriyah al-‘Amma lil-Kitab, 1992, pp. 18-19.
15 For a comparative approach to al-Juijani’s achievement and contribution to modern 
literary theory, see K. Abu DIb, Al-Jurjdni’s Theory.
16 The notion of philosophy as “essentially an alien way o f thinking” can be traced 
back to a debate (muqabasah) that took place before a vizier in Baghdad in 932 AD, 
between the Christian Syrian translator Abu Bishr Matta, representing philosophy, 
and the theologian Abu Sa‘Td al-STrafi, representing kaldm (theology), over the 
respective merits of the “new learning” springing from the Greek philosophical
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tradition. See al-Tawhldi, Al-Muqdbasdt, ed. H. al-Sandubi, Cairo: Al-Maktabah al- 
Tijariyyah al-Kubra, 1929, pp. 68-87. See also Oliver Leaman, An Introduction to 
Medieval Islamic Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 9.
17 As a student at the University of London in the early fifties, Mahmud was 
influenced by this school of philosophy, then subscribed to by many English-speaking
philosophers.
18 _For an outline o f Mahmud’s interdisciplinarity, suggesting the presence of a
common boundary connecting philosophy and literary criticism, see Abdul-Ghani, op. 
eft., pp. 123-54.
19 See Mahmud, Ma ‘a al-shu ‘ara
20 Ibid., p. 139.
21 Ibid.
22 I am thinking especially of Muhammad Mandur, with whom Mahmud had 
numerous conftontations and debates.
23___________Mahmud, Fi falsafat al-naqd, p. 109.
24 ‘Abdul-Ghani, op. cit., p. 60.
25 That is, a kind of epistemology.
26 ‘Abdul-Ghani, op. cit., p. 61.
27 Z.N. Mahmud, TajdJd al-fikr al-A rabi (“Renewal of Arabic Thought”), Beirut- 
Cairo: Dar al-Shuruq, 1974, p. 136.
28 I.e., the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776).
29 Mahmud, TajdTd, p. 241.
30 Z.N. Mahmud, Khurafat al-mltaphysTqa (“The Misconception of Metaphysics”), 
Cairo: Al-Anglo, 1951, pp. 83-4.
31 The term “desacralization” was coined by Mircea Eliade. See T.R. Wright, 
Theology and Literature, London: Blackwell, 1988, p. 140.
32 ‘Abdul-Ghani, op. cit., p. 4.
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IV. De-structuring Literary Theory:
“Winks” Made to Speak to Epistemology
What follows is an exercise in de-structuring literary theory. Antedated 
by theory’s unfolding configuration (put forward in Part One), the 
exercise is, in effect, an effort to extrapolate a cluster of morphological1 
markers with an eye to the functionality of mould-breaking concepts and 
argumentative ploys determinative of a paradigmatic shift. The elusive 
presence of the markers suggests that these are, in a sense, a constellation 
of glints, hints, or, quite simply, “winks”. Defined in a set of functional 
propositions, these “winks”, to use Clifford Geertz’s pictorial metaphor, 
“can be made to speak to epistemology”.2
The purpose of this exercise is, then, to explore the workings of a 
number of “winks” with respect to an emergent modernism, in so far as 
their subtle presence involves an identifiable distinction between, on the 
one hand, renovationist assumptions of cultural change as a decidedly 
uninterrupted flux of historical continuity, and, on the other, innovationist 
ones founded on a tentative notion of discontinuity. The aim in making 
such a distinction involves the reassertion of a paradigmatic shift, one 
whose focus or foci of cultural transformation is marked by rupture, 
disjointedness and fragmentation.
So, yes, there is a fault line separating two distinctly definable 
models of cultural transformation; one that manifests itself not only in 
their divergent approaches towards an increasingly awesome relationship 
with modem culture, but also in their respective conception of what 
suggests an inherently totemic filiation with Arab-Islamic heritage and 
tradition.
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The first modernizing model, involving renovationist ideas ifom 
the age of al-Nahdah, has, it is argued, laid the foundations for a “double 
dependency”. There is, Adunls asserts,
a dependency on the past, serving to compensate, through 
remembering and reviving, for the lack of creative activity; and a 
dependency on the European American West, serving to 
compensate, through intellectual and technical adaptation and 
borrowing, for failure to invent and innovate.4
A reaction against this situation has, however, now set in; 
gradually, but forcefully, the concept of an alternative model, the counter­
revivalist model, has assumed a position of prominence through the work 
of such poets, theorists and critics as Adunls , Kamal Abu DTb, Khalida 
SaTd, A. Mseddi, Jaber ‘Asfur, Muhammad Bennls and others. By the 
end of the eighties, in fact, a self-generating, self-referential modernist 
theory had become the dominant critique within contemporary Arabic 
culture.
This new perception, revolving around the agents of change, 
provides a radically different way of seeing things, one constituting a 
Gestalt-switch5 towards a fresh discovery of the world, conceived and 
viewed through new conceptual spectacles. However, as Adunls points 
out:
This modernity has not been discovered from within the prevailing 
Arab cultural order and its systems of knowledge. It was a reading 
of Baudelaire that changed my understanding of Abu Nuwas and 
revealed his particular poetic quality and modernity, and it was
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Mallarme’s work that led me to understand the mysteries of Abu 
Tammam’s poetic language and the modem dimension within it.6
A reading of Rimbaud, Nerval and Breton has, he further points out, led 
him on to “discover the poetry of the mystical writers in all its uniqueness 
and splendour”, while French criticism has provided “an indication of the
* • * 7newness of al-Jurjam’s cultural vision”.
The upshot is that the poet (or critic) has come to be conceived as a 
cultural overseer, critiquing within the context of a modernist world
• f t  •view, or as a literary retrodictor, whose poetic sensibility enables him to 
discover and re-invent the deep-rooted modernity embedded in the past. 
Having reached this disquieting conclusion, Adunls now delivers his final 
thrust. There is, he asserts, “no paradox in declaring that it was recent 
western modernity that led me to discover our own, older modernity, 
which lies outside our ‘modern'politico-cultural system established on a 
western model”.9 There is, he explains, a particular problem here:
The modem poet sees himself in fundamental conflict both with the 
culture of the dominant political system, which reclaims the roots 
in a traditionalist manner, and with the images of western culture as 
adopted and popularized by this system. The system separates us 
from our Arab modernity, from what is richest and most profound 
in our heritage.10
By the same logic (to repeat the point once more), modernity is, as Aziz 
Al-Azmeh puts it: “not confined to Europe, but is a universal civilization, 
which from mercantile beginnings can utterly transform the economies, 
societies, polities and cultures of the world, and reconstitute the non- 
European world on the basis of existing fissures.”11
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The metaphor o f  “base and superstructure ”
In comparing and contrasting the two models of modernism outlined 
above, it is useful, as an analytical device, to focus particular attention on 
the Marxist metaphor of base and superstructure.
The issue is posed in Arabic theory of criticism by the presupposed 
relationship between the economic (base) and other social and cultural 
forms (superstructure); and, while the contention that the base determines 
the superstructure is accepted, or at least tolerated, by exponents of the 
first model, it is firmly disputed by exponents of the second.12
By emphasizing the difference between these two positions, Adunls 
(along with Abu Dib and others) is able to justify the claim that 
innovative modernism in Arabic literary theory is self-referential and 
self-generating — it is not merely part and parcel o f European modernism.
One of the primary points of departure in his Sadmat al-hadathah 
(“The Shock of Modernism”) is a demonstration that poetry may be 
advanced in a society with an underdeveloped economic base and 
backward in a society with an advanced economic base. This point is of 
fundamental importance for an understanding of Adunls’s critiquing of 
the statics and dynamics of Arabic culture; for he conceives the whole of 
Arabic culture as a phenomenological history: “I stress here” (he notes) 
“the phenomenological method [zdhiratiyyah]; for I restrict my inquiry to
the study of cultural phenomena, treated as separate from their material
1 • * •base.” In terms of the phenomenological method, this means that he is
exploring “the inner subjective world of experiences; that is, of 
consciousness without presuppositions”.14
The method is further explored through Adunls’s insistence on re­
reading Arabic cultural heritage “not through the interpretations of its 
previous readers, but through a primordial reading of its own texts”.15
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Thus it is that his critique of cultural heritage comes to be connected with 
the phenomenological approach. By “bracketing o ff’16 the ideological 
and theological presuppositions inherent in our “modem” politico- 
cultural system, Adunls’s method of rethinking modernity suggests the 
possibility of a conceptual analysis which appropriates the classical 
heritage, suspends conventional assumptions and sets aside the
1 *7preconceptions derived from current Arab literary theory.
The de-definition o f modernism
Innovationist modernism opposes not only the presuppositions of the 
renovationist pattern but also its attempt to redefine the pre-fixed 
principles of Arabic modernism in terms of modem western criteria. This 
situation emerges through two major strands, namely, historicism and 
essentialism.
The historicist viewpoint hinges on the notion that modernism, in 
common with other human phenomena, “cannot be understood in 
isolation from its historical development and from its significance to the 
particular historical period in which it existed, and to the people of this
1 Q
period”. As such, Arabic modernism is conceived, in its renovationist 
manifestation, as a replay of a historical phenomenon: a formula of 
European making and “beginning”.19
‘Abdullah L‘aroui attempts to sidestep this conclusion by 
underlining the distinction between “particularism” and “authenticity”, 
which are conceived as constituting two separate areas of exclusive 
territory:
Since al-Nahdah our bodies have lived in one century while our 
minds and feelings have lived in another . . . This situation has 
been justified by the proclaimed need to maintain authenticity . . .
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The question of attributes and characteristics will remain the issue, 
but in terms of a recognition of the unity of history and a negation 
of any continuous belief in an authentic model. Finally the purpose 
o f historical analysis is to separate particularism from  authenticity.
The first is dynamic and progressive, the second static and
20regressive.
It is this view -  that the history of European modernism constitutes a 
sufficient explanation for the concept of modernism itself, and that the 
value of the concept thus lies in its beginning and development — that 
gives modernism its distinctive historicist significance as a temporal 
category; for it is only, L‘aroui believes, the rigorously precise properties 
determined by a historicist definition which explain its particularism as a 
primary point of reference for Arabic modernism.
The second major strand, namely essential!sm, which sees 
European modernism as being essentialized and reduced to an all- 
inclusive blanket definition reflecting an absolute criterion, is 
exemplified in Muhammad al-Nuwaihi’s book Qadiyyat al~shi.‘r al-jadid 
(“The Question of New Poetry”), the validity of this model being 
explored in his study of Eliof s article “The Music of Poetry”.21 Having 
provided an initial translation of the essay, al-Nuwaihi attempts to see “to 
what extent Eliot’s ideas were relevant to the new form”.22 His 
Eurocentric approach purports to show, inadvertently and through an 
indication of the likenesses and differences between Arabic and European 
modernism, that the essentialist qualities of the (original) European 
model are reducible to a watertight definition, and that “the context in 
which these exist or are studied is irrelevant”.23 The implication here is 
that, by de-defining modernism and rejecting the theoretical assumptions 
of historicism and essentialism, Arab innovationists are in effect
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attempting to dismantle the concept of an absolutized model of 
modernism founded and foregrounded as an immutable definition, in 
favour of a paradigm in motion, this being an experimental category that 
has creativity as its primary classifier; for creativity, as Adunls writes, is 
“a realization without a model . . .  a model in itself’.24
The controversy does not end here. Yet there is no reason, at this 
stage, to regard the two contrasting models of modernism as being in 
conflict, since their teleologies are fundamentally different.25
The semiological frame o f  reference
In the second volume of his study of the Statics and Dynamics in Arabic 
culture, Adunls attempts to reconstruct the procedural and substantive 
elements of a semiological frame of reference inherent in the Sufi 
experience of al-batin: that is, of the esoteric or hidden meaning that
entails, on the level of language and literature, “the separation of the
26 * • name and the named”. According to this frame of reference:
The name is not equal to the named. The relationship between the 
two is that o f  a signifier with what is signified. It is not a 
relationship o f  identification. In other words it is a relationship o f
27possibility, not o f certainty.
AdunTs is clearly thinking here of the semiotic implications inherent in 
Sufism, the tenth-century Islamic mystical movement whose polemic 
regarding the allegorical nature of interpretation predates the rise of 
modern semiotics in the early twentieth century; and this, as we shall see, 
has far-reaching consequences for his endeavour to re-invent a frame of 
reference encompassing the complex relation between the subjective and 
the objective, between the language of literature and the realm of reality.
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In order to grasp the originality of this interpretative device, it must 
be recalled that the Batini school stood in direct opposition to the Zahiri 
school, whose name derives from the Arabic word denoting the exoteric, 
that is, the clear or phenomenal. Al-Jahiz’s dictum (produced some time
9  $ 9 0before 869) is in many ways paradigmatic for the Zahiri method of 
textual reading; “the meaning,” he says, “is bound to identify, fully, with
30the name [the word].” The reasoning here is that language worlds 
because the meaning is pre-fixed by convention. In other words, it pre­
dates the writer’s entry into the frame o f reference in which the signifier 
(the word) is fully identified with the signified (the meaning).
By thus rejecting the conventional exoteric certainty of Zdhirism in 
favour of the esoteric and illuminating possibilities of Sufi Bdtinism, 
Adunls’s enterprise offers a semiological perspective on the criticism, and 
therefore on the reading, of Arabic poetry and prose. In place of a 
conventional web-spinning reading (or misreading), Adunls proposes that 
modern Arabic criticism should reconstruct a polymorphic method of 
interpretation; rather than try to perpetuate an old cultural linearity, it 
should recognize and explore the multi-layered and multi-dimensional 
possibilities inherent in the Sufi imagination.
There is no space here to do justice to the complexity and detail of 
Adunls’s derivation of his socio-cultural assumptions.31 We may, though, 
note the interesting contrast he draws between the two mutually exclusive 
interpretative categories as embodying an opposition between the rigidity 
and linearity of the apparent {Zahiri) and the flexibility and playability of 
the figurative/the metaphorical/the non-literal {ta wili).32 The idea seems 
to be that this figurative approach offers a semiological frame of
reference, whose central assumption is that poetry resides in what some
♦ ♦ * critics call “the gap” (al-fajwah): that is, the space separating the
signifier from the signified.34
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K. Abu Dib suggests, in place of “gap”, the alternative term “space
r
of tension”. For him, poetics (or literary theory, or the aesthetics of
^ f ipoetry) constitutes “one of the functions of this gap or space of
- i n
tension”. The all-important point, however, is Abu DIb’s insistence on 
viewing the gap as a “determinant factor” or “necessary condition” for 
“recognizing the difference between poetic vision and daily
*  ^R • *commonplace experience”. In its more straightforward function the gap 
is then represented as standing in a metonymic relationship39 with the 
process o f ongoingness and change: it is an open field for play, an 
uncategorizable category, an orientation to innovation freed from the 
constraints of demarcation.40 Yet there is a crucially important benchmark 
encompassing this “ludic” gap of Sufi semiology: that of transformation 
from the static to the dynamic, from permanence to mutability, from the 
confirmation and affirmation of an Arab central authority determining 
socio-cultural and/or aesthetic interpretation to the metaphorical negation 
of a final meaning, truth or signification.
Finally, the focus on the centrality of a patriarchal authority, 
emblematic of the absolute supremacy of the “law of the father”, is worth 
touching on. As Sidqi IsmaTl appropriately points out, religious thought 
in Arabic-Islamic culture has always tended, albeit not in linear fashion, 
to be linked to the secular power of the ruler. The upshot is that, even 
within the seemingly hermetic context of Sufism, the Sufi is seen as 
“more of a failed politician than a mystic” 41
Cultural parallelism
The term “cultural parallelism” is used here to indicate the relevance of 
re-examining Arab literary heritage from the perspective of modern 
sensibility, in order to identify the methods whereby this critical device
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can reconstruct the concept of modernism beyond the limits of European 
periodization.
This concept will be investigated in two ways: first, through an 
exploration of the presence, in two or more texts (or phenomena) 
belonging to different cultural histories, of common features sufficiently 
similar to justify setting up a comparison between their historically 
separate modes of existence; and, second, through de-temporalizing, for 
the purpose of theoretical inteipretation, two or more separate cultural 
phenomena connected by reason of discoverable similitude, in order to 
address related questions of synonymization and interchangeability.
There are various accounts of how Arab theorists have attempted, 
through the concept of cultural parallelism and comparativeness, to 
unravel, from the different strands, a modern theory of criticism. In his 
seminal work ATJurjani ’s Theory o f Poetic Imagery (1979), K. Abu DIb 
sets out, with unfailing discernment and sophistication, to develop a fresh 
comparative approach designed to fulfil the concept’s fullest potential. By 
emphasizing the novelty and ingenuity implicit in the tenets of al- 
Jurjani’s critical system, and revaluating the possible homologies existing 
between his ideas and those of modern critics, Abu DIb is able to 
demonstrate that this eleventh-century critic and poetician is in fact 
excitingly modem; that he can be said “(cpmlmg Eliot’s words), to have 
lived not merely the present, but the present moment of the past”.42
As this quotation suggests, the impetus behind Abu DIb’s critical 
endeavour has pragmatic43 overtones, stemming as it does not only from 
an assumption that the modernism requiring Arab writers to steer out into 
wider European and American waters is not entirely new, but from a 
further assumption: that this process cannot be regarded as marking out 
an exclusive, exhaustive and well-defined cultural territory.
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Closely connected with this method of reading modernism into 
innovative texts belonging to Arabic tradition, without, however, 
sacrificing the locus of their referentiality, is A. Mseddi’s treatise Al- 
Tqfkir al-lisani f i  ’l-hadarah al-Arabiyyah (“Linguistic Thinking in 
Arabic Culture”) (1981). In the context of his endeavour to explore the 
Arab stock of linguistic knowledge, Mseddi views poetics as being in a 
process of formation and transformation, and, as such, evoking a 
progression of continuous signifying operations and attempting to 
formulate their frame of reference. As a modernist endowed with the 
sensibility to discern and respond freely, he conceives poetics as a 
theoretical matrix permitting further sustained reading and re-defining; 
modem poetics does not have, as its object, the set of concepts, categories 
and significations transmitted to us by tradition, but is rather itself a 
generative discipline, and one, moreover, of infinite possibilities, capable 
of bringing to light the relevant assumptions embedded in classical 
linguistic theory. The term metacriticism might be applicable to this 
polemical initiative.
Cultural parallelism also works as a reductive method. By initiating 
goal-oriented readings of individual interdisciplinary texts,44 Arab 
theorists have attempted to classify and verify classical critiques in terms 
of established modern criteria, cutting through a vast amount of irrelevant 
detail, by-passing ideological accretions and setting aside a multiplicity of 
misconceptions. Viewed and scrutinized from a metacritical position, the 
way these interdisciplinary texts function is then understood in terms 
other than those determined by the historicity of the discourses available 
to their authors as producers of meaning.
The compilation Al-Nazariyyah al-lisaniyyah wa ’l-shi ‘riyyah f i  7- 
turdth al- Arabi min khilal al-nusus (“Linguistic and Poetic Theory in 
Arabic Heritage as Viewed through the Texts”) (1988), a compendium of
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critical and analytic concepts and strategies exhibited through a wide 
selection of classified literary and extra-literary texts, specifically allows 
the modem reader to capture, on the basis of attitude or anticipated 
response, the significant moments of a complex process. The process is 
illustrated in the compilers’ concern to devise a taxonomy, or descriptive 
system, which will enable us to re-invent these overlapping and 
intersecting critiques through new conceptual spectacles. This 
displacement and re-arrangement of critical assumptions involves a 
paradigmatic shift, a radically different way of seeing things, thus 
enabling old texts to be assigned to new functions partly or wholly similar 
to their own. An introductory book dealing with the strategies of reading 
verifies this complex process of synonymization through the following 
metaphor:
An ostrich, which cannot fly, belongs nevertheless to the genus of
bird, as a result of its partial resemblance to prototypical birds like
sparrows or robins, which can fly.45
The same principle of juxtaposing two critical concepts belonging to 
divergent cultural histories, and of highlighting their connecting links, 
holds true for a second operation, the de-temporalization o f literary 
phenomena, that is, reading the determinants o f  the new into those o f the 
old, and vice versa.
Adunls’s attempt to de-temporalize in order to synonymize is 
embodied in his Al-Sufiyyah wa ’l-suryaliyyah (“Sufism and Surrealism”) 
(1992),46 the establishment of correspondences between Sufism and 
surrealism being made possible, in a suggestive analogy, by omitting a 
vast amount of irrelevant historical detail and by reducing their notions to 
the most fundamental ones. To this end Adunls contrasts their strategies
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and critical assumptions, irrespective of the temporal and cultural 
distance separating the two systems. Through a goal-oriented method of 
comparability, the relatedness existing between the zahir and the bdtin, 
the exoteric and the esoteric, the conscious and the subconscious, the 
theme is brilliantly investigated. Thus the concept of Sufi writing is 
contrasted with that of surrealist writing by articulating their common 
formative notions: the idea of the timeless moment, that is, the High Point 
where the oneness of the subjective and the objective leads to the 
disappearance of contradictions; the notions of love and imagination; the 
concept of shath, the Sufi term for surrealist automatic writing;47 the
* AR • •mystic concept of inkhitaf that is, the surrealist state of ecstasy. Adunls 
then contrives both to inject into modem critical theory a sense of the 
cognitive value of Sufi devices of reading and to demonstrate, by reading 
Sufism into surrealism, the timelessness o f  modernist sensibility. This last 
assertion needs amplification. The idea of timeless modernist sensibility 
should be seen as implying not a rupture between system and history, but 
rather a shift from history to critique, from the temporal to the atemporaL 
Furthermore, by reconsidering modernism from the perspective of 
its universalizability, Adunls is able, in his “Rimbaud, the Orientalist 
Sufi”, to argue as follows:
Most western researchers who have explored the influence of the 
Orient on the Occident define the Orient as including, firstly, 
Greece and, secondly, the Judaeo-Christian tradition. There is, as I 
have already mentioned, no trace in Rimbaud’s poetry of any 
positive Greek or Judaeo-Christian influence. There are, however, 
negative influences, in the sense that Rimbaud’s poetry exhibits an 
almost total absence of these cultures.49
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The upshot is that this celebrated exponent of French modernism, as 
envisaged by the Arab innovationist modernist Adunls, is not exclusively 
western. Thus the contradistinction between Adunls’s position and that of
the renovationist modernist may explain their different approaches to the
• •  * *binary question of modernity and authenticity.
Fashion, creativity and modernism
Fashion is the catalyst seiving to change the direction of a prevailing or 
short-lived custom or style. It does not necessarily arise out of the need 
for the modem or the new.
Let us repeat once more the closing sentences of Adunls’s An 
Introduction to Arab Poetics, where modernism is defined in relation to 
fashion and creativity:
Modernity should be a creative vision, or it will be no more than 
fashion. Fashion grows old from the moment it is born, while 
creativity is ageless. Therefore not all modernity is creativity, but 
creativity is eternally modern.51
Here is as straightforward a statement of the innovationist position as one 
could wish for. Modernism is ultimately derived from creativity; and 
creativity, for Adunls, resides primarily in innovation — in the act of 
creating something novel. He also suggests that innovation, so conceived, 
should be seen in the context of total freedom:
I want to stress that modernity requires not only freedom of thought 
but physical freedom as well. It is an explosion, a liberation of 
what has been suppressed. To think and write what is truly new 
means, above all, to think about what has never been thought about
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and to write what has never been written: that huge, constant area 
of suppression -  religious and cultural, individual and social, 
spiritual and physical.52
This account does not simply reject, implicitly, the renovationist model of 
modernism, but also the entire modernist project viewed as fashion, that 
is, as an external mode o f  change.
Writing some ten years before Adunls, M.M. Badawi had set out an 
alternative position regarding the concept of fashion in poetry:
Arab poets turned to the poetry of T.S. Eliot in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s, when it was already beginning to look old-fashioned, 
having in the meantime been succeeded by the work of the 
generations of Auden and of Philip Larkin.53
He was, it appears, quite prepared to accept the following consequences 
of his observation:
To the informed reader the excitement of discovery which was felt 
by many Arab poets and critics in the late 1950s in the work of 
Eliot seemed somewhat naive and certainly provincial.54
Such a conclusion seems too fanciful, to run too obviously counter to 
common sense, to be fair or plausible. Fashion, in a literary context, may 
indeed provide an explanation for cultural influences, but only in so far as 
it enables us to discover their relevance. What, then, underlies the 
positive response of modern Arabic poetiy to Eliot? In a study entitled 
“The Tammuzi Movement and the Influence of T.S. Eliot on Badr Shakir 
al-Sayyab”, N. El-Azma offers an answer that contests the role
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erroneously attributed to fashion, thus stressing, albeit inadvertently, what 
I earlier called “the infelicity of misreading trendism for modernism”. 
The contention is advanced within the framework of a proposed theory of 
change:
First of all, the shift of emphasis from religion to nationalism in the 
political life of the era as well as in its thought gave great 
importance to the various pre-Islamic heritages, which, although 
they strikingly impress us by their pagan characteristics, have 
increasingly been given more consideration as part of the heritage 
of the area.55
Additional factors whereby the major emphasis falls on the discovery of 
the cultural sources of Eliot’s so-called “mythical method” are cited as 
contributing to the success of this experiment:
Thus the ideologists of some of the revolutionary parties have 
drawn considerable attention to this neglected source of patriotic 
spirit.56 Many gods and goddesses, such as Baal, the god of fertility 
and strength, Ishtar, the equivalent of Aphrodite, and Tammuz, the 
equivalent of Adunls in Greek mythology, thus became of great 
relevance to the spiritual and intellectual aspect of Arab 
renaissance.57
Discussion bearing on the concept of cultural influences, and on 
their entrenchment in the ephemeral context of literary fashion, could not, 
then, fail to have consequences for Arabic modernism. Adunls and other 
innovationist modernists have successfully initiated a re-thinking of a 
distinctive self-generating model of modernism through critical
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examination and theoretical redefinition of what constitutes the matrix of 
Arabic poetics.
From criticism to critique
In common usage the term “literary criticism” simply denotes the 
analysis, interpretation and evaluation of literary works. It was only 
recently that the relative absence or neglect of theoretical refinement 
implied in this was specifically addressed by Robert Con Davis and
co 4
Ronald Schleifer, and the notion of “critique” advanced by way of 
remedy. Yet the concept of “critique” as a means of providing a totalizing 
and inclusive perspective on “culture” may be regarded as firmly 
established in old classical Arabic theories of linguistics and poetics.59
In view of this, introduction of the general term “cultural critique” 
needs no excuse. It is the prime task of the relevant morphological 
markers to define, expound and explain the function and meaning of the 
shift that has taken place, spurred on by innovationist modernism, from 
the linear discipline of literary criticism to the interdisciplinary initiative 
of cultural critique, from an emphasis on the writer to an emphasis on the 
text, and, from there, to a focus on the reader.
The transformation from critical language to the language of 
critique assumes, then, that the concept of modernism primarily 
comprises a theory of perpetual change, best considered as a polymorphic 
enteiprise. Seyla BenhabTb highlights the complexity of critique as 
against criticism:
While criticism . . . stands outside the object it criticizes, asserting 
norms against facts, and the dictates of reason against the 
unreasonableness of the world, critique refuses to stand outside its 
object, and instead juxtaposes the immanent, nonnative self­
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understanding of its object to the material actuality of this object. 
Criticism privileges an Archimedean standpoint, be it freedom or 
reason, and proceeds to show the unfreedom or unreasonableness 
of the world when measured against this ideal paradigm. By 
privileging this Archimedean standpoint, criticism becomes 
despotism: it leaves its own standpoint unexplained, or it assumes 
the validity of its standpoint prior to engaging in the task of 
criticism.60
The basic distinctions involved may be conveniently set out in the 
table below, exhibiting the dynamics of change:
Modernism in function: framework o f  a paradigmatic shift
The terms on the left apply to criticism (naqd), those on the right to
critique (tanqid):6]
renovative -  innovative 
critical -  metacritical 
disciplinary — interdisciplinary 
homogeneous -  heterogeneous 
indigenous -  trans-cultural 
filial -  affilial
conforming / imitative -  creative / self-referential 
judgemental -  evaluative 
literary -  literary / cultural 
absolute -  relativistic
compulsory / fate-induced -  voluntarist / will-induced 
origin -  beginning / beginnings 
continuous -  mptuous
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linear -  fragmentary 
certain -  problematic
In the final analysis, innovative modernism goes far beyond any 
adherence to a literary movement denotative of a tendentiously expressed 
“-ism”. It rather suggests (as proclaimed earlier by Elias Khury with more 
than a nod towards a tentative theory of change) “a problematic of its 
own”; one interlocking a cluster of fragmented issues held together by a 
central theme. Let me here reiterate this problematic, which is in many 
ways paradigmatic for the entire modernist project:
The idea of modernity in contemporary Arabic culture is posited as 
a problematic of its own. It is not a copy of western modernity but 
is an Arab attempt to formulate this term within the context of a 
cultural domain which has its own historical particularism, and 
lives the problems emanating from the concept of Na.hd.ah. This is 
why modernity has been foregrounded as a revivalist enterprise. 
Having conjoined the splinters of cultural, social and political 
fragmentation, modernity can be presented as an attempt to surpass 
this fragmentation by means of moving forward.
In a later passage Khury draws the consequent conclusion:
For the Arabs, whose legitimacy, based on the past, has been lost, 
modernity can be seen as a quest for future legitimacy in a world 
forcibly unified and hegemonized by western capitalism. In this 
world the peripheries are banished and pushed to the edge of 
history’s memory, only to be restituted as a folkloric object, as a
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benchmark attesting to the superiority of the West and its ability to 
negate, if not annihilate, the category of the “other” . . . 62
1 This widely applicable term is used here as originally understood by Goethe: to 
denote the systematic study of formulation and transformation — whether o f rocks, 
clouds, colours, plants, animals or the cultural phenomena o f human society — as these 
present themselves to sentient experience. See Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1979, vol. 
VIII, p. 229.
Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f  Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic 
Books, 1973, p. 23.
*3
The notion o f “continuity versus discontinuity” is best illuminated by the argument 
central to Michel Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge; one advanced to demolish the 
historical analysis based on the concept o f linearity:
For history in its classical form, the discontinuous was both the given and the 
unthinkable: the raw material of history, which presents itself in the form of 
dispersed events -  decisions, accidents, initiatives, discoveries; the material 
which, through analysis, had to be rearranged, reduced, affected in order to 
reveal the continuity of events. Discontinuity was the stigma of temporal 
dislocation that it was the historian’s task to remove from history. It has now 
become one of the basic elements of historical analysis. (Foucault, op, cit., p. 
8 .)
4 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 80.
5 “Gestalt” is a term borrowed from German, denoting a process o f configuration, and 
proposing an organized whole with qualities different from its parts as viewed 
separately. The idea o f a Gestalt-switch here suggests a new vision of wholeness: one 
determining its components (and not vice versa).
6 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 81.
7 Ibid.
Q
That is, the reverse of prediction -  “prediction backwards”. See Robert M. Martin 
(ed.), The Philosopher’s Dictionary, Peterborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2000,
p. 202.
9 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 81. 
w Ibid., p. 82.
Al-Azmeh, Islams and Modernities, pp. 23-4.
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12 For further discussion of the metaphor o f “base and superstructure”, see, for 
instance, Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, pp. 75-82. This valuable account of the central literary concepts in 
Marxist criticism includes a chapter on cultural critique which is truly innovatory in 
its field. See also Terry Eagleton, Marxism and Literaiy Criticism, London: Methuen, 
1976, pp. 3-16. This provides a brief and lucid general survey o f the topic, with a 
preliminary discussion of the relations between Marxist theory and structuralism plus 
its aftermath.
t_______ _
Al-Thdbit wa ’l-mutahawwil, vol. I, pp. 21-3.
14 See under “Phenomenology” in Martin, op. cit., p. 173.
15 Al-Thdbit wa ’l-mutahawwil, vol. I, p. 24.
16 Martin, op. cit., p. 173.
1 7 For a discussion of the phenomenological method in literature, see Hawthorn, op. 
cit., pp. 130-1.
18 Martin, op. cit., p. 103.
19 As I have repeatedly argued in the foregoing pages, Edward Said’s attempt to 
replace the filial (organistic) tenn “origin” with the less tendentious tenn “beginning” 
is central to his critique of the Eurocentric essentialism that runs through much of 
current literary criticism. For a consideration of this attempt and its relevance, see 
Hannah Arendt’s comments in Guillory, op. cit., pp. 27-8.
20 Al- Arab wa ’l-fikr al-tarikhi (“The Arabs and Historical Thought”), Beirut: Dar al- 
HaqTqa, 1973, p. 24.
21 Al-Nuwaihi, op. cit., p. 24.
12 Ibid.
23 See Hawthorn, op. cit., p. 59.
24 In Mawdqif, No. 36, p. 158,
25 I.e., different in relation to their aims, puiposes or functions.
26 Al-Thdbit wa ’l-mutahawwil, vol. II, p. 212.
21 Ibid.
28 I.e., providing an uncompromisingly categorical example.
29 hi his work The World, the Text and the Critic, Edward Said draws attention to the 
eleventh-century Andalusi school of Zahirism, portraying the contribution of its 
exponents in a favourable light and showing how their polemics anticipated the
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twentieth-century debate between structuralists and generative grammarians, between 
descriptivists and behaviourists.
*30 — — — _See al-Jahiz, Kitcib al-bayan wa ’l-tabyin (“Rhetoric and Elucidation”), ed. Hasan 
al-Sandubi, Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Tijariyah al-Kubra, 1926, vol. I, p. 42.
31 For a socio-cultural perspective, see his Zaman al-shi'r (“The Temporality of 
Poetry”), Beirut: Dar al-‘Awdah, 1972.
32 Al-ta’wTli is described by Oliver Learaan as the “figurative”. See Leaman, op. cit., 
p. 204.
The concept of playability embedding the “figurative” is best explained in 
Henry Corbin’s Creative Imagination in the Sufism o f  Ibn ‘Arabi, London, 1969. 
According to Corbin, ta ’wTl, as professed in Sufism, is essentially a means, based on 
the transmutation of everything visible into symbols, whereby the world is understood 
symbolically. This is (he adds) rendered practicable through the intuition o f an 
essence or person in an image which partakes neither of universal logic nor of sense 
perception, and which is the only means of signifying what is to be signified. See J.E. 
Cirlot, A Dictionary o f  Symbols, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 2nd ed., 1971, 
p. xliii.
33 See Kamal Abu DIb, Fi ’1-shVriyyah (“On Poetics”), Beirut: M u’assaset al-Abhath 
al-‘Arabiyya, 1987, pp. 102-4.
34 The “gap” covers the following: absence; ellipsis; figure. See Hawthorn, op. cit.
35 See Abu DIb, Fi ’l-shi ‘riyyah.
36 According to M. Krieger, literary theory, or poetics, or the aesthetics o f poetry, are 
three ways of saying the same thing. See his Theoiy o f  Criticism, Tradition and its 
Systems, Baltimore-London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 3.
37 Abu DIb, Fi l-shi 'riyyah.
^  Ibid., p. 20.
39 “Metonymy” (lanaya) is conceived, in K. Abu Dib’s interpretation of al-Juijani’s 
theory of poetic imagery, in the following terms:
[It is] a process in which the presentation is concentrated on a concrete picture 
which evokes a series of associations in the mind of the recipient. But in the 
poet’s imagination . . . “Idnaya” presents a picture which is not fused or 
identified with the entity to which it refers. The two entities [of the gap] stand 
apart, their relationship being determined not by the linguistic or the
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immediate context, but by the social, cultural context, on the one hand, and on 
a set of logical or factual links relating them, on the other. It is due to this 
pattern of relationship that Idndya “has an effect on the soul” which a direct 
statement of the meaning does not have. (Abu DIb, Al-Jurjani’s Theory, pp. 
165-6.)
40 I.e., the problem of marking off the “signifier” from the “signified”.
41 Sidqi IsmaTl, Al-Hiss al-jamahiri wa ’l-riya’ al-adabi (“The Sensibility o f the 
Masses and Literary Hypocrisy”), Damascus: Al-Mawqif al-Adabi, May, 1971, p. 12.
42 Abu DTb, Al-Jurjcmi’s Theory, p. 322.
43 In connection with his pliably instrumental use of relevant terms.
44 Looked at fifom a modem perspective, these texts can be described as 
“interdisciplinary”. See, for example, Ben Agger, Cultural Studies as Critical Theory, 
London-Washington DC: Falmer Press, 1992, pp. 17-19.
45 See Martin Montgomery, Alan Durant, Nigel Fabb, Tom Fumiss, Sara Mills, Ways 
o f Reading, London-New York: Routledge, 1992, p. 171.
46 London: Dar al-Saqi, 1992.
47 A.J. Arberry, in 1950, identifies “automatic writing” as being an element of Sufi 
experience:
The most curious and interesting Sufi figure is al-Niffari (d. 982), who left 
behind him theories of revelations (Kitab al-mukhatabdt) purporting to have 
been received from God in a state of ecstasy, possibly by automatic writing. 
(Arberry, op. cit., p. 64.)
48 Al-Sufiyyah wa ’l-suryaliyyah, p. 239.
49 Ibid., p. 237.
50 For an analysis of the impact o f Sufism as a determinative element in shaping the 
Arabic novel, see, for instance, Nabll Sulayman, Al-Tasawwuf ka bunya ruwa'iya 
(“Sufism as a Narrative Structure”), Damascus: Al-Mawqif al-Adabi, April, 2000, pp. 
37-44.
51 Introduction to Arab Poetics, pp. 101-2.
52 Ibid., pp. 100-1.
Badawi, op. cit., p. 263.
54 Ibid.
55 El-Azma, op. cit., p. 671.
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56 Ibid. El-Azma is here referring specifically to Antun Sa‘adah’s Al-Sira ‘ al-fikri f t  7- 
adab aUSuri (“Conflict in Syrian Literature”), Beirut, 1st ed., 1960, pp. 58-65.
57 Ibid.
58 In Davis and Schleifer, op. cit.
59 See, for example, Subhi al-Salih, Dirdsdt f t  fiqh al-lugha al- Arabiyyah (“Studies in 
Arabic Semantics”), Beirut: Dar al-Ahliya, 2nd ed., 1962.
60 Quoted in Davis and Schleifer, op. cit., p. 6.
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PART THREE:
The Case for a New Paradigm: 
A Corollary Exposition
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Introduction
No single thesis can fully explain all the critical, literary and cultural 
currents that have shaped the assumptions of a self-pleading paradigm 
central to an ascending literary theory. However, it is possible (as the 
present inquiry has made explicitly clear throughout) to proffer an 
approximate model of theory; one which, while striving to avoid any 
over-neat explanation of all the transformational possibilities at work, 
will nonetheless provide devices serving to clarify and facilitate an 
understanding of the mechanisms involved.
The argument from a case of paradigm shift has been elegantly and 
engagingly set forth in Muhammad Bennls’s exhaustive treatise on 
structures and supersessions in modern Arabic poetry. His idea of 
epistemic change is worked out in cogent detail within the established 
frameworks of, inter alia, Michel Foucault’s notions of breaks, ruptures 
and discontinuities that distinguish historical periods, and give rise to the 
“episteme” (or “paradigm”) dominating what is regarded as knowledge or 
truth at any one time. The other, parallel argument is the one emblematic 
of Thomas S. Kuhn’s theory of paradigmatic change. The convergence of 
the two approaches to a common point is suggested, albeit obliquely, in 
some of the shared theoretical groundwork involved. In the course of 
unravelling a constellation of what he aptly terms ibdalat 
(“supersessions”), Bennls effectively builds his central contention into a 
transformative sequence of “opposition and acceptance”, whereby an 
older paradigm is overthrown and replaced by a new one incommensurate 
with the old. These processes, conveying the idea of a ceaseless forward 
motion, point up competing languages and terminologies1 whose relations 
may never be viewed as easily commutative. Whenever a turning point 
occurs, it is reflected in corresponding practical developments in modem 
Arabic poetry, which lead on to ways of viewing the world so different
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that they shape or determine not only substantive beliefs about culture 
and literary theory but also problems and methods entailing different 
standards for the provision of an effectively valid explanation. In 1969, 
almost seven years after he had given the term “paradigm” its initial 
currency, Kuhn made the following statement:
A paradigm is what members of a scientific community share, and, 
conversely, a scientific community consists of men who share a 
paradigm.2
The term “community” is one of the most elusive and indefinable 
in cultural studies. To identify an influential community, within the socio­
cultural context of the present inquiry, it is necessary to distinguish this 
community’s boundaries, and to be aware of its common purpose, 
whereby the concerns of the present exert control over the past.
In these circumstances, the tenn is here used to denote an effective 
Arab cultural elite, an innovation-based community engaged in the 
ongoing process of building a reputation as the intellectual powerhouse 
for an emerging paradigm, and in some way recognized as central to the 
idea of a shared, secular, modern-oriented position: one within which 
writings on modernity/modernism project a broadly transforming 
conceptual “prism” rather than an uncompromisingly definitive “ism”. It 
is from this perspective that Hisham Sharabi describes such a 
theoretically dominant elite as comprising “an internally diverse, largely 
avant-garde movement of critical intellectuals, writers, professionals, 
scholars and students”.4
In the light of this process of supersession, modern literary theory 
has been viewed, throughout, as persistently variable and alterable -  as a 
nominal entity which, by virtue of a name, conjoins a variety of exclusive
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histories, innovatory concepts and solipsistic assumptions requiring (from 
time to time) interventions that allow the text to speak to an epistemology 
of becoming.
These approaches disclose, in consequence, the balancing forces 
and tensions shaping the idea of change: their participation in the multi­
layered and multi-dimensional character of theory points up a collective 
combinatory, ergo compositional whole. Although distinguishable by 
virtue of the respective raison d ’etre of its individual parts, this whole is 
here so joined and/or disjoined as to provide a way of bringing dynamics 
and process into the interpretive templates informed by the proposed 
model.
While their proliferation is largely a twentieth-century 
phenomenon, notions of theory are in fact occasionally found in the 
writings of Arab writers and commentators before 1900. The term itself 
appears as early as the tenth century, some of its primordial expressions 
being present in a multiplicity of theoretically oriented assumptions as old 
as literature itself. Viewed through the lens of the present, such 
assumptions have an increasingly visible potential bearing on current 
criticism.5
“What theorizing tanzlr really means,” argues al-Baqillani (d.
1013) (as quoted by al-Tahanawi), “is a process of thinking in the pursuit
of which a science [ Him] based on certainty or probability ghalabatu zann 
£ # t
can emerge.” Al-Baqillani goes on to explain that this progression of 
thinking involves “moving forward from one level of meaning to 
another”.7 This leads to a link being established between “method” and 
“intention”, the polar components in a heuristic enterprise of theory- 
making.
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In modern theory the significance of this notional8 link is 
emblematic in the insightful and unfailingly learned argument to be found 
throughout Edward Said’s Beginnings: Intention and Method.
A very considerable authoritative power is claimed for the elusive 
term “science”. Yet the study of how science, a conceptual tool with 
widespread currency in the social sciences, operates within a literary 
framework has its basis here in the notion of frequency (tawatur), the 
generative force of negation and confirmation that our modern judgement 
assigns to a methodology. The workings of this force of recurrence are 
nowhere better shown than in Al-Azmeh attempt to make al-BIruni (d. 
1048-9) and al-Subki (d. 1369-70) into theorists of perspicacious 
relevance for the 1980s. Science ( Him), as elaborated by them, should 
(Al-Azmeh argues) be seen as generally divided into two types, which 
“were epistemologically on par but which differed in origin: that based on 
demonstrative certainty iyaqin) and that whose veracity is derived from 
traditional acceptance (tasdiq)”.9 Thus literary (ergo critical) theory, or 
poetics or the science of literature, falls firmly into the niche of tasdiq:
The truth of its individual elements is no less certain than that of 
the sciences based on demonstration.
Only certainty is
derived from the constancy of their occurrence (tawatur).10
Moreover, the category of tasdiq -  which conveys, within the new 
ascending paradigm, the idea of persistent frequency -  makes it possible 
for us to perceive this representation of theory as a model tied into 
ongoing dynamics and process: a theory exploring itself as theory,11 a
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narrative constituted by an interface, conjoining the referential12 with the 
1 %self-referential, thus clearly manifesting a factive/fictive status. Theory 
as such is, in a sense, a meta-theory, a theory of theory, a creation whose 
determinative limits have a great deal to do with the selection of data 
(dictated by particular theoretical interests) and with what critical concept 
is allowed to exist or appear. To engage in this transforming process is to 
manufacture the possibility of a dominant “mode of becoming”.
On this account (if we may generalize) the imagination of the 
modem critic would appear, in its endeavour to preside over the past by 
reference to the concerns of the present, to be increasingly eclectic. In a 
positive sense, eclecticism is here seen as a suggested forward movement 
synonymous with the notions of extensiveness, scope and diversity: a 
creative form of dynamism denoting a deliberate attempt to select, 
combine and extend. Muhammad Miftah identifies a “positive” 
eclecticism, which he sets against “negative” syncretism:
Selecting or using elements borrowed from various theories is 
bound to lead to eclecticism. Yet eclecticism does not have to lead 
to syncretism (talflqiyya), which afflicts only the naive with blind 
faith in the irreversible certitude of what he reads -  neither aware 
of the historical and epistemic circumstance in which these theories 
arose, nor capable of discerning permanent from changing elements 
or locating their points of convergence and divergence.14
What is clear from the above is that the modern critic, as explained, 
selects his own intellectual experiences from a matrix of past and present 
writings 011 literature and theory, and, from his vision of the future, 
selects those devices, strategies and conventions which best suit his 
intentions with regard to a particular critique.
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The extent to which these intentions correspond to the ongoing 
progression, increasing in force by successive additions and associated 
with the foregoing processes of model-building, hardly needs to be 
stressed. The point here is that -  even though it has been in an ostensible 
state of entropy -  this model has established itself throughout in an array 
of displacements. To make the seemingly “suppressed” expressed15 is one 
way for this unsettling operation to manifest the discursiveness of its 
mode of becoming; whereby the claims of the term “emergent” are being 
questioned, re-examined and foregrounded with the power of logical 
validation against possible misunderstanding.
These shifts have, in consequence, given rise to the radical notion 
of a paradigmatic movement from one mode to another, and may be 
articulated into a network of overlapping but distinct sub-paradigmatic 
strands. It is this articulation of cutting and cross-cutting that makes the 
idea of “concept mapping” a viable interpretive device. With such a 
device the term “concept” can now be admitted, relatedly, as a component 
of a thought, rather in the way a word is a component of a sentence that 
articulates a thought. As such, concept-mapping is present to provide the 
“vocabulary” as well as the “grammar” that produces the permutations 
whereby a model of theory is brought from being to becoming.
Let us repeat once more: the presence of concept-mapping is to be 
seen, at this point, as focal in a heuristic operation of structural 
configurating, one intended to describe and explain a cluster of 
assumptions mapped on to the concepts embedding the assigned model as 
a whole. The whole can be understood only through an understanding of 
its parts and of their literary culture-sensitive assumptions, while the 
assumptions themselves can be understood only through an understanding 
of the whole to which they belong. Even so, the whole is proffered as 
exceeding the aggregate of its structuring parts: the vibrating pressure of
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its significance transcends the bounds of structure.16 Moreover, as a 
reversed process of structural configurating, an understanding of this 
significance denotes, pointedly, the relations of its components and their 
implications regarding the imminent ascendancy of a new paradigm.
L From a mode o f being to a mode o f becoming
In the light of the preceding discussion, it may be said that the 
paradigmatic motion from “being” to “becoming” provides the 
framework for an interdisciplinary (ergo intertheoretic) shift whereby the 
power relations at work within the proposed model of theory are moved 
beyond the phase of critique through the offering of an alternative 
epistemology. Central to the shift is the presence of an array of processes 
whereby an older paradigm is challenged, dislodged and superseded by an 
emerging one. The prime movers behind this are members of a vanguard 
elite setting themselves to undo the effects of an entrenched mode of 
being. Needless to say, these members function, discursively, as the 
originators of new meanings, thus propounding, within the ascending 
paradigm, the possibility of a mode of becoming.
Since the significance of the model employed is an essential part of 
its structural configuration, and therefore essential for a discussion of the 
paradigmatic shift at work, it will be helpful to revisit the model5s 
intended meaning in its most general sense. At the core of this meaning, 
and of the way the model functions, is the concept of interpretation.17 In 
this sense the model has been presented, throughout, as an interpretive 
embodiment indicative of differential possibilities. It is in effect a 
figurative whole designed to facilitate the understanding of theory by 
supplanting its assumptions in favour of more perspicacious ones. As 
such, the proposed model is never intended to respond solely to a singular 
(literalist) explanation connoting certitude, an unqualified freedom from
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doubt; rather it is, primarily, an interlocking creation, to be prised open to 
reveal a plurality of interpretations.
Seen from this viewpoint, explanation (unlike interpretation) 
implies the reading (or misreading) of literary texts as part of an enforced 
method of singularity, one imposed in top-down fashion and signifying a 
theology-laden absolutism in a world of postmodern subjectivism.18 The 
core assumption of such a reading is a predicative perception of the 
“literary” as the fall and synonymous embodiment of the “literal”. Under 
the rubric of ancestral authenticity, the literary is thus viewed as the 
producer of a meaning decided antecedently, one whose prescriptive 
notion of a valid frame of reference is persistently pre-fixed. There is no 
imprecision or ambiguity; rather a determined identification linking 
words and their referents. This approach rests, at bottom, on the specious 
notion that the word and its object represent an initial unity now split into 
two.
Adunls, Arkoun, Sharabi, Abu DIb, ‘Asfur, Maalouf and many 
others reject this pre-determinedness of meaning, which is currently 
assigned, in Salafi (fundamentalist) discourse of authenticity, to an 
increasingly indefinable concept of cultural identity. All attempts, these 
critics would say, to fix the connotation of such a concept once and for all 
are liable to turn people into utterly changeless entities. Maalouf s 
approach is representative in this regard:
Identity isn’t given once and for all: it is built up and changes
throughout a person’s lifetime.19
Adunls provides another example whereby identity is seen as 
heterological rather than homological. The following is typical of the way 
he dismisses, as redundant, any nostalgic conception of identity:
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Authenticity [asalah] is not a fixed point in the past to which we 
must return in order to establish our identity. It is rather a constant 
capacity for movement and for going beyond existing limits 
towards a world which, while assimilating the past and its 
knowledge, looks ahead for a better future.
Assuming this to be valid, the irrelevance of a literalist reading of 
the literary is further emphasized by literalism’s evident incapacity to be 
anchored in the present or to mediate with it. The tension between 
literature and theology may be Said, in consequence, to translate into a 
ceaseless tension between the past and the present. The most telling 
instances of such a tension, whereby theological orthodoxy has power to 
reduce literary concepts to fixed ideological instruments, are those 
persistently dominant in current Salafi-oriented discourse21 of culture. 
Proclaimed with more than a nod towards the language of cultural 
monologism, this increasingly ethnocentric stance is illustrative of the 
multi-purpose concept of al-madawiyyah (approximately translatable as 
“anachronism”). Coined by Adunls to designate the re-asserted centrality 
of the past as the primary location of current Arabic literary/cultural 
theory, the term is accorded different weight in different contexts, Al- 
madawiyyah may be viewed, in this context, as a misconceived attempt, 
marked by an uncritical acceptance of institutional bias towards the past, 
to perpetuate dismissal of the present. Such a posture functions in favour 
of the anti-modem by maintaining and legitimating, as fixed and binding, 
the cumulative canonicity of a Salafi-laden view of the past.
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From the vantage point of the foregoing, modem literary theory as 
a transforming model pivotal to paradigm change may be Said to signify, 
primarily, an attempt to undo the impediments and dysfunctionalities 
embedding culturally coded systems of value and representation. Turning 
on the question of whether their elimination (or modification) is possible, 
the attempt carries over into discussion of the dynamics and process of 
advance from being to becoming. Inevitably modern theory encounters 
these impediments and dysfunctionalities; and its strength is determined 
by its ability to allow passage between one mode and another. At the 
basis of such a motion is the idea that a mode of being is, in the final 
analysis, the locus for a static-dynamic opposition. This condition is 
predicated here, disparagingly, as illustrating a nexus of those structures 
that produce and represent stasis, the presence of systemic “fixedness”.
To put it another way, intellectual inertia might be seen, in this 
connection, not as a passive indisposition to motion but rather as 
indicating an active stance, one set against the workings of paradigmatic 
change. By claiming to be not only right but righteous, the perpetuators of 
such an absolutized position cannot, effectively, be scanned for all the 
possible constituent structures produced. Representing the flip side of the 
coin -  that is, a range of distorted forms of change -  these systemic power 
constructs offer a specific grid of mutually reinforcing examples drawing 
on themes commonly encountered in the discourse of cultural 
fundamentalism. That is to say, they function as metaphors illustrative of 
the impediments imposed on the category of choice, viewed as an 
exclusively modern notion. To facilitate understanding of the case for a 
paradigm shift, let me highlight the major areas in question.
(a) Neopatriarchal structure
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Neopatriarchy is a term used by Hisham Sharabi to describe a distorted 
distribution of power by virtue of gender in our current Arab culture and 
society. Viewed as a mode of being denoting a total cultural 
phenomenon, this multi-dimensional concept derives its meaning (as it 
occurs in history) from
the two terms or realities which make up its concrete structure,
22modernity and patriarchy.
This structure would correspond to the way in which deep-rooted 
traditionality works and gives meaning to a deformed model of 
modernized patriarchy:
The latter must be viewed as the product of a hegemonic modern 
Europe; but “modernization” as a product of patriarchal and 
dependent conditions can only be dependent “modernization”: 
dependency relations inevitably lead not to modernity but to 
“modernized” patriarchy.
The upshot is that, for Sharabi, the model displayed postulates “the 
metonymy of inverted modernity”.24 This modernity offers a distorted, 
even wholly dysfunctional discourse, able to operate (in Bakhtin’s 
definition of the tenn “discourse”) as “a method of using words that
• 0 Spresume a type of authority”.
In this sense, a discourse reflecting distorted epistemic construction 
may be construed as emblematic of dysfunctional authority -  that is to 
say, of an authority rooted in patriarchal values and filiations of a kinship 
religious and/or ethnic nature; one projecting the peculiar duality of the 
modern and the patriarchal, “coexisting in contradictory union”.
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This difficulty leads us, inevitably, to the other side of the coin: to 
the question of dependency and of how neopatriarchy manifests itself 
within the parameters of a secular model illustrative of what Sharabi calls 
“fetishized modernism”.
For him the epitome of this form of modernism is a “fetishized 
consciousness”, one exhibiting
two related and mutually reinforcing tendencies, imitation and 
passivity. Ideas, actions, values, or institutions are validated (or 
invalidated) not by criticism but by reference to a (received) 
model.26
Defined in terms of the translation of Western models, the received model 
(of fetishized modernism) is described by Sharabi as
a category which to a large extent determines neo-patriarchal 
outlook and practice, [imposing] itself directly without mediation 
or critical self-consciousness. It governs all kinds of activities,
97including creative ones .. .
This is “trendism” par excellence.28
(b) Salafi structure
The ubiquitous presence of the patriarchal and the modern “coexisting in 
contradictory union” may also be considered with reference to the Salafi 
position on modernity. The context for this typically points up elements 
of tradition regarded, by a resurgent pre-modern orthodoxy, as the source 
of political and cultural legitimacy. In social theory the latter is viewed as 
central vis-a-vis the exercise of authority.
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Adunls’s critique of cultural legitimacy, which is clearly geared to 
his thesis of the permanent and the changing in Arabic culture, is 
emblematic of an all-encompassing theory carrying through a counter- 
canonical project (albeit applied at times a little too neatly) that involves a 
complete dismantling of Salafi structures of power. A key point in this is 
the subversion of Salafi processes of legitimation whereby a theology- 
anchored conformism operates a priori; a conformism embedded in a 
ludicrously improbable image of the past and persistently at loggerheads 
with the present.
A cultural theorist and intellectual demystifier, Adunls has had a 
huge impact on the study of cultural critique. Without his theory of 
change, we would probably not have had an operational interdisciplinary 
lexicon of keywords working, collectively, to construct a new conception 
of modernity.
In many ways the Salafi cultural position here proclaims itself the 
persistent perpetuator of patriarchy rather than the restrained promoter of 
change. While this position involves upholding the essentialist attitudes 
of a firmly entrenched establishment, that of Adunls, by contrast, entails 
embracing radical alternatives that privilege the status of innovation. His 
quarrel is thus not with the suggestion that some innovation-based 
canonical textualities within the core curriculum might play their part in 
the processes of identity formation. The question is rather whether an 
essentially regressive theory, offering no resistance to the status quo, can 
ever lead to any position other than that of solipsistic closure.
There is, in other words, a crucial difference between, on the one 
hand, viewing the present in terms of a permanent canon evocative of a 
dysfunctional image of the past and, on the other, understanding the past, 
critically, in terms of the concerns of the present.
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Thus the overriding aim here is the logical and powerful case to be 
made against the cultural fixity of an essentialized past which is being 
rapidly overtaken by the dynamics of the present. However, the core 
theme of Adunls’s theory may in effect be construed as a call to resist not
OQonly the notion of what Aijaz Ahmad terms “excess belonging” 
(connoting an ethnocentric canonicity) but also the notion of “absence of 
belonging” (denoting a Eurocentric-based one). Seen in this light, 
patriarchy -  a biology-based form of authoritarianism proclaiming an 
essentialized identity, and used to describe the distribution of power 
gender in culture and society -  suggests that the issue of authority should 
be viewed as a vital intersection between two seemingly opposing forms 
of domination: ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism. Colonized as they have 
been by power relations, these forms point (Sharabi and Adunls would 
say) to a possible convergence to a common point of cultural hegemony.
One final point should be made in this regard. Crucial inquiries 
such as Edward Said’s -  undertaken at a meta-theoretical level into the 
role played by the myth of “origin” in upholding belief in an irreducible, 
ahistorical model of particularism, and thereby impeding the possibility 
of meaningful cultural change -  should (it is now clear) be viewed as 
relevant to the present vexed question of Salafi anachronism.
Said’s critique of the notion of “origin” provides the organizing 
focus for his thinking on the dysfunctionality of essentialist models of 
theory; and his distinctive use of the term “origin” as distinct from 
“beginning” has become the effective hallmark of the Saidian approach. 
For him “origin” is an essentialist category working in conjunction with 
ethnocentrism:
251
Origin is a silent zero point, locked within itself. It is the realm of 
untroubled semantic security . . . whereas “beginning” is the event 
that founds the realm of order and writing -  syntax . . . 31
We might perhaps gloss this to imply a debunking of the biological 
rootedness (in Said’s view) of a seemingly prevailing ethnocentrism, 
which stands in symmetric relation to extreme particularism. His 
argument is concerned, above all, with exploring ways of reading texts by 
revealing their patriarchy-induced particularism, and, in so doing, 
demolishing their “filial” power.
This should be understood as an endeavour, mediated through a 
lexicon of cultural semantics, effectively to downgrade the status of the 
genealogical decidability pervading a culturally imposed notion of 
conformism. The possibility of this (Said would say) hinges on 
privileging the status of “affiliation” -  a notion advocating the creation of 
a metaphorical father as opposed to the production of a biological one.
A further point should be added. In the light of this paradigmatic 
interpretation, theoiy may be seen as postulating the supersession of the 
old notion of “fate”, operating as a predominant status quo, by the 
characteristically modernist notion of “choice”.
(c) Differentialist structure
One of the perspectives offered by Arabic cultural theoiy is Al-Azmeh’s 
thesis claiming convergence of, on the one hand, the essentialism central 
to Salafi and Islamo-nationalist culturalism and the attendant organicism 
of its notion of history, and, on the other, the differentialism elaborated 
by pundits of a Eurocentrism that entails racism on implicit biological 
lines. Both sides, he stresses, speak the same language of ancestral
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authenticity and identity. This line of argument emerges clearly in the 
following passage in Is lams and Modernities:
Like racism, cultural differentialism is an essentialist perceptive 
system premised on a notion of a pregiven “culture” which, like 
race, has no sociological definition. Culture is here an absolute 
term coined to schematize, without precision, an indeterminate 
reality.32
He goes on to make the following point:
. . .  it is the enormous advantage of this notion that it is put forward 
to initiate sheer difference, for in this sense it can be disproved 
because it is tautological. . .
In criticizing this form of differentialism, surrounded and sealed by 
the patriarchal straitjacket of essentialism, Al-Azmeh points out how 
Salman Rushdie,34 whom he describes as a “primary victim” of cultural 
fundamentalism, had to recreate his own cultural genealogy so as to 
provide an evolving mythological category: one premised on the absolute 
authority proclaimed by the romantic populism of an effectively non­
existent category of “Islamic” literature. According to Al-Azmeh:
The primary victim, Salman Rushdie himself, edging towards 
compromise at a particular moment, recast his intellectual 
genealogy in such a way that the Arabian Nights, the influence of
* * • T ^which he professes, became “Islamic” literature.
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Closely connected with this essentializing position -  of recasting 
the Arabian Nights as specifically “Islamic” -  is the attempt by nostalgic 
Salafi fundamentalists to recreate an imagined past that never was, thus 
predicating Arabic literature, erroneously, as the product of a literalist 
interpretation of Islam, In other words, at the heart of this interpretation 
of a misleadingly monolithic whole — a whole that acts as an organized 
single force -  lies a monist36 image of an earlier period of history, a 
golden age from which point culture has steadily degenerated. Such a call 
to reclaim the past (Al-Azmeh rightly asserts) reflects a corresponding 
discontent with the present and mistrust of the future.37
In summary, then, two major objectives underlie Al-AzmelTs 
stance: to dismantle the erroneous (ahistorical) notion of a single 
determinative form of Islam leading to an avowedly essentialist monism; 
and to use this dismantling as a heuristic-methodological stimulus for 
taking on the false historicity of the solipsistic models he is investigating, 
namely, the negative forms of Islam, culture and modernity.
Each of these two objectives interacts with the other and reinforces 
it; hence the focus, through ongoing reference to sources and resources 
interdisciplinary in their nature, on a broader intellectual, literary and 
cultural critique of the homogenizing claims of monocentric Salafism and 
Eurocentric modernism.
(d) Analogical structure
The idea of an analogical (qiyasi) structure articulating Arabic systems of 
knowledge has been introduced by M.A. al-Jabiri to explain the shared 
essentializing sameness of two analogous or parallel narratives alluding, 
within the parameters of past and present representations of knowledge, 
to a cluster of cultural formations in discourse. What starts out as a search
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for analogy and correspondence often serves to replicate a point in the 
past identified as a celebrated “origin”.
In his study of the “Arab mind”,38 al-Jabiri points out (in 
accordance with a Foucaultian analytical approach) three prominent 
determiners in the history of Arabic culture, which he identifies as 
“dominant epistemes” or “epistemic systems of knowledge”.
The first episteme refers to al-bayan, this being the field of 
representation of Arabic knowledge, standing for eloquence, style and 
clarity of expression.
The second episteme, al- ‘irfan, is emblematic, within the
TOintellectual framework of Neoplatonism, of a conception combining 
mystical intuition and gnosis. Al- firfan, according to the followers of Ibn 
Rushd (Averroes), the rationalist Andalusi philosopher, led to the demise, 
in the Islamic East, of philosophical inquiry within Arabic culture.
The third episteme, al-biirhan, refers to the notion of 
demonstration, to a process of reasoning predicated on rational and 
discursive argument conjoining a l-‘aql (reason) and al-nazar 
(speculation, examination, discernment).
These epistemes are regarded by al-Jabiri as the regulating 
disciplinary structures that limit what can or cannot be written or Said in 
current Arabic culture. In other words, an episteme manifests itself as a 
“discourse”, an ordered and structured framework encompassing a 
historically specific field of representation of knowledge.
Al-Jabiri wishes us to examine critically the epistemic systems of 
al-bayan and al- ‘irfan. His negative critique entails, equally, questioning 
their relevance to the present and reassessing their instrumentality.
Al-burhan, the third epistemic system al-Jabiri has striven to 
articulate, offers what is, in the final analysis, the epitome of a project of 
modernity. Assuming we have no wish to debunk the exemplary status of
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modernity, how are we to come to terms with our cultural heritage? The 
answer to this question may be found in al-Jabiri5s discussion of a 
possible modernizing approach, one the present writer is tempted to 
construe as illustrative of a “critical intervention55, a calculated 
interposition made possible only by engaging with its modem relevance. 
Al-Jabiri writes:
There is no renewal or modernization from a point of nothingness. 
Re-engagement with a previous (relevant) project, i.e., Arabic 
cultural tradition, seems to me persistently inescapable.
Focal to this notion of a “critical intervention55 is what al-Jabiri pointedly 
terms “the Andalusi cultural project.55
For him, destabilizing the subconscious powers determinative of 
the Arab mind is central to an effective actualized use of this project. The 
subconscious powers in question are the following:
I. verbal power {sultat al-lafz);
II. ancestral power {sultat al-salaf);
III. analogical power {sultat al-qiyds) .40
The upshot is that, in place of an emulative approach embracing, 
uncritically, the totality of the Andalusi model, al-Jabiri proposes the 
development of a “critical55 understanding of the past; that is, instead of 
attempting to follow the model to the letter, thereby uncritically asserting 
the superiority of the past over the present, we should acknowledge that 
all understand of the past must operate within the possibilities of its 
instrumentality43 in the course of the present.
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There is a significant sense in which this same position has (as 
indicated earlier) been consistently emphasized. According to Adunls’s 
argument, the Andalusi model, or rather the effectiveness of this model, 
has demonstrated that “no culture exists in isolation from other cultures”, 
and that this cultural “combination” effectively “earned Arab-Islamic 
civilization at its most mature to the West by way of Andalusia”.42
* * *
Having examined some of the anomalies (represented by entrenched 
structures) which cannot be resolved within the old paradigm, it is now 
time to draw together the various threads of the argument and to identify 
the sub-paradigmatic strands that have contributed decisively to a 
paradigm shift.
The chain of movements below can, therefore, be viewed, at both 
micro and macro level, as the means whereby an innovation-based 
literary (ergo cultural) theory is being continually deconstructed and 
reconstructed in a fallibilistic and open manner.
To put it another way, these sub-paradigmatic strands consequently 
provide a line of “becoming” emblematic of the theoretical points of 
break whereby the discursive and intuitive power formations of the old 
are being displaced and replaced by the new.
2. From “ism ” to conceptual “prism ”
Often making an association with the “modernist” European and Anglo- 
American literary/cultural movement of the first part of the twentieth 
century, an array of Arab writers has erroneously viewed the term 
“modernism” (with modernity as its matrix concept) not as a blanket term 
to cover a variety of leanings, vogues and trends, overlapping one another
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and merging into one another within the ephemerality of the Western 
literary canon, but rather as a one-way determination emblematic of a 
monolithic “ism” seeking to break with sets of collectively held concepts 
of validity.
Among the features shared by such writers, whether Salafi or 
“trendist”, is a particular approach to a possible theory of change; and 
central to this is the tendency to essentialize. In such an approach, cultural 
identity is determined by the myth of a fixed “uncontaminated” origin, 
and by the way this myth appears as natural, authentic and unproblematic. 
The two models (Salafi and “trendist”) may therefore be viewed as the 
two sides of the same coin.
This means that, whereas from an ethnocentric perspective theory 
is viewed in terms of an usuli (fundamentalist) tendency that relentlessly 
stresses subordination to a theology-laden conventionalism, Eurocentric 
theory is approvingly regarded (by the proponents of trendism at the 
receiving end) as a peripheral by-product, a borrowed creation 
conforming to the ever-changing diktat of a commodified Western model.
Nowhere is the link between ethnocentrism and Eurocentrism more 
explicit than in the convergence of Salafism and trendism to a common 
point. The natural corollary of their subservience is a shared tendency to 
follow, to abide by, to adhere to. In a more negative sense, conformity 
effectively turns into an endeavour to fundamentalize, essentialize, 
fetishize.
This is a highly significant conclusion. The theoretical strands 
represented within the work of Adunls, al-Jabiri, Arkoun, Sharabi, Abu 
DIb and Al-Azmeh, to name just a few, may now be seen in effect as 
central to a wider secular43 drive which, having rejected Salafism and 
trendism, has ended by locating the repressive aspects of the very notion 
of a remorseless conformity. Adunls in particular has been drawn to
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debunk the conforming revivalism of al-Nahdah for its lack of any sense 
of dissidence. This stance he describes as tajawuzi: a transgressive/non- 
conformist position affirming the plurality inherent in secularity while 
transgressing the singularity residing in conformity. According to his 
argument, this has
laid the foundation of a double dependency on the past, to 
compensate for the lack of creative activity by remembering and 
reviving; and a dependency on the European-American West, to 
compensate for the failure to invent and innovate by intellectual 
and technical adaptation and borrowing. The present reality is that 
the prevailing Arab culture derives from the past in most of its 
theoretical aspects, the religious in particular, while its technique 
comes mainly from the West.44
This passage captures, very precisely, the gist of two converging 
models of dependency. Yet what it also does in effect is to highlight the 
ascendancy of an alternative model, one predicating a sub-paradigmatic 
shift from the singular to the plural, from definitive “ism” to a 
polymorphic conceptual “prism”. Al-Azmeh’s contention that “there are 
as many Islams (and modernities) as there are situations that sustain 
them” may be construed as a simple shorthand means of underlining the 
primacy of the proposed alternative: namely, an innovation-based literary 
theory.
3. From the philological to the critical
Much of the theoretical groundwork probing the role of theology-induced 
philology in determining the lexicon of modem literary theory was laid 
by innovation-based secular writers, whose priorities were directed firmly
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towards the construction of modernity vis-a-vis a possible 
reconceptionalization of the link in Arabic etymology between the 
philological and the religious.
Central to this philology-induced argument is the examination, in 
Edward Said’s Beginnings: Intention and Method, of the way the word 
“innovation” (ibdd *) articulates with the “negative” concept of “heresy” 
(bid‘a). As Said puts it:
It is significant that the desire to create an alternative world, to 
modify or augment the real world through the act of writing (which 
is one motive underlying the novelistic tradition in the West), is 
inimical to the Islamic world view. The Prophet is he who has 
completed a world view; thus the word heresy in Arabic is 
synonymous with the verb to “innovate” or to “begin”. Islam views 
the world as a plenum, capable of neither diminishment nor 
amplification.45
Adunls is more relentless than Said in questioning the disagreeably 
totalizing ring to Salafi fundamentalism. Whereas Said attempts to 
explain, in terms of existent theology-induced etymology, the evident 
absence of the novel (which is a modern European genre), Adunls 
employs the same kind of negational etymology to unmask the “static” in 
Arabic culture as a permanent mantle signifying regressive, degenerate 
features, given that fixity offers no resistance to the status quo. In 
Adunls’s words:
. . . those in power designated everyone who did not think 
according to the culture of the caliphate as “the people of 
innovation” [ahl al-ihddth], excluding them with this indictment of
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heresy from their Islamic affiliation. This explains how the term 
ihdath [“innovation”] and muhdath [“modem”, “new”], used to 
characterize the poetry which violated the ancient poetic principles, 
came originally from the religious lexicon.46
It is from this negational etymological perspective, whereby reality is 
mediated through a religious lexicon marked by a particular feature of 
“instruction”, that Adunls now makes the following affirmation:
Consequently we can see that the modem in poetiy appeared to the 
ruling establishment as a political or intellectual attack on the 
culture of the regime and a rejection of the idealized standards of 
the ancients, and how, therefore, in Arab life, the poetic has always 
been mixed up with the political and the religious, and indeed
i 47continues to be so.
The shift from the philological to the critical now emerges. 
Whereas etymological research is used as a preliminary step in a 
“critical” inquiry designed to expose the “power of instruction” hidden in 
an implicit discourse of reasoning, critical analysis may be understood as 
a cultural critique par excellence; one whose primary intention is to 
“undo” the effect of the religious lexicon (acting as a mask for a one-way 
determination) on the construction of modern literary theory.
4. From tafsir (explanation) to ta ’wil (interpretation)
As conceptual tools for text-reading, explanation and interpretation have 
been viewed by innovation-based modernists as suggesting two opposing 
strategies for understanding literature. While explanation is presented as 
pre-fixing the meaning of a literary text, thus drawing it into the
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singularity of a pre-given simplistic reasoning (“the less Western, the 
more authentic”), interpretation is offered not as an “uncritical” ordering 
tool, imposed with a view to creating a strategy cohering fully with the 
logic of cultural monologism, but as a “critical” tool for teasing out the 
manifold meanings existent beyond a predicated, unproblematized mode 
of “stability”.
The uncritical affirmation located in such “stability” leads on to its 
very antithesis, “instability”, so pointing up an embedded concept of 
negation. Edward Said has made this clear in his discoursing on 
“monocentrism”, a negational concept he understands as “working in 
conjunction with ethnocentrism”, as “licensing a culture to cloak itself in 
the particular authority of certain values over others”.48
Parallel to this line of reasoning is al-Tahanawi’s innovative 
differentiation (produced in 1737) between the two forms of reading:
Interpretation [ta’wil] is conjecture [zann] of the intended meaning 
[murad\; while explanation [tafsir] emphasizes its certainty.49
The gist of al-Tahanawi’s definition appears pointedly in tune with that 
posited in Umberto Eco’s The Limits o f  Interpretation:
On one side it is assumed that to interpret a text means to find out 
the meaning intended by its original author or -  in any case -  its 
objective nature or essence, an essence which, as such, is 
independent of our interpretation. On the other side it is assumed 
that the text can be interpreted in infinite ways.50
To round off these remarks, two points need to be stressed. The 
first is that innovation-based theory has displayed, along a line of
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becoming, an anticipated glide from explanation to interpretation. The 
second point is that, since the publication of Adunls5s major treatise on 
literary theory from the viewpoint of cultural statics and dynamics, 
modem criticism has been concerned with formulating the basis for an 
interdisciplinary matrix of knowledge free from presuppositions.
If the debate on reading as an irreducibly complex process of 
interpretation begins with Adunls, the more recent example of it is to be 
found in J. ‘Asftir’s Qira’at al-turath al-naqdi (“Reading the Critical 
Heritage”).51 Central to this book is an approach known as reader- 
response criticism. ‘ Asfur is not, though, concerned solely with individual 
responses to literary texts, but with the general response determinative of 
the interpretive capacity of literature.
Having concluded, albeit implicitly, that social change remains 
unrealized if  not unrealizable, Adunls and a cluster of innovationists 
have, in effect, rejected the notion that change is possible solely by virtue 
of social forces.53
This means that theory, being an elitist enterprise, has been led 
away from the study of forms of economic and social structures rather 
than towards them.
Proposing to create what amounts to a “poetics of becoming”, one 
embracing a paradigm of innovation and drawing on (in Khalida SaTd’s 
words) “Abbasid modernity and European modernity of the past two 
centuries”, this poetics has effectively displaced all discussion of the 
predicaments surrounding the idea of social change and its implication.
The foregoing examination of the concept of modernity has already 
indicated how its function can and will be defined:
. . . these modernities are based on the retrieval of the status of
man, his effectiveness in history, and his freedom and
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responsibility. What constitutes our modernity is, then, an 
endeavour to undo a state of alienation.54
Within the context of this state of alienation, the role of Sufi 
universalism55 in the making of innovation-based theory is highly 
symptomatic. If a symptom is defined as something that indicates the 
presence of something else, Sufism may be seen, in retrospect, as the 
powerhouse of the metaphorical, whereby words are perceived as the 
mantle of the universe and the universe as the mantle of words.
The most relevant example of Sufi writings, reclaimed by 
innovation modernists, is provided in Ibn ‘Arabi’s (1165-1240) 
metaphorical proposition connecting the book and the universe. The 
following quotation from his Turjuman al-ashwdq (“Interpreter of 
Longings”) is connotative of an attempt to textualize the universe and 
universalize the text:
The universe is an immense book; the characters of this book are 
written in principle with the same ink and transcribed on the eternal 
tablet.56
A variation on this theme, whereby the dichotomy of the subjective 
and the objective has been obliterated, is supplied in Umberto Eco’s 
notion of the “double metaphor” positing “the world as a text and the text 
as a world” :
To interpret means to react to the text of the world or to the world
c n
of a text by producing other texts.
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The theme of world and text finds its expression in Adunis’s Al- 
Kitab (“The Book”), a dark rhapsodic critique scattered with arresting 
aesthetic and political insights that question Arabic culture and history. 
Imaginatively, indeed idiosyncratically written, the work offers the 
possibility of a modem secular re-engagement with the tradition assigned 
to the genre of sacred books.
Within a different framework, it is appropriate to turn to Adunls’s 
reading of Sufism vis-a-vis the surrealism of Rimbaud, and vice versa.59 
What establishes the plausibility of this proposed cultural convergence is 
the existence of an invisible interface, an implicit allegorical 
connectedness, an almost undetectable comparability.
That is not to identify, in the present context, a “causal law”, one 
suggesting a direct relationship between two boundaries, a chronological 
succession whereby one brings about or produces the other. Such a 
contention would be simply untrue.
Finally, it is not possible, when dealing with problems entailing the 
displacement of “explanation” by “interpretation”, to evade the question 
of just how innovation-based modernists receive, perceive and understand 
literature. In his Fi 3l-shi ‘riyyah (“On Poetics”), Kamal Abu DIb posits 
the question as a semiological problematic highlighting the primacy of 
imagination:
Texts are full of gaps which the reader/receptor fills in, and literary 
criticism involves interpreting rather than explicating what textual 
language aspires to convey.60
The point is, it is no longer possible to explicate. Explanation must be 
replaced by interpretation.
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5. From trendism to critical intervention
The phenomenon described in the first part of this work as “trendism” 
may be viewed as the effect of increasingly uncontrollable processes of 
vulgar consumerism, which presumes, indeed demands, the freedom to 
follow, replicate, simulate, imitate and emulate a predominant 
Eurocentric model. Based on uncritical adherence to fashion, this 
phenomenon provides, within the context of theory’s current obsession 
with authenticity, the ammunition for Salafi and renovation-based writers 
who dismiss modernity/modernism as denotative of a seemingly 
unstoppable drive towards mindless acquiescence in the underlying diktat 
of borrowed forms of cultural consumerism.
One consequence of this is a dependency bringing with it what 
Jaber 4 Asfur has aptly called ittibafiyyah ‘asriyyah, a form of repetition 
reflecting uncritical conformity to a rampant commodification of culture 
closely associated with the development of effective systems of 
globalization.
Two ideas appear to be linked with this perspective:
First, if  this interpretation of the relation between cultural trendism 
and fashion within a global scene is correct, then uncritical approval of 
the replication of an increasingly ubiquitous model may be seen as 
confirming the notion of a far-reaching lack of authenticity. In so far as a 
trendist aspires to appease otherness via a mimetic act -  by seeking to 
become like it -  his attempt may be described as emblematic of a course 
of action whereby the colonized subject is being re-produced, in H.K. 
Bhabha’s words, as “almost the same, but not quite”.61 Hence trendism 
may be regarded as a mere corollary of the issues of cultural identity, 
rendering these issues far more difficult either to gloss over or to resolve. 
The more damaging the issues become in the course of modernization, 
the greater grows the threat of indolent subservience to a non-reductionist
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reduction positing itself as universally valid culture. To put it another 
way, a trendist should in effect be viewed not only in his guise as passive 
reader of the literary corpus of otherness (with more than a nod towards 
prevailing and short-lived fashion), but also as a mindless (ergo 
uncritical) replicator of an uncompromisingly categorical model.
Second, the notion of relational (ergo critical) reading of the 
literary corpus of otherness plays a crucial role in the shaping of 
innovation-based theory. A clearer idea of its scope may be gathered by 
examining the way literary terms, informed by two different cultures, 
appear to be effectively related despite their being virtually unrelated in 
context and time.
In place of a temporally specific connection, resting upon a 
relationship of replication, with eyes kept open for resemblances, 
innovation-based writers postulate analogical correlations determined by 
an adequate framework for comparison. Based on the notion of time- and 
context-free similitude, this framework proposes a distant method of 
comparability, one described by classical sociology as being in many 
aspects “close to creation in the arts, poetry, etc.”.62
The point (as has already been shown) is that an analogical method 
may be seen as an ongoing function of deliberate “critical intervention”. 
Edward Said’s attitude towards an all-encompassing theory -  a theory 
whose underlying theorizing may be consistently or reasonably conceived 
as providing de-temporalizable literary concepts -  is one of intended 
critical re-engagement. A group of Andalusi linguists and grammarians 
(noted in his work The World, the Text and the Critic as belonging to the 
Zahiri school of interpretation, whose stance embodies “the ultimate 
avoidance of vulgar determinism”)63 are treated as “worldly” participants 
in the reconstruction of a de-essentialized literary theory. Through 
mediation and substantiation Said explores the relevance of the ideas of
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theorists like Ibn Hazm, Ibn Jinni and Ibn Muda’ al-Qurtubi with regard 
to contemporary literary criticism.
The idea of a critical intervention in the sense indicated is in no 
way peculiar to Edward Said. Adunls provides a new perspective on the 
functioning of the analogical method as the corollary of critical 
intervention. Having acknowledged that he himself had been one of those 
captivated by Western culture, he further admits that he had not 
discovered modernity in Arabic poetry from within the prevailing Arab 
cultural order and its systems of knowledge. According to Adunls:
It was reading Baudelaire which changed my understanding of Abu 
Nuwas and revealed his particular poetical quality and modernity, 
and Mallarme’s work which explained to me the mysteries of Abu 
Tammam’s poetic language and the modern dimension in it. My 
reading of Rimbaud, Nerval and Breton led me to discover the 
poetry of the mystic writers in all its uniqueness and splendour, and 
the new French criticism gave me an indication of the newness of 
al-Jurjani’s critical vision.64
Kamal Abu DIb’s discovery of the structuralism in al-Jurjani’s Theory o f  
Poetic Imagery may be seen in one sense as identifying
a fundamental feature of . . . the dynamic way in which modem 
writers have come to look at our literary tradition.
This dynamism, he explains,
springs from the interaction between the influence of Western 
criticism and literature and a surging spirit of revival in Arabic
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culture. A change of sensibility has affected, to varying degrees, 
modem views on most aspects of the tradition . . . The process 
began towards the end of the last century and continues today more 
mature, vigorous, and sophisticated but, above all, with greater 
awareness of the most fundamental currents which prevailed in the 
tradition and shaped it.65
M.A. al-Jabiri derives a cluster of key terms and concepts 
regarding the “Arab mind” from Michel Foucault’s Archaeology o f  
Knowledge. But, for all that, the discursiveness of his epistemological 
investigation into the body of culture and thought offers an avowedly 
Arab specificity.
The final point returns us to a central issue in the making of Arabic 
literary theory: namely, its complex relatedness to otherness. This 
relatedness manifests itself through the use of borrowed concepts in an 
analogical rather than analytical way. The purpose of the former is to 
underline that these concepts are played out at a persistently thematic 
level. As such, they may be said to realize their own meaning through 
processes of synonymization and similitude rather than emulation or 
replication.
Mohammed Arkoun’s exploration of a self-pleading humanist trend 
in Arabic thought during the tenth century is based on a non-literal use of 
analogy: it neither borrows from nor refers to an explicitly
deconstructivist way of reading texts. Nevertheless, Arkoun may in a 
sense be viewed as a deconstructivist thinker, whose textual analysis 
tends to hold back from stressing external evaluative criteria; a thinker 
who seems increasingly detached from the premises and assumptions 
associated with deconstruction.
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To conclude: an effective shift in critical position and method from 
trendism to innovation-based modernism (one unavoidably embedded in 
diverse Eurocentric locations), whereby the critic is unable to jettison or 
convincingly reject the intellectual commodified products of a presiding 
otherness, may be Said to denote a persistent problematic, an interlocking 
set of unresolved issues. In his Al-Naqd al-muzdawij (“Double Critique”), 
A. Khatibi provides the basic contours of this problematic; and, even 
allowing for a degree of exaggeration in his stance, it must be conceded 
that he keeps the debate going:
The Arab scholar or man of science is the translator and articulator 
of a methodological and theoretical body of knowledge that has 
been formed in a different language and in other countries; in most 
cases, he hardly understands the historical and philosophical 
ground of this body of knowledge. He feels crushed by the 
scientific production of the Other . . . and is satisfied to remain in 
the shadow of Western knowledge and to formulate a secondary 
knowledge of his own . . . However, everything will be shaken on 
the level of theory when we become aware of this tension, and 
when the Arab world puts a stop to the process of accumulation 
and concentrates instead on establishing the conditions and 
requirements of its own independent production; at that point it will 
be clear that everything must start anew from the very beginning. 
This means that when [the Arab world] has properly mastered 
Western knowledge it will see that the matter does not call for just 
adopting and translating this knowledge but also and at the same 
time analyzing and comprehending the process of formation, 
transformation and break in the course of history.66
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6. From renovation to innovation
The foregoing discussion of a possible check-list for theory’s frames of 
reference implies a distinction between “innovation” and “renovation” as 
separate categories. Central to this differentiation is a dynamic process of 
realization and representation. The source of the process lies deeper: it is 
located not in the continuous “renovative” systems of history, whether 
linear or cyclic, but rather in that compulsion to innovation which, in a 
Foucaultian sense, is denotative of epistemological notions present within 
the tool-box of discontinuity: rupture, break, mutation, transformation.
What conclusion can be drawn? There seems good reason to 
reiterate the point: while innovation-based modernism proposes radical 
changes by bringing new assumptions into play, renovation-based 
modernism implies, by contrast, an adherence to revival, renewal and 
rendering old assumptions as new.
In examining the raison d'etre of the slippery concept of change, 
Adunls uses a puzzle cited by the Greek biographer and essayist Plutarch 
to raise, in a tentative and limited way, the question of the instability 
implicit in the shifting notion of identity, whose meaning, contrary to 
received opinion, cannot be viewed as always the same.
To demonstrate the problem of identifying the concept’s contour, 
and the evident instability of the concept itself, the puzzle asks the reader 
to suppose that, in the course of repair over a number of years, a ship 
owned by Theseus has its planks replaced one by one; and that the 
original planks are retained and used to make up a second ship just like 
the first. Which is the original ship?67
For Adunls the paradox of the ship implies a comparison that 
identifies both similarities and dissimilarities, spurring the reader to 
consider the idea of identity afresh, as a metaphor stretched to cover the 
workings of a biaxial concept central to the problematic of a paradigm in
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motion. If identity betokens a pre-given retrievable essence, 
fundamentally unchanged, it also betokens a dynamic process of 
becoming, permanently produced and reproduced.
The above example, which appears acceptably significant but also 
contains tentative or contradictory implications, will have illustrated the 
contrast between renovation and innovation. While renovation-based 
writers conceive identity as an established quintessence, emblematic of a 
primarily fixed, backward-looking position marked by nostalgic appeal to 
a frozen past, innovation-based writers propose it not as a condition of 
being the same, but as a dynamic term serving to indicate the presence of 
a specific unsolved problem — a term connotative of a forward-looking 
stance, continually established and always in progress.
It may be useful, finally, to note that renovationists -  as Hisham 
Sharabi rightly points out in his Al-Muthaqqafun al- Arab wa ’l-gharb: 
‘asr al-nahdah 1875-1914 (“Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Age of
/TO
Nahdah, 1875-1914”) — represent an extension of al-naz‘ah al-
islahiyyah, that is, the reformist tendency whose method of analysis is 
based, primarily, on linguistic explanation. The relation of reformist 
discourse to its religious, theoretical and methodological frames of 
reference lacks (he argues) a critical dimension. It belongs to an 
incomplete construct, one disparagingly described by Sharabi as 
illustrative of a world of “sub-theory”. It would be wrong to think of sub­
theory as a viable alternative to theory, since renovationists, in contrast to 
innovationists (their distant relatives whose assumptions maintain the link 
between “crisis” and “criticism”), tend to adopt the insistently defensive 
position of a lingering status quo.
7. From the canon to counter-canonicalism
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If we accept that renovation represents an extension of the reformist 
tendency of the age of Nahdah, which “was not an awakening but a return 
to the past and a firmer attachment to the text”,69 then what is to be the 
function of innovation? Must its intention exclude a questioning of those 
canonical texts which tend to form the core of writings designated as 
intrinsically valuable literature?
Following the Nahdah reformists, renovation-based writers have 
always treated the canon -  viewed as a totemic object emblematic of 
cultural, patriarchal, religious and political authoritarianism -  with kid 
gloves and excuses. Innovation-based writers, by contrast, tend to adopt a 
different emphasis: the past, they maintain, can no longer be seen as a 
glamorized essence with permanent fixity of meaning, or be taken on its 
own valuation, but should be understood in terms of the present. This 
point is clearly crucial, in that it permits a distinction between definitive 
terms, largely determined by their respective purposes (or intentions).
The English term “canon” (applied here to literature) implies a 
specifically theological origin. While there is no precise verbal equivalent 
in Arabic, this does not exclude the concept of an existing canonicity, one 
that reflects an entrenched power structure and, above all, supplies 
models for the use of language and the writing of literature.
The real significance of the disjunction between “canon” and 
“heritage” lies in an evident shift in perspective, a shift that may be 
viewed as uncompromisingly categorical. This is most clearly illustrated 
in a movement from a seemingly harmonious canon, complied with 
power, to a discordant heritage comprising both canonical and 
uncanonical literature; from a uniformity articulated within a monistic 
framework to a plurality dominated by various styles and models of 
thought; from static canonicity to dynamic counter-canonicity.
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It does seem, then, that the notion of a shift away from a mandatory 
canon, pre-determining the past, towards the idea of an optionally 
embraced heritage, supplies the potential for a proposed counter- 
canonical alternative, one that makes possible attention to writings 
excluded, marginalized or simply viewed as minor or even irrelevant. 
Only with innovation-based writers has this line of reasoning been 
initiated, and an emerging paradigm begun to signal a switch of register. 
When writers, following Adunls, refer to the modernist qualities present 
in a secularized mode of Sufism, which Adunls himself subsumes under 
the rubric of an ongoing process of desacralization, it is by way of 
endorsing a particular development of the concept of innovation. This 
leads us to the most powerful single factor among the many factors that 
enter into the making of modem theory.
Let us dwell, initially, on the semantic features of “innovation”. 
The priority given to the meaning of this word is, from Adunls’s 
viewpoint, particularly significant, in that the Arabic ibda ‘ (“innovation”) 
is troublesome from the etymological viewpoint. Suggesting, first and 
foremost, an act of creation out of nothing, it presents a paradigm case in 
language. Ibda‘ does not lack a specifically religious referentiality; 
indeed, it may be Said to have an avowedly theological connotation.
The view ascribed to Islamic theology asserts that things may come 
into existence out of nothing. The same may be said to be true, albeit in a 
different way, for the workings of new critical concepts and literary
forms. In this sense the writer may be regarded, via a process of realizing
7n
archetypes through similitudes, as a creator in his own right. In one of 
Adunls’s early poems, indeed, the poet is portrayed, in Sufi fashion, not 
as “a creator” but as “the creator”. The following lines illustrate this 
point:
274
In me He unified the universe
His eyelids wear mine,
In me He unified the universe
Through the workings of my own free will,
1 1Who then invents who?
What all this amounts to is that the role of innovation is central to 
any discussion of what the counter-canonical means. Arabic literary 
theory today clearly implies not only a challenge (on the grounds of its 
non-relevance to the concerns of the present) to a contentious canon 
complicit with power, but also the suppression of this canon, given the 
latter’s promotion in the name of an ever more ubiquitous, religious, 
patriarchal and political legitimacy. There is an implied need to consider 
the whole relationship between culture and authority -  more specifically, 
to question the negation, on the part of the perpetuators of the existing 
canon, of the ascendancy of the role of innovation in literature itself.
While Adunls’s position, in common with that of other innovation- 
based writers, involves attention to writings (like those of Sufis like al- 
Hallaj, al-Niffari and Ibn ‘Arabi) excluded by literary history as minor or 
irrelevant, the position of Mohammed Arkoun, along with that of al-Jabiri 
and other modem cultural commentators and theorists, involves a critical 
focus on interdisciplinary humanistic strands of thought dating back to 
the ninth and tenth centuries: the age of al-Jahiz, Ibn Miskawayh, al- 
Tawhldi and proponents of the Andalusi model.
8. From de-definition to re-definition
As has already been explained, the critical definition of modernism 
proffered throughout this inquiry addresses, by means of different lexical 
and critical resources determinative of the function of the type of reading
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adopted, a bundle of interconnected theoretical and empirical research 
problems. These problems turn on the question of de-definition.
In this connection, a de-defmer may be viewed as an oppositional 
reader engaging renovation-based texts, or, more specifically, as a 
critiquer exposing, through a process of demystification, the presence of 
emulation in the workings of a double articulation: just as Salafi 
anachronism and its ensuing ossification betokens the ethnocentric 
assumptions undeipinning a mimetic form of revivalism, so Eurocentric 
trendism, on which fashion has imposed its ephemeral reign, betokens, 
with an inexhaustible capacity for mimicry, a common standard of 
reproduciability against which cultural products are constantly measured. 
To put it more simply, we find the same pejorative imitativeness 
exhibiting itself in two distinct albeit similar formulations.
The dynamic of de-definition, from which springs the energy to 
reject or hold on to caveats, is thus not simply an effective tool for calling 
into question a definition that works outside reference to a new paradigm; 
it is also an approach undertaken with a view to undoing contradictions 
and fissures, and, furthermore, a means of negotiating in favour of spaces 
of innovation, with more than a nod towards an alternative epistemology.
What the above suggests is this: if a definition, in its Aristotelian 
sense, is “the formula of thing’s essence”, and, subsequently, an essence 
denotative of a closure, creating as it does a fixed meaning of the thing 
defined, a sense of finality and irrevocability, then de-definition may be 
seen as a dis-closure, an empirical open-endedness taking on, in a 
possible exercise, the ideologically73 contaminated biaxial concept of 
Euro/ethnocentrism.
This situation corresponds to a paradigmatic framework existing 
outside the enclosure of essentialism. One criticism of the latter is that it 
implies, in the context of Salafism and trendism, a blind reverence for the
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spirit of literalism, thus underpinning an abiding belief that texts can be 
tied down to the speciously unassailable dominance of an explicit 
monism.
Preoccupation with literalist interpretation manifests itself, in 
effect, as the product of a spirit of emulation. The literal becomes 
foregrounded; and, because of this, emulated texts come to be part of a 
trammelling language of canonicity. Reiterating the distinctions between 
the home-grown and the appropriated, this language thrusts itself to the 
fore, so reducing literature to the pre-fixed and the self-proclaiming.
Another way of seeing how de-definition articulates with 
innovation is to draw attention to the centrality of the notion of creation 
out of nothing (ex nihilo) and to the psychological reality of this notion 
vis-a-vis the making of theory.
In a book entitled Al-Shams wa ’l - ‘anqa’ (“The Sun and the 
Phoenix”) ,74 the present writer has attempted to explore the possibility of 
circumventing a dependent reading of literary texts, on the ground that 
the latter may lead to an effusion of interpretations fast becoming 
contaminated by the fumes of an overheated engine. One aspect of the 
dysfunctionality springing from dependent reading is the interference of 
appropriated ideas, whose relevance has not been established, with the 
workings of a theory of change. It is important to keep in mind that such 
ideas are couched, inexorably, in a tendentiousness privileging the 
nowness rather than the newness in a global system fully exposed to 
Western consumerism.
Avoidance of the consequences of dependent reading is here 
addressed within the possibilities of a process of auto-suggestion. The 
desired effect may be induced through a willing suspension of disbelief 
vis-a-vis an assertive sense of absolutism and infallibility -  a sense
277
produced by the mindlessly exacted criteria of a persistent literalism and 
by repeated reference to origin as a supposed virtue.
One might counter this proposition by reference to Roland Barthes5 
assertion that there exists no “innocent55 reading. However, even if one 
accepts this assertion within a process of inteipretation, this still leaves 
room to avoid the dogmatism of Salafism and the diktat of trendism.
The above discourse is constructed in a metaphorical fashion; it 
draws upon the aura of connotations inherent in the narrative structure of 
the myth of al- ‘anqa \  the imaginary phoenix which, so legend has it, is 
bred in Arabia and exposes its long neck75 to the full force of the sun5s 
rays (the text), until it (the phoenix/critic) burns (itself/himself) out. A 
new phoenix (critic) will then arise from the ashes to attend to a new text.
If this is accepted, then (following on from the foregoing argument) 
the similarity between the two referentialities of a defetishized notion of 
creation (the religious and the secular) can be pressed into immediate 
service, now playing a fundamental role in upholding the critic within the 
focus or foci of his own fiction, as the mubdi\ the innovator, the 
originator, the prime mover.
Reasoning from this analogy, text-reading may be seen as set in a 
less contaminated space, angled towards the examined text not from a 
fixed pre-determinate position but from an indeterminate one.
As a result, the methodological question of finding a critical 
approach relevant to the text under consideration, a point of departure, a 
beginning principle, can come into play unimpeded by the diktat of 
authority contained in the exclusiveness of a definition interchangeable 
with the reductive category of generalization.
The upshot is that reading literary texts via the canonicity of 
dominant critical definitions connoting fixed judgements can, in effect, 
hobble the interpretation of these texts in the light of what they are and
278
what they are not. More specifically, such a dysfunctional reading may 
proceed haltingly in constructing possible unprejudiced, reasonably 
meritorious interpretations, or may even lead, as Zaki Najib Mahmud has 
put it, to a mode of criticism “intent on disparaging a cat for not being a 
tiger”.76
It is admittedly hard to accept that such an experiment can, in 
consequence, create something out of nothing in a literal sense. Yet 
viewing the critic as a critical reader, capable of doing justice to, or 
simply examining, the text’s reality -  like a phoenix burning itself before 
rising from the ashes with renewed presence (to attend to the singularity 
of a new text) -  may be taken, above all, as an attempt to facilitate the 
growth of doubt about mindlessly reproducing and applying an accretion 
of uncritically adopted concepts.
The transition from a phase of de-definition to one of re-definition, 
noted at the start of this section, now assumes full meaning. In a study 
anchored in the central assumption of the primacy of a paradigm of 
innovation, Kamal Abu DIb offers a new model of theory. This model, 
provided in a study entitled Al-Haddthah, al-sultah, al-nass (“Modernity, 
Power, Text”), does not rest on pre-determined precepts; it is rather 
formed out of an endeavour to jettison the misplaced certainty of special 
status accredited to a canonicity that has borne often tumultuous evidence 
of the prejudices present within the modem and the pre-modern.
This is a complex and sophisticated model for modem literary 
theory, one fully aware of the negative consequence of credulously 
accepting the reductive label of “derivative” rather than “relational”; a 
model implicitly capable of detachment from a context of origin.
Having attempted, in the course of an ongoing oppositional crisis 
diagnosis, to reconstruct theory primarily as a postulation of an aesthetics 
of transgression, Abu DIb appears in agreement with Ihab Hasan’s
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celebration, in a parallel context, of a “muse” assigned to the critic, not 
radically different from the poet’s inspiring goddess of indwelling 
creativeness. Such a stance entails emphasis on the primacy of 
“imagination”, the faculty of the mind that “empowers change” and 
makes it possible for “the critic . . . now and then” to “improvise on the 
possible”.78
An analogous argument is offered in Khalil Hawi’s essay 
“Nazariyat al-khalq min ‘adarn” (“Theory of Creation Ex Nihilo”),79 
which deals with the convoluted concept of literary innovation. The 
discourse of this concept bears an ostensive reference -  it points to the 
secularization of the theology-laden thesis of “creation out of nothing”. 
This in turn hints at a possible move in the opposite direction, as 
indicated in the proposition put foiward in Greek philosophy and 
reiterated by Shakespeare: “Nothing comes from nothing.”80
Hawi’s notion of literary creation is thus profoundly antithetical to 
the latter. As a Promethean innovator (he goes on to say) the poet is 
ceaselessly emulating God’s act of creation, so fashioning poetry out of 
beginningless matter; from a void.
9. From genre-bending to genre-making
In moving from a seemingly incontestable definition wrapped in the 
ruling ideology (in its pure state as an instrument of instruction with 
inbuilt authoritarian tendencies) to the indeterminate suggestibility of a 
tentative re-definition (via the negativity underlying a definition that 
entails detailed attention to the question of cultural difference), the model 
theory put foiward here does not claim a closure, but rather offers a mode 
of disclosure: a heuristic method whereby a spiral of presuppositions 
contributing to the labelling of a text may be pressed, so propounding a
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study of works that frequently turns on the question of generic 
classification.
Since genres may be classified in various ways, their descriptive 
(fact-stating) premises and indicative mood may be sustained or shifted in 
application and meaning to a state of non-argumentative prescriptivity. 
But to study prescriptivity, in this sense, means to view the concept from 
a particular perspective: not as an epistemological structure of thought per 
se, but as the manifestation of a misleadingly contained ideology, a 
category relating to or enforcing the applicability of an implicit 
obligation. On the face of it, this lower epistemological profile of 
prescriptive terminology may seem viable, but it is almost certainly 
unsound, because it implies insistence on pre-existing definitions of what 
genres ought to be.
In an indirect response to ideology’s relations of domination, Aijaz 
Ahmad provides an explanation, with a negative ring to it, of what is 
wrong with the so-called “law of the father” which is central to a didactic 
mode of paternalism. For him, to study ideology is to study, among other 
things, the ways in which “the law of the father (you must write this if
* » 91 *you are to be admitted into my theory)” serves to sustain ubiquitous 
relations of domination.
The revolt of modem poetry against conventions of rhyme and 
metre embodies a process of explicit transgression against the law of the 
father, in which emphasis is laid on an aesthetics o f memory. Against this 
conclusion one might point to the stream of “Adunlsian” concepts of the 
1970s and after, where the stress on a possible demise of boundaries 
between literary fomis might be taken as reflecting an attempt not to 
write the new poem only, but to create a strikingly new kind of writing
denotative of a metapoetry, one constructed through and informed by
82extra-literary language. In addition, and far more importantly, many of
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Adunls’s radical concepts have, from that period on, assumed an almost 
“iconic” significance. Such paradigmatic shift is possible because the 
stability attributed to a seemingly well-defined genre has an additional 
implication: that what appears as natural or given suggests, albeit 
obliquely, the presence of a cluster of obligatory notions of 
“authenticity”, whereby the descriptiveness of poetics is persistently 
pushed to the point of manifest prescriptiveness.
Writing in a comparable context, Adorno questions the notion of a 
static sense of “authenticity”, thereby shifting away from the prescriptive 
fixity of a blatant essentialism:
Whatever is authentic in this concept [of poetry] has become so
only under the perspective of something that is different from it.83
Another way of putting this is to argue that, whereas poetry, 
labelled the diwdn al- ‘Arab (“register of the Arabs”), has revolted against 
the biological inevitability inhering in the law of the father 
(euphemistically described by Edward Said as the locus of 
cultural/literary “filiation”), changes occurring, since the seventies, in the 
fictive genres (i.e., the short story and the novel) strongly indicate the 
exploration of a possible re-engagement, within the parameters of factors 
relevant to the present, with the conventions and eccentricities that 
pervade classical Arabic narrative theory. In this latter instance, the “law 
of the father” refers not to biological lineage but to an “imperial” mode of 
socio-cultural patriarchy, functioning as a self-pleading ideology.
The implications of this are far-reaching. To contest the claim that 
modern Arab poetics is not determined by its own rules, new strategies 
are required. The most important need in this respect is to probe the 
possibility of a viable distinction between what is cross-cultural or
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universal in Arabic fiction and what is particular (i.e., indigenous). This 
emerges clearly in Sabri Hafiz’s sociology-anchored study The Genesis o f  
Arabic Narrative Discourse.
Focused on the notions of text, context and discourse as 
rudimentary aspects of fiction most directly analysable in terms of being 
observable structures with socio-cultural dimensions, the study challenges 
the widely held belief that Arabic culture had ground to a halt at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. For Hafiz, the emergence of a new 
public, with its own distinctive home-grown cultural particularism, has 
effectively induced the convoluted processes of inborn genre-making. 
From this perspective a re-assessment of how far modem Arab narrative
R A  •  • •theoiy is indebted to the impact and stimuli of Western poetics becomes 
a viable possibility.
10. From literary criticism to cultural critique
What I should like to underline, in concluding this analysis, is that 
scrutiny of the nature and significance of the paradigmatic shift from 
literary criticism to cultural critique leads us on to the following 
argument: that two equally effective variables of literalism have, in the 
course of careful processes of undoing, been exposed to constant critical 
examination -  and exposed, moreover, in such a way as to lay them to 
rest once and for all. These two variables are: first, the unequivocally 
mimetic reading of the canonical works of the Arabic literary tradition; 
and, second, the avowedly imitationist reading of Eurocentric literature 
and theory, modelled explicitly on the ever-changing ubiquity of cultural 
fashion.
One way of understanding the rationale behind the processes of 
exclusion/inclusion implied in the above is to suggest that the sub- 
paradigmatic strands permeating this ongoing corollary exposition are
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theoretical sources and resources to be drawn upon, and to be viewed, 
also, as illustrating the way theory’s binary opposites -  statics and 
dynamics, innovation and renovation, permanence and change, definition 
and de-defmition, being and becoming, modernism and trendism, 
Salafism and Sufism, obligation and choice, filiation and affiliation, etc. -  
work collectively to construct an ascendant paradigm ready and waiting 
to emerge. This specified paradigm is the framework within which the 
innovation theory under scrutiny may be viewed as emblematic of a 
wheel come full circle.
Such a depiction is, it must be conceded, a rationalization. 
However, its determinative logic tends to presuppose the following 
features, which may be set out along a continuum:
(i) Relatedness. The meaning of innovation theory is viewed, within 
this presentation, as residing in the complex relations (connections, 
comparisons or associations) operating within a network of sub- 
paradigmatic strands; strands contributing to a break whereby the 
old paradigm is replaced by a new one. This model of theory, 
providing the critical tool for analysing an interlocking nexus of 
lurking logical connections, predicates the concept of literary 
criticism as heuristically relational (ergo anti-essential and 
transcultural). Cultural differences may, in effect, be viewed as the 
outcome of differential relations rather than essentialist quality.
(ii) Contextualism. The notion of context is seen here as a useful means 
of stressing the set of situations within which innovation theory is 
actually propounded. Context is both temporal and cultural. As the 
function of a system of relevance, the context provides the critical 
tool for questioning the hegemony of canonical texts in the light of
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the concerns of the present. It also provides a cultural point of 
reference according to which the processes of separating the 
domains of “modernism” and “trendism” become possible.
(iii) Interdisciplinarity. Innovation theory has brought into focus modes 
of representation that take into account considerations from such 
diverse disciplines and concepts as logic, philosophy, sociology, 
psychology, linguistics, epistemology, ideology, mythology, 
axiology, aesthetics, history and historiography. This view of a 
possible articulation accommodating a plurality of disciplines and 
concepts has specific reference to the convoluted nature of the term 
interdisciplinarity. And what the latter appears to suggest, in a 
broad sense, is the possibility of transcending literary criticism as 
restrictively perceived. It also seems to suggest, within the 
“framework” or context of cultural semantics, a transition from the 
claims for homogeneity often associated with literary criticism to 
the heterogeneity and hybridity of a self-avowedly “impure” 
cultural critique. It can be argued, of course, that these two terms 
are not qualitatively identical. It should be stressed, nonetheless, 
that they tend to share an emphasis on the centrality of “identity” 
and its persistent complexity -  which implies that they are two 
tokens of one type. Their relationship is thus partially symmetric if 
not wholly commutative. Another way of putting this is to say that 
the passage from literary criticism to cultural critique is actually 
less a passage than a “conceptual slippage”, indicative of a smooth 
gliding movement between two interrelated disciplines.
1 For a checklist of competing terms referring to the concept of “newness” in poetry, 
see the Glossary of Terms in Moreh, op. cit., pp. 323-4.
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Now superseded by al-shi cr al-hadith (“modem poetry”), a term suggesting 
the relationship and relatedness of theory and the emergent paradigm of al- 
hadathiyyah (“modernism”), such redundant terms as al-shi 'r al-jadld (“new poetry”), 
al-shi‘r al-mahmus (“whispered poetry”) and al-shi'r al-muntaliq (“unrestrained 
poetry”) seem pointedly to signify the action o f an adjective comprising an attribute in 
conjunction with a noun, rather than designating, in the Aristotelian sense, “the 
formula of thing’s essence”. What the foregoing terminology suggests is thus a self-
referential specificity, one acknowledging the laws o f an ephemeral necessity.
2 *See the Postscript in T.S. Kuhn, The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions, Chicago:
University o f Chicago Press, 3rd ed., 1996, pp. 174-210.
As indicated in the course o f this study, Kuhn is invoked in literary contexts in 
connection with the term “paradigm”. The link might, however, bear further 
explanation. The term was, we are told, “borrowed” by Kuhn himself “from 
linguistics and prosody”. See The John Hopldns Guide to Literaiy Theoty and 
Criticism, p. 447.
3 Among the literary and cultural magazines and reviews employed by the “elite” as 
platforms for advancing the cause o f modernity/modernism, the following may be 
instanced:
In Beirut, a thriving centre for intellectual activity, Suhail IdrTs founded Al- 
Addh (“Literatures”) in 1953; Yusuf al-Khal founded Shi 'r (“Poetry”) (1957-69); and 
Mawdqif (“Stands”) was founded by Adunls in 1968. For an overview of the literary 
press in the Arab world as a whole, see, for example, Encyclopedia o f  Arabic 
Literature, vol. 2, pp. 611-13. For Egypt see ‘Ali Shalash, Ittijahat aTadab wa 
ma'arikuh f i  ’l-majalldt al-adabiyyah f t  Misr (1939-1952) (“Literary Trends and 
Encounters in Egyptian Literary Magazines (1939-1952)”), Cairo: A l-Hafa al- 
‘Ammah lil-Kitab, 1991.
4 Neopatriarchy, p. 11.
5 For a definitive critique stressing the view that the past should be understood not in 
its own terms but rather in terms of changes induced in consciousness by the present, 
see Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldun. See also Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, in 
which the author explores the relevance to modem criticism o f the Zahiri theory of 
eleventh-century Andalusia, viewed as central to the unfamiliar field of medieval
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Arabic linguistics -  the relevance lying, he argues (albeit obliquely), in the way it has 
stood the test of time and remained pertinent in terms of the present.
In similar vein Said treats Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), author of The New 
Science, as a critic whose ideas have had a significant and demonstrable bearing on 
modern criticism. The ideas in question, proposing a systematic framework for a 
philosophy of history, had an outstanding forerunner in the person o f Ibn Khaldun 
(1332-1406), who much earlier placed history among the social sciences — though 
Franz Rosenthal, the translator of Al-Muqaddimah into English, has argued, on the 
basis of straightforward and self-evident probability, that Vico could hardly have been 
acquainted with Ibn Khaldun. See Grace E. Cairns, Philosophies o f  History: Meeting 
o f East and West in Cycle-Pattern Theories o f  History, New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1962, p. 336.
6 M. al-Tahanawi, Kitdb hashshaf istilahdt al-funun (“Dictionary of Technical 
Terms”), Bibliotheca Indica, Collection of Oriental Works, Asiatic Society of Bengal, 
1862, part 2, p. 1386 (offset print, Istanbul, 1984).
7 Ibid.
8 *That is, hypothetical, assumed to function as a heuristic-methodological stimulus.
9 Al-Azmeh, Ibn Khaldun, p. 6. For a similar account of the difference between a 
scientific problem and a social problem, set out in modem sociological parlance, 
consider the following passage:
A scientific problem is one that is defined by systematic theory and the 
relevant empirical data. A social problem is any condition o f either the social 
structure or cultural structure of a social system that is defined by some group .
See Bernard Barber, Intellectual Pursuits: Toward an Understanding o f  Culture, New 
York-Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, p. 80.
10 Al-Azmeh, ibid., pp. 6-7.
11 See Adunis, Kaldm al-bidaydt (“Textual Beginnings”), p. 210.
12 That is, referring to things in the world, heterological.
13 In a postmodern sense, a self-referential text may be described as homological, 
revealing a reflexive fictive mode; a text turning away from the mimetic function of 
the Realism (with or without a capital “r”) of the nineteenth-century novel.
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14 M. Miftah, Tahiti al-khitab al-shi 'ri: istrdtijiyat al-tanass (“Analysis o f Poetic 
Discourse: The Strategy of Intertextuality”), Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqafi al- 
‘Arabi, 2nd ed., 1986, p. 7.
15 In this connection see Said’s discussion of “secular criticism” in The World, the 
Text and the Critic, pp. 1-30.
16 This dismissal of the fixedness of conventional structuralism may be viewed in 
terms o f Derrida’s abjuration of structure as a static notion: “What is suppressed by 
this static conceptualization is the ‘force’ or animating pressure of intent which 
exceeds all the bounds of structure.” See Christopher Norris, Deconstruction: Theory 
and Practice, London-New York: Methuen, 1982, p. 51.
17 What interpretation suggests here, among other things, is that the textuality of the 
proposed model is full of gaps which the reader fills in. This notion of interpretation 
has been resolutely taken up by numerous modernists, such as Jaber ‘Asfur, who sees 
reading not only as a critical tool for analysis but as a theory of construction 
conceived in terms o f receiving, perceiving and understanding. See Jaber ‘Asfur, 
Qird’at al-turdth al-naqdi (“Reading the Critical Heritage”), Cairo: Dar Su‘ad al- 
Sabbah, 1992, pp. 11-16.
18 In other words, singularity o f explanation functions as a monistic monolith, 
reflecting a purported ruling ideology.
19 On Identity, p. 20.
9 0 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 90.
21 That is, a discourse of finality, a closing-off of possibilities.
22 Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, p. 3.
23 Ibid,, p. 4.
24 Ibid.
25 M.M. Bakhtin, in Michael Holquist (ed.), The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 
trans. Emerson Caryle and Michael Holquist, Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1981, 
p. 427.
9 A________ _Sharabi, Patriarchy, p. 24. “Fetishized modernism”, a category viewed by Sharabi 
as determining a neopatriarchal outlook and practice, is conceptually commutative 
with “trendism”.
An early, extreme illustration of fetishized modernism viewed as a destructive 
force may be found in a poem published in the 1940s by Bairam At-Tunisie. The
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poem describes, in strikingly vitriolic fashion, the negative impact o f a permeating 
trendism as perpetrated by Azrael, the angel o f death in Islamic tradition:
Count Azrael came to me from Europe in a trance 
His English nails were leonine and scalloped 
From his French dental-plate a thousand elephants 
Dived in an Austrian tunnel when he swallowed.
He wore the black shirt o f a Roman politician 
Beside him was a scythe o f German brand 
He dipped into a pouch of Spanish ammunition 
He had a Greek stiletto in his hand.
He stopped the traffic with Hungarian bravado 
He steered towards a pit o f Belgian slack 
And staring through a pair of lenses ground at Oslo 
He wondered when the robot world would crack.
I crossed myself, he made a motion in Bulgarian 
I spoke, he spoke to me in Portuguese 
I waved my hand, he waved goodbye in High Bavarian 
I woke, and rummaged for my fleas.
See Herbert Howarth and Ibrahim Shukrallah, Images from  the Arab World 
(Fragments of Arab literature translated and paraphrased with variations and 
comments), London: Gazelle, 1977, p. 39.
27 Sharabi, ibid. Sharabi cites “modem Arabic poetry” as an example. This value 
judgement of modem poetry is, o f course, as unqualified and unquantified a statement 
as a sweeping generalization.
28 As has been clearly argued throughout this text, the objection to fashion-induced 
trendism rests upon a position whereby the category of “emulation” is employed as 
preconditional to viability. At the heart of this category lies a network of power 
relations exemplified by a ubiquitous Eurocentric reasoning which views “difference”
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as wholly unnatural. Hence the dominant accounting procedure leading to trendism 
seeks, constantly, to accentuate a “singular” modernism via a highlighting of 
“filiative” connections with the canonical criteria posited in terms o f an imitated 
origin.
Implicit in this issue of power relations is the suggestion that a trendist will 
hanker after an unqualified identification with a replicated model, thus affirming a 
wholesale mode o f “sameness” while negating “difference”: a state premised on 
complete absence of absences.
For a particularly relevant example of a “trendist” approach to modem 
criticism, one underlining a conscious process whereby European cultural 
assumptions are adopted uncritically, see Yusuf Hamad Jaber , Al-Bunyawiyyah fi 7- 
naqd a l-‘Arabi al-mu'asir (“Structuralism in Contemporary Arabic Criticism”), 
Riyadh: Kitab al-Riyadh, 2004.
29 See Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory, London-New York: Verso, 1994, pp. 73-122.
30 Ibid.
31 Beginnings, p. 318.
32 Al-Azmeh, Is lams and Modernities, p. 6.
33 Ibid.
The reference is to the author o f the controversial novel The Satanic Verses. 
Obviously the teim “Islamic literature” is being used by Rushdie in a sense different 
from that employed for discussion in the present study.
■7 C
Al-Azmeh, Is lams and Modernities, p. 8.
36 The tenn “monism” is used here as the antonym of “pluralism”.
37 This nostalgic trajectory springs from a sentimental yearning for a paradigm that 
will affirm an imaginary “sacred” past while negating an ongoing “profane” present.
38 The concept o f “Arab mind” is postulated here as central to an epistemological 
framework; it is seen not as an essence but as a function mirroring the model-building 
processes within Islamo-Arabic culture.
39 Islamic philosophers were imbued, in a greater or lesser degree, with either 
Aristotelianism or Neoplatonism -  in many cases with both. Al-Kindi, the father of 
Islamic philosophy, has a Neoplatonic aspect, but the doctrine attains its intellectual 
fruition in the complex emanationist hierarchies developed by al-Farabi and Ibn STna. 
Their views were in turn developed (or metamorphosed) by subsequent thinkers into
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an emanative hierarchy of lights: witness, for instance, the thought o f Shihab al-DIn 
al-Suhrawardi, or the doctrine of the Unity o f Being espoused by Ibn ‘Arabi. See the 
section on Neoplatonism in Islamic Philosophy in the Routledge Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 625.
40 See M.A. Jabiri, “Bunyat al-‘aql al-‘Arabi” (“The Structure of the Arab Mind”), in 
Naqd a l-‘aql al- ‘Arabi (“Critique of the Arab Mind”), vols. 1, 2, Beirut: Markaz 
Dirasat al-Wihda al-‘Arabiyyah, 1985, 1986.
41 This is simply a shorthand way (following John Dewey) of referring to ideas, 
concepts and judgements as instruments operating through experienced situations.
42 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 89.
43 The word is used here in a Saidian sense. See “secular criticism” in The World, the 
Text and the Critic, pp. 1-30.
44 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 80.
45 Beginnings, p. 81. On the basis of his perceived view of Islam’s outlook on the 
world, Said concludes that “stories like those in the Arabian Nights are ornamental, 
variations on the world, not completions o f it . . .  ” It is hard to see how one can 
escape, let alone justify, the negative consequence of this value judgement of a 
masterpiece of narratology like the Arabian Nights. Said’s attempt to explain this 
powerhouse of fiction in terms of a theology-induced etymology appears pointless at 
the very least. Quite apart from anything else, it does not help us differentiate between 
the two opposing visions o f literature and theology.
46 Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 76.
47 Ibid.
48 The World, the Text and the Critic, p. 53.
49 Al-Tahanawi, op. cit., p. 89.
50 Eco, op. cit., p. 24.
51 ‘Asfur, op. cit.
52 In his study of statics and dynamics in Arabic culture, AdunTs describes his 
projected inquiry as a “phenomenological history”. The reason for this is not far to 
seek. Adunls spells out in advance an insistent emphasis on the investigation of 
cultural phenomena as an ongoing process involving “bracketing o ff5 or withholding 
judgements about the material base of Arabic culture: that is, making no assumptions
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about the social structure o f cultural phenomena. See Al-Thabit wa ’l-mutahawwil, I, 
24.
53 The limits of the proposed change are very frequently suggested by the claim that 
society is a “text” that can (following Derrida) be deconstructed so as to reveal its 
embedded meanings.
54 K. SaTd, “Al-Malamih al-fikriyah lil-hadathah” (“The Intellectual Attributes of 
Modernity”), in the literary critical journal Fusul (Cairo), vol. IV, No. 3, April-May- 
June, 1984, p. 27.
55 For a useful discussion of Sufi universalism viewed from a modem standpoint, see, 
for instance, Herbert W. Mason’s comments on the “problem of universalism” in Al- 
Hallaj, London: Curzon Press, 1995, pp. 53-62. See also Clarke, op. cit., p. 136.
56 See J.E. Cirlot, A Dictionary o f Symbols (trans. from Spanish by Jack Sage), 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981, p. 31. This summary o f Ibn ‘Arabi’s 
doctrine demonstrates an early attempt to view the world as text and the text as world.
57 See Eco, op. cit., p. 23.
C Q   ^
Adums, Al-Kitab: ams, al-makan, a l-’an (“The Book: Past, Place, Present”), 
London: Dar al-Saqi, 1995. The concept of the “book”, as propounded by Guenon, 
relates to the “symbolism of weaving”.
59 See AdunTs, Al-Sufiyyah wa ’l-surydliyyah. In this book Adums argues that 
Rimbaud was an oriental Sufi in an occidental context. AdunTs employs this 
seemingly oxymoronic conclusion to question the notion of “the authentic” central to 
the concept of literary canon.
For Deleuze and Guattari, Rimbaud said it all in this connection. In his A 
Season in Hell (trans. Louise Varese, Norfolk, Conn.: New Directions, 1952, pp. 9, 
13), the poet gives voice to the following standpoint on race:
I have always been of an inferior race . .  .
I am of an inferior race for all eternity . . .
There I am on the Briton shore . . .
I am a beast, a nigger . . .
I am of a distant race:
My ancestors were Norsemen . . .
See G. Deleuze, F. Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi, London- 
New York: Continuum, 2004, p. 419.
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London: Allen and Unwin, 1964, p. 267.
63 Said, The World, the Text and the Critic, p. 36.
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Abu DTb, Al-Jurjdni ’s Theoiy, p. 1.
66 A. Khattbi, Al-Naqd al-muzdawij (“Double Critique”), trans. Muhammad BennTs, 
Beirut, 1980, p. 9. Quoted in Sharabi, Neopatriarchy, pp. 114, 115.
67 See AdunTs, Madarat, in Al-Haydt daily (London), 13 November 1997, issue No. 
12,676.
68 Hisham Sharabi, Al-Muthaqqafun al-'Arab wa I-gharb: ‘asr al-nahdah (“Arab 
Intellectuals and the West: the Age of Nahdah”), Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 1971, p. 11.
69 AdunTs, Introduction to Arab Poetics, p. 85.
70 See Zolla Elemire, Archetypes, London: Allen and Unwin, 1981, pp. 62, 63, 64, 65.
71 AdunTs, Qasa ’id ’ula (“First Poems”), Al-Athar al-kamilah, p. 512.
72 *See Peter T. Mamcas, Logic as Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology, New York- 
London: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971, p. 276.
73 That is, functioning within the context of a prescriptive discourse.
74 Khaldoun al-Shamaa, Al-Shams wa ’l - ‘anqd’ (“The Sun and the Phoenix”), 
Damascus: Manshurat Ittihad al-Kuttab al-‘Arab, 1974.
75 Etymologically the word ‘anqd ’ refers to a long-necked creature, the “phoenix”.
76 See Mahmud, Ma (a al-shu 'ard p. 87.
77 Kamal Abu DTb, “Al-Hadathah, al-suhah, al-nass”, Fusul, op. c i t , pp. 34-63.
78 Ihab Hasan, Paracriticisms, Urbana-Chicago-London: University of Illinois Press, 
1975, p. 3.
79 Khalil Hawi, “Nazariyat al-khalq min ‘adam” (“Theory o f Creation Ex Nihilo”), in 
Tahawwuldt (Beirut), Summer, No. 1, 1983, pp. 142-53.
80 Ibid., p. 152.
81 Aijaz Ahmad, Jameson’s Rhetoric o f  Otherness and the “National Allegory ”, in 
Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, Key Concepts in Post-Colonial 
Studies, London-New York: Routledge, 1995, pp. 77-82.
82 AdunTs5s Al-Kitdb might be suggested as an example.
293
o - j
Theodore W. Adomo, The Jargon o f  Authenticity, trans. Knut Tranowski and 
Frederic Will, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.
84 For a counter to Sabri Hafiz’s thesis, emphasizing the influence o f European fiction, 
see ‘ Ali Shalash, Nash ’at al-naqd al-ruwd ’i f i  'l-adab al- Arabi al-hadith (“The Birth 
of Modem Arabic Novelistic Literature”), Cairo: Maktabat GharTb, 1995.
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Coda: Theory and Difference:
Auguste Comte / Taha Husain / AdunTs
It has been the central argument of this thesis that innovationism, as 
distinct from renovationism and trendism, establishes the “difference” 
whereby innovation modernism becomes a paradigmatic entity, evolving 
through its own autonomous processes of internal dynamics.
The emphasis here is on the way “difference” establishes its own 
distinctive mode of autonomy vis-a-vis Western theory. However, the 
link between the two constructs is conceived not as static but as dialectic, 
not as derivative but as relational. This should not be understood as a 
denial of reality, but rather as a recognition that Arabic theory is to be 
conceived, as theory, in its own terms. Relatedness must not be confused 
with derivativeness.
Having contested the notion of Eurocentric truth as absolute 
answerability, and having realized that the model theory constructed 
throughout must be answerable to no poetics but its own, it is clear that 
such a theory must be viewed as pointedly differential. A model theory is 
said to be differential when the elements and factors it brings into play 
organize, and are organized by, its respective system of relevance. The 
system appears when we examine, critically, the complex relation of the 
following citations, each of which is referring to the distinction between 
social “statics” and social “dynamics” as central to a theory of historical 
change. This allows passage from one discipline to another, and permits 
us to view the workings of transformational conceptual slippages.
It was Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology, who introduced 
what he termed social physics, dividing the discipline into two branches: 
statics and dynamics. While social “statics” represented the endeavour to
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defend the status quo, social “dynamics” endeavoured to arrive at the 
laws of historical change.
The term was borrowed by Comte from the physical sciences, but 
its connotation has altered since.1 This change has entailed, specifically, 
processes of conceptual slippage whereby the movement from social 
statics (al-thabit) to social dynamics (al-mutahawwil) can be viewed 
within a new context: not as a replicated “origin” but as, in a Saidian 
sense, the celebration of a new “beginning”.
Writing in 1952, amid an era of cultural advancement, Taha Husain 
draws on Comte’s term for change. Arabic literature, he explains,
not unlike other literatures or social phenomena, is composed of 
two elements called by Auguste Comte: statics and dynamics. A 
state of balance (equilibrium) between the opposing forces (of past 
and present) marks our literature as distinct from other literatures.2
AdunTs’s employment of Comte’s terminology in his The Static 
and Dynamic: A Study in Conformity and Creativity among the Arabs 
provides a more radical movement towards a possible theory of cultural 
change.
1 See Mitchell, op. cit., and Audi, op. cit.
2 Husain, Alwan, p. 17.
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